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This thesis explores two key measures of economic wellbeing - economic 
insecurity and income inequality. Chapters 2 and 3 present an Economic Security Index 
(ESI) for New Zealand, a new measure of economic wellbeing. An ESI is a measure of 
economic insecurity that identifies which subgroups of the population are susceptible to 
financial loss due to events such as an unanticipated rise in medical expenses or a fall in 
income. An ESI also measures if these subgroups have sufficient financial resources to act 
as a buffer when economic shocks occur. The main index is constructed in Chapter 2 using 
micro-level data from New Zealand’s Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) and 
Household Economic Survey (HES). An alternative index is constructed in Chapter 3 using 
longitudinal data from the Survey of Family, Income and Employment (SoFIE) to test the 
robustness of the main index’s findings. After controlling for various demographic and 
socioeconomic factors, the findings of both versions of the ESI predict similar patterns. 
The main findings suggest that economic insecurity is highly cyclical, tracking closely to 
GDP growth and the unemployment rate. This result suggests that insecurity in New 
Zealand is largely an involuntary phenomenon. It is also observed that insecurity varies 
by subgroups of the population. Groups that are more likely to experience economic 
insecurity are ethnic minorities, young adults, people with no educational qualifications, 
single-adult households, persons whose relationships ended over the ESI year, high-
income households and persons on temporary employment contracts. 
In Chapter 4, both versions of the ESI and longitudinal health data from SoFIE are 
used to estimate the causal impact of economic insecurity on the mental wellbeing of New 
Zealanders. The study uses fixed effects models to test the hypothesis that being 
economically insecure increases the likelihood of poor mental wellbeing. To proxy for 
mental wellbeing, I use each respondent’s Kessler-10 (K10) score as well as the Short 
Form 36 (SF-36) health survey, two common indicators of mental disorders. For the SF-
36 health survey, both the Mental and Physical Component Summary (MCS and PCS) 
Measures are used. To proxy for insecurity, the exogenously assigned ESI values from 
HLFS (‘predicted economic insecurity’) are used, as well as ESI values from SoFIE 
(representing ‘lived insecurity event’, such as if an individual loses their job or gets 
divorced). Consistent with the literature on this topic, the results suggest that both 
measures of insecurity lead to worse mental wellbeing; however, the results are not 
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statistically significant. Further, the analysis produced mixed results when looking at the 
relationship between insecurity and physical health. Experiencing a ‘lived insecurity 
event’ is found to improve physical wellbeing, albeit the results are not statistically 
significant. ‘Predicted economic insecurity’ is found to have a strong, statistically 
significant negative relationship with each respondent’s standardised PCS scores, which 
suggests that insecurity worsens physical wellbeing. These associations remain after 
adjusting for several demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.  
In Chapter 5, the theme shifts to income inequality. This chapter uses ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression analysis to determine the deep determinants of income 
inequality, a topic that has received very little attention in the literature. Specifically, the 
study explores whether the deep determinants of comparative development - which 
explains differences across countries - are also important in explaining within-country 
income inequality. The three main hypotheses that explain comparative development are 
the geography, institutions and genetics/fractionalization hypotheses. The results of the 
preferred model show that there are some elements from each of the three hypotheses 
that contribute to explaining within-country income inequality. Whether a country is 
landlocked or not, distance from the technological frontier, birthplace diversity and the 
time that has elapsed since the Neolithic Revolution are all found to be deep determinants 
of income inequality. The results also show that the deep determinants of income 
inequality vary depending on a country’s level of economic development. Explanations 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Most modern-day societies strive to improve the wellbeing of their citizens. 
Navigating the ways to bring about sustainable wellbeing is at the forefront of policy 
agendas of most governments. Although what is considered wellbeing has changed 
throughout history, and varies across countries, within countries and even by individuals, 
there is one key element that arguably underpins wellbeing in almost every society - 
economic wellbeing. There is no agreed-upon definition of economic wellbeing, but it is 
understood as a state of financial contentment in which one has command over one’s 
resources, both at present and in the future (Council on Social Work Education, 2020; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2013, p. S6). When good 
economic wellbeing exists, societies tend to be prosperous and work together for the 
greater good for all their citizens. 
At the heart of the wellbeing debate are the measures that capture economic 
wellbeing. There are a number of measures that have become commonplace, including 
GDP per capita, income inequality, unemployment and poverty. Each measure has its 
proven advantages and disadvantages, and the choice of measure depends on the reason 
for its use. In this thesis, I explore two important measures of economic wellbeing, 
economic insecurity and income inequality. Both measures are related, but have key 
differences that distinguish them from each other. In broad terms, economic insecurity 
deals with financial uncertainty and how ‘at-risk’ population groups are to economic 
shocks; while income inequality focuses on income disparity and is largely concerned 
with the level of fairness within societies. My main aim is to use these two measures to 
unearth the possible causes of poor wellbeing, estimate the proportion of populations 
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most affected and recommend policy options to help promote greater economic 
wellbeing. 
Economic wellbeing is an important consideration in the wellbeing debate 
because, in addition to satisfying people’s basic needs, it has flow-on effects to wellbeing 
in many other aspects of life, including mental health, physical health, social participation 
in society, education and food security (for example, Bradshaw, 2002; Crespo & Ferreira, 
2009; Marmot, 2002; Raffo et al., 2007; Sturm & Gresenz, 2002). Such elements, as well 
as countless others, work together to develop an “economy of well-being”, where 
societies strive to establish and sustain a “virtuous circle”, in which “individual well-being 
and long-term economic growth are mutually reinforcing” (Llena-Nozal et al., 2019, p. 4). 
1.2. Thesis Contributions 
This thesis presents three main studies that fill three major gaps in the literature. 
Firstly, I make a unique contribution to the literature by constructing an Economic 
Security Index (ESI) for New Zealand, a new measure of wellbeing. An ESI estimates each 
household’s probability of experiencing large unbuffered income loss. The ESI for New 
Zealand is based on the ESI for the United States presented by Hacker et al. (2014), with 
a few changes to the methodology to account for New Zealand’s unique economy. 
The main contributing factors to the ESI are income volatility, out-of-pocket 
medical expenditures, debt servicing, housing costs and household wealth in the form of 
liquid financial assets. The ESI supersedes simpler measures of income volatility 
previously developed for New Zealand. These volatility measures account for the 
variance in income or expenditure from one year to the next, but do not account for the 
buffering capacity of individuals or households, an important indicator of financial 
resilience (for example, Carter & Gunasekara, 2012; Carter et al., 2014; Moore, 2017). 
Two versions of the ESI are constructed in this thesis using different population surveys 
to test the robustness and the representativeness of the results. 
Economic insecurity is important as it is a phenomenon that affects individuals 
from all demographic and socioeconomic backgrounds. Moreover, as opposed to some 
macroeconomic wellbeing indicators that focus on aggregate wellbeing, insecurity 
measures also focus on the individual or household experience. This makes it easier for 
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policymakers to target subgroups of the population that are vulnerable to large 
unbuffered income loss. The concept of insecurity is also highly pertinent to the ongoing 
COVID-19 pandemic, making it a popular topic of discussion in recent times. As a result, 
there has been much speculation and attempts at estimating economic insecurity 
reported by the New Zealand media in response to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.1 
However, the ESI constructed for this thesis is the first objective economic insecurity 
index for New Zealand. 
The ESI is also a useful tool to explore the social ills that are likely related to 
economic insecurity, such as mental health issues, crime and food insecurity. In this 
regard, the index constructed in this study contributes to a follow-up study which 
examines the relationship between financial uncertainty and mental wellbeing, a topic 
that has not yet been explored in New Zealand. The is the second major contribution in 
this thesis.  
New Zealand’s ESI answers the following questions: (1) Has the level of economic 
insecurity changed over time? (2) What is the extent of economic insecurity across 
regions in New Zealand? (3) Are certain demographic groups more susceptible to losses 
from economic shocks? (4) Is insecurity related to the business cycle? and (5) Does 
economic insecurity predict health outcomes? Because of the nature of the study and its 
relevance to issues affecting New Zealand’s economic, social, cultural and health systems, 
another aim is to communicate the findings of this project to policymakers so that they 
can evaluate whether any policy changes, such as welfare or tax reforms, are necessary 
based on the results. 
The third major contribution is an exploration of the deep determinants of income 
inequality. There has been a lot of work done in the deep determinants literature that has 
focused primarily on comparative development and provides explanations for cross-
country variation in incomes. However, studies examining the deep determinants of 
within-country income inequality have been sparse. The studies that focus on within-
country inequality so far, have primarily included a deep determinants of inequality 
analysis as a minor supplement to comparative development studies.  
 
1 See online newspaper articles reported by Andelane (2020) and Stock (2020), and a press release by the 
Commission for Financial Capability (2020) as examples. 
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There are three main competing deep determinants hypotheses in the 
comparative development literature – the geography hypothesis, the institutions 
hypothesis and the genetics/fractionalization hypothesis. My contribution to this strand 
of the literature focuses on all three hypotheses to carry out a comprehensive study on 
the deep determinants of income inequality. I hypothesise that the deep determinants of 
comparative development are important in explaining income inequality. This study is 
strongly based in history to uncover the inherent characteristics of countries that may be 
related to current income inequality levels. This study also shows how these inherent 
historical characteristics are related to a country’s current institutional makeup and how 
this relationship affects a country’s wellbeing. Further, I use the findings to recommend 
policy changes that could help lessen within-country disparities in income, if this is a 
desirable outcome. 
1.3. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 present two versions of the 
ESI for New Zealand using different population surveys. Chapter 4 uses the ESIs 
constructed in Chapters 2 and 3 to explore the causal relationship between economic 
insecurity and mental wellbeing. Chapter 5 examines the deep determinants of income 




Chapter 2  
An Economic Security Index (ESI) 





The results in this chapter are not official statistics. They have been created for research 
purposes from the Integrated Data infrastructure managed by Statistics New Zealand.  
 
The opinions, findings, recommendations, and conclusions expressed in this chapter are 
those of the author(s), not Statistics NZ. 
 
Access to the anonymised data used in this study was provided by Statistics NZ under the 
security and confidentiality provisions of the Statistics Act 1975. Only people authorised 
by the Statistics Act 1975 are allowed to see data about a particular person, household, 
business, or organisation, and the results in this paper have been confidentialised to 
protect these groups from identification and to keep their data safe.  
 
Careful consideration has been given to the privacy, security, and confidentiality issues 
associated with using administrative and survey data in the IDI. Further detail can be 






Economic insecurity has become increasingly important as a measure of economic 
wellbeing. Although no commonly accepted definition of economic insecurity exists in the 
literature, the term is strongly related to the concepts of risk perception and loss aversion 
(Hacker et al., 2014). Economic insecurity is also grounded in the belief that uncertainty 
about future economic prospects tends to leave people worse off. This comes from the 
fear and anxiety that households or individuals may be incapable of overcoming 
hardship-forming economic losses in the future (Bossert & D'Ambrosio, 2013; 
D'Ambrosio & Rohde, 2014; Hacker et al., 2010; Hacker et al., 2014; Osberg & Sharpe, 
2002, 2005; Rohde & Tang, 2018; Rohde et al., 2020; Rohde et al., 2015; Romaguera‐de‐
la‐Cruz, 2019). Insecurity measures focus on how exposed different groups in society are 
to economic or social risk, which differentiates it from inequality measures which focus 
on the distribution of income or wealth and highlight the disparity between different 
groups of people. 
A main feature that makes insecurity an important measure to include in New 
Zealand’s wellbeing debate is that unlike inequality (and poverty) indicators, which 
primarily focus on static levels of income measured at a single point in time, insecurity 
accounts for the variation in income levels over time, making it a dynamic measure. The 
fallout of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, as well as 
economic shocks caused by events such as natural disasters, have ignited interest in 
insecurity in recent years as academics, policymakers and other researchers aim to 
estimate how ‘at-risk’ different subgroups of the population are to ever-changing 
economic and social circumstances. Insecurity also has implications for a broad spectrum 
of the population. It affects all socioeconomic groups, not only those living beneath the 
low-income threshold, but also high- and middle-income groups (Hacker, 2019; Ranci et 
al., 2017).2 As a result, most governments of the developed world have become focused 
on the degree to which individuals who experience income losses are protected from 
economic hardship. This is because groups that are vulnerable to economic insecurity 
 
2 The established low-income threshold in New Zealand is 60 percent of the median household disposable 
income, after housing costs (Statistics New Zealand, 2016a). 
 
 7 
could potentially experience a range of social ills. These social ills could include poor 
physical health outcomes and poor self-rated health (Cheng et al., 2005; Muenster et al., 
2011; Offer et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2007; Wisman & Capehart, 2010), 
low subjective well-being (Luechinger et al., 2010), poor mental health outcomes 
(including psychological distress and non-specific psychological illnesses) (Benach et al., 
2014; Hellgren et al., 1999; Menéndez-Espina et al., 2019; Rohde et al., 2016; Watson & 
Osberg, 2017), bad housing (Deloitte & Victoria University of Wellington, 2017) and food 
insecurity (Alaimo, 2005; Carter et al., 2011; Parnell et al., 2001; Rose, 1999; Stuff et al., 
2004). Moreover, evidence suggests that insecure individuals tend to become myopic and 
are less likely to plan for the future if they are uncertain about it (Hacker, 2019). 
Therefore, knowing the subgroups of the population that are especially susceptible to 
income losses from economic shocks can help guide policymakers in their initiatives to 
assist households that are more likely to experience economic insecurity. 
The multifaceted nature of insecurity makes its measurement a complicated task 
that usually consists of combining many different important elements. For this reason, 
there is no agreed-upon measure of insecurity in the literature. Several ways of 
measuring insecurity exist (Hacker et al., 2014; Lusardi et al., 2011; Osberg & Sharpe, 
2005; Romaguera‐de‐la‐Cruz, 2019), and each method captures different elements and, 
in some cases, they build on each other. In this study, I construct an Economic Security 
Index (ESI) for New Zealand modelled after the ESI for the United States, which was 
conceptualized and constructed by Jacob S. Hacker (Yale University), Gregory A. Huber 
(Yale University), Austin Nichols (The Urban Institute), Phillip Rehm (Ohio State 
University), Mark Schlesinger (Yale University), Rob Valletta (San Francisco Federal 
Reserve Bank) and Stuart Craig (Yale University). It was published in a 2014 paper in The 
Review of Income and Wealth titled, “The Economic Security Index: A New Measure for 
Research and Policy Analysis” (Hacker et al., 2014). An ESI is a measure of economic 
insecurity that identifies which subgroups of a population are most susceptible to 
financial loss due to unexpected income shocks, such as a fall in income or unforeseen 
household or medical expenses. An ESI also measures whether these groups have 
sufficient financial resources to act as a buffer in the event of economic shocks. Such an 




The New Zealand ESI uses micro-level data on individuals and households 
spanning from 1999 to 2019 (~20 years) and is intended to show how household 
economic wellbeing has changed over time.3 Measurement at the individual or household 
level can help determine the distributional characteristics of insecurity which could have 
important policy implications. My technique also extends the current methodology used 
in Hacker et al. (2014) to match New Zealand’s unique datasets and economic 
environment. The ESI is also used to examine the marginal effect of being insecure based 
on different demographic characteristics to determine the possible drivers of income 
losses. 
After controlling for various demographic and socioeconomic factors, the main 
findings from the index show that economic insecurity in New Zealand closely followed 
the business cycle over the past two decades, all else held constant. New Zealand’s main 
urban centres, Auckland and Wellington, are found to be the most economically secure 
regions over the period of study, whilst Manawatu-Wanganui is the most insecure region. 
Population subgroups are also found to have variations in insecurity levels. The results 
suggest that ethnic minorities, young adults, people with no educational qualifications, 
single-adult households, persons whose relationships ended over the ESI year, high-
income households and persons on temporary employment contracts are more likely to 
experience insecurity. Policy interventions are recommended to assist the groups that 
are most susceptible to income shocks. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 gives a review of the 
pertinent literature. Section 2.3 looks at the design and construction of the ESI with 
special considerations for the New Zealand economy. Section 2.4 discusses the data used 
for this study. Section 2.5 presents the descriptive findings of the index and discussion. 
Section 2.6 concludes with a summary of the findings, discussion of the limitations of New 
Zealand’s ESI, its policy implications, recommendations for how the index may be used 
and suggestions for further research. 
 
3 The ESI for New Zealand constructed in this study spans from 1999 to 2019. However, data could not be 
matched over the years 2015 to 2016 due to a change in data collection techniques by Statistics New 




2.2. Literature Review 
Common wellbeing indicators, such as inequality and poverty, have been the 
primary focus of wellbeing studies so far. Only recently, following the seminal work of 
Osberg (1998), has the literature expanded to include economic insecurity as a new 
measure of wellbeing. Since then, this burgeoning field of study has been increasing in 
importance amongst researchers. Probably the most prominent theme in the literature is 
insecurity’s discernible link to the business cycle, which tends to be consequential to all 
aspects of life, including labour market activities, investment and consumption decisions, 
fertility decisions, education and housing. Most studies find a negative relationship 
between insecurity and the business cycle whereby the probability of experiencing large 
falls in income decreases during economic booms, and increases during economic 
downturns (Cantó et al., 2019; Espinosa et al., 2014; Hacker et al., 2014; Ranci et al., 2017; 
Rohde et al., 2015; Romaguera‐de‐la‐Cruz, 2019). A main feature of economic downturns 
is unemployment which is commonly cited as a major driver of economic insecurity, 
whether that unemployment is voluntary (for example, planned withdrawal from the 
workforce to care for children or a sick relative) or involuntary (for example, job loss due 
to recessions) (Cantó et al., 2019; Hacker et al., 2014; Rohde et al., 2015). Moreover, 
perceived job security affects subjective feelings of insecurity, whether those feelings are 
rational or not (Cantó et al., 2019; Espinosa et al., 2014; Rohde et al., 2017a; Rohde et al., 
2015; Rohde et al., 2016; Romaguera‐de‐la‐Cruz, 2019). 
Insecurity is dynamic in nature in that it incorporates present as well as future 
wellbeing in determining quality of life. The forward-looking nature of insecurity 
presents a psychosocial element to insecurity as future expectations significantly affect 
individual/household decision-making behaviour. Uncertainty about the future can 
strongly dictate current consumption and investment decisions, which could have an 
impact on future generations. Some studies have shown that individuals with a 
pessimistic view about their financial future, based on their current situation and all 
available information, may forego investment in housing or their children’s education 
(Diaz-Serrano, 2005; Romaguera‐de‐la‐Cruz, 2019; Stiglitz et al., 2009). Moreover, 
insecure individuals are found to be more likely to delay fertility (Fiori et al., 2013; 
Mansour, 2018; Modena et al., 2014), reduce household consumption spending (Benito, 
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2006; Bowman, 2013; Romaguera‐de‐la‐Cruz, 2019), alter labour market decisions 
(Ashford et al., 1989; Cantó et al., 2019; Espinosa et al., 2014; Rohde et al., 2017a; Rohde 
et al., 2015; Rohde et al., 2016; Romaguera‐de‐la‐Cruz, 2019) and even change their 
political affiliation (Lepinteur et al., 2018). Studies have also found that in order to buffer 
future uncertainty, forward-looking households will boost precautionary savings in the 
present (Benito, 2006; Klemm, 2010). The main takeaway from these studies is that 
where there are constraints on households’ ability to smooth their consumption over 
time because of economic insecurity, there is likely to be diminished lifetime utility due 
to under-consumption in some periods and over-consumption in others (Rohde et al., 
2014). 
Not only has insecurity been linked to changes in individual decision-making 
behaviour, it is also related to negative socioeconomic and health outcomes. Economic 
insecurity has been linked to adverse health outcomes, including mental health 
(psychological distress and non-specific psychological illnesses) (Benach et al., 2014; 
Carter et al., 2011; Catalano, 1991; Kopasker et al., 2018; Mandal et al., 2011; Menéndez-
Espina et al., 2019; Mucci et al., 2016; Rohde et al., 2016; Watson & Osberg, 2017), suicide 
(Blakely et al., 2003b; Catalano, 1991; Houle & Light, 2014; Howden-Chapman et al., 
2005; Mucci et al., 2016; Nandi et al., 2012), heart disease (Catalano, 1991; Mucci et al., 
2016) and obesity (Muenster et al., 2011; Rohde et al., 2017a; Smith et al., 2016, 2017; 
Wisman & Capehart, 2010). Some researchers have also found insecurity to be related to 
low subjective wellbeing and self-rated health (De Witte, 1999; László et al., 2010; 
Luechinger et al., 2010). 
Such evidence suggests that insecurity has implications for broad areas of society. 
Given its social and economic importance, there has been significant progress made in 
recent years in developing techniques to measure insecurity. The existing research is 
grounded in uncertainty about the future; but although this common ground exists, the 
measurement of insecurity varies widely as does the inclusion/exclusion and relative 
importance of various economic risks. Moreover, unlike inequality indices that are based 
on a static perspective, insecurity is based on the anticipation of future economic distress 
making its measurement quite challenging. As a result, there is no general consensus on 
the measurement of insecurity and the measures tend to differ on several dimensions. 
Some researchers present subjective measures that are drawn from individuals’ 
perceptions about their economic futures (Anderson, 2001; Espinosa et al., 2014; Mandal 
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et al., 2011). Such measures capture the undeniable psychological component of 
insecurity. Opponents have found these methods unreliable especially considering that 
people in similar situations could possess inherent characteristics (for example, 
personality traits, culture and ambition) that make their perception of wellbeing vary 
widely (Krueger & Schkade, 2008). To overcome this limitation in subjective measures, 
some researchers advocate the use of objective measures, though they acknowledge the 
importance of the psychological element in analysing insecurity (D'Ambrosio & Rohde, 
2014; Hacker et al., 2010; Hacker et al., 2014; Osberg, 1998; Osberg & Sharpe, 2002, 2005, 
2009). Both objective and subjective measures undoubtedly have clear benefits when 
used separately, since it is possible that an individual could perceive themselves as 
insecure but could be found to not be objectively insecure. Such comparisons on a 
population scale can produce useful information that can help researchers generalise if 
there are patterns in perceptions across demographic groups about themselves and their 
societies. There is a third group that constructs insecurity measures by combining both 
subjective and objective elements of insecurity (Cantó et al., 2019; Rohde et al., 2017a; 
Rohde et al., 2015; Rohde et al., 2016; Romaguera‐de‐la‐Cruz, 2019). These authors argue 
that this multidimensional approach presents a more comprehensive measure of 
insecurity. An example of this method is called the ‘counting approach’ and is drawn from 
the poverty literature. The traditional approach creates a multidimensional poverty 
measure by using a technique of counting the number of dimensions in which people 
suffer deprivation (Alkire & Foster, 2011; Alkire et al., 2015; Atkinson, 2003). The 
counting approach was adapted to the insecurity literature that applies a similar 
procedure which aggregates multiple insecurity dimensions into a single indicator 
(Bucks, 2011; Cantó et al., 2019; Rohde et al., 2015; Romaguera‐de‐la‐Cruz, 2019). 
Commonly used objective indicators could include income drops and unemployment, 
while subjective indicators could include discontent about one’s financial circumstances 
and changes in the ability to take a vacation (Cantó et al., 2019; Rohde et al., 2015). A 
downside to this measure is that it only captures whether an individual is insecure or not 
insecure in each dimension but does not capture the magnitude of insecurity. 
Insecurity indexes can also be categorised into either aggregate or individual 
measures. Aggregate measures are most popular in the literature. These present indices 
for the population as a single unit (usually by region or country) based on macroeconomic 
indicators such as unemployment and relative poverty rates (Berloffa & Modena, 2014; 
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Osberg, 1998; Osberg & Sharpe, 2002, 2005, 2014; Sharpe & Osberg, 2009). Osberg 
(1998), who was the pioneer in insecurity measurement, as well as follow-up work with 
other researchers (for example, Osberg & Sharpe, 2002, 2005, 2014), developed 
aggregate measures of insecurity using a ‘named-risk’ approach.4 A criticism of aggregate 
measures is that they do not capture mean-preserving variations in insecurity across the 
population (Rohde et al., 2015; Romaguera‐de‐la‐Cruz, 2019). For instance, there could 
be large variations in the risk of job loss amongst different demographic groups even if, 
say, the unemployment rate is constant. Hence, some more recent papers advocate 
measures using micro-level data which have the advantage of showing the prevalence of 
insecurity amongst different demographic groups, the distribution of insecurity and how 
it varies over time (D'Ambrosio & Rohde, 2014; Nichols & Rehm, 2014; Osberg, 2015; 
Rohde et al., 2015; Romaguera‐de‐la‐Cruz, 2019). Moreover, micro-level indicators could 
easily be aggregated into a population-level indicator as is done in works such as Bossert 
and D'Ambrosio (2013, 2016), D'Ambrosio and Rohde (2014), Hacker et al. (2014) and 
Osberg (2015). 
Another feature that distinguishes insecurity measures is whether they assume a 
prospective (forward-looking) or retrospective (backward-looking) approach. Unlike 
other measures of wellbeing, insecurity indexes explore not only current wellbeing, but 
also future uncertainty which needs to be captured in the indicator. This is quite difficult 
to do, and as a result, the majority of the literature presents retrospective measures 
which estimate anxiety about the future based on past experiences (Hacker et al., 2014). 
There is an emerging strand of the literature that explores a prospective approach that 
tries to predict what future conditions could explain current states of insecurity (Osberg, 
2015; Rohde et al., 2015, 2016, 2017). 
2.2.1. The Conceptualisation of the Economic Security 
Index (ESI) 
The debate about the measurement of insecurity is ongoing in the literature, but 
authors all have sound justifications for the methods chosen in their respective studies. 
 
4 This is discussed in Section 2.2.1. 
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The ESI constructed in this study follows the methodology used in Hacker et al. (2014) 
and is based on the combination of three key approaches found in the literature. This 
section of the literature review gives a brief overview of these approaches and will 
explain how they contribute to the ESI. 
One approach uses multiple factors to construct a weighted index of economic 
insecurity. This is the foundation of the works of Osberg (1998) and Osberg and Sharpe 
(2002, 2005, 2009) who developed an index of economic wellbeing using a ‘named-risk’ 
approach. In this and similar approaches, the index constructed measures the percentage 
change over time in economic risks associated with events such as widowhood, 
unemployment, illness and old age. They model the risk of economic loss associated with 
each event as a conditional probability and then weight the prevalence of economic risks 
by the proportion of the population affected. A major shortcoming of this measure is that 
the inclusion and weighting of each component is highly subjective (since theory 
provides limited guidance on this) and is likely biased by the personal values of each 
researcher (Hacker et al., 2014). Moreover, a named-risk approach does not account for 
possible differences in economic risks across different demographic groups and over 
time. 
The second approach explores the buffering capacity of households as it measures 
whether or not each household has the capacity to cover any losses associated with 
economic shocks (Bossert & D'Ambrosio, 2013; Lusardi et al., 2011). It is a simple 
measure that presents the level of economic resources needed to have financial security. 
Although such asset sufficiency measures are quite important in establishing economic 
security, it is only part of the whole picture since they do not model the probability that 
an individual or household will experience an income shock and need to draw from 
precautionary savings or other forms of wealth to replace the lost income. 
The third approach measures income or expenditure volatility, a main component 
of insecurity and financial risk. This growing body of literature explores the probability 
of large swings in income or expenditure from one year to the next (Carter et al., 2014; 
Deloitte & Victoria University of Wellington, 2017; Gorbachev, 2011; Gottschalk & Moffitt, 
2009; Hacker & Jacobs, 2008; Moore, 2017; Nichols & Zimmerman, 2008). Though this is 
a fundamental part of measuring insecurity, these measures do not account for the risk 
of large, unforeseen expenses (for example, medical costs or funeral expenses), and also 
do not account for the buffering capacity of individuals or households. 
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The ESI constructed by Hacker et al. (2014) for the United States combines 
elements of all the previous approaches into a comprehensive measure. The ESI captures 
the proportion of individuals who experience large unbuffered loss and the extent to 
which they are protected against those losses. The researchers focus on the three main 
factors associated with economic insecurity in the United States. Firstly, they explore the 
probability of income loss, which is the focus of the income or expenditure volatility 
measure and the weighted index of multiple measures mentioned previously. In this 
regard, they look at the proportion of individuals who are susceptible to a year-on-year 
decline in their annual disposable household income of 25 percent or greater. This 25 
percent threshold is considered appropriate since the authors find considerable evidence 
to suggest that the median American household would experience some form of 
economic hardship if their household income declined by that amount. Secondly, they 
include medical spending shocks in their calculation. Medical out-of-pocket (MOOP) 
expenses, which include doctor/hospital fees and insurance payments, are a significant 
risk to American households and are considered to be beyond the control of individuals. 
MOOP spending is shown to reduce disposable income for Americans and is therefore 
considered a major threat to economic security. Thirdly, they incorporate the buffering 
effects of financial wealth (the focus of resource adequacy or asset sufficiency measures) 
to explore how resilient individuals are when faced with large economic losses. This 
component measures households’ capacity to replace their lost income until it returns to 
its original level following a negative financial shock. Their insecurity estimates for the 
United States are used to explore the variability of economic insecurity by year, state and 
across different demographic groups.5 The design of the ESI by Hacker et al. (2014) is 
outlined in Appendix A and forms the basis of this study. 
2.2.2. Economic Insecurity in New Zealand 
The majority of the existing studies on insecurity focus on the United States (for 
example, Bucks, 2011; D'Ambrosio & Rohde, 2014; Gottschalk & Moffitt, 2009; Hacker, 
2019; Hacker et al., 2010; Hacker et al., 2014; Hacker & Jacobs, 2008; Nichols & Rehm, 
 
5 For current information on the ESI for the United States, see http://www.economicsecurityindex.org/. 
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2014). The main findings of these studies suggest that insecurity in the US has increased 
over the past two to three decades and that insecurity is strongly correlated with the 
business cycle. These studies have prompted interest in exploring the dynamics of 
insecurity in other developed countries (for example, Cantó et al., 2019; Diaz-Serrano, 
2005; Romaguera‐de‐la‐Cruz, 2019). Of these, there is a handful of papers that focus on 
Oceania, namely works by Sharpe and Osberg (2009), Osberg and Sharpe (2011) and 
Rohde et al. (2015) on Australia. Sharpe and Osberg (2009) and Osberg and Sharpe 
(2011) aggregate insecurity measures for a group of OECD countries, including Australia, 
based on indicators such as poverty rates and unemployment rates. Rohde et al. (2015) 
used micro-level data to estimate insecurity in Australia from 2001 to 2011. They used a 
range of different approaches and find that when aggregated, their insecurity estimates 
correlate with the trends in unemployment and GDP growth rate. They also find that 
insecurity varies across different demographic groups and that high levels of insecurity 
persist for most individuals over time. 
Economic insecurity has not yet been explicitly examined in the context of New 
Zealand. Although there has been extensive work done examining the economic 
wellbeing of New Zealanders, these focus primarily on inequality or poverty (for example, 
Ballantyne et al., 2004; Barnett et al., 2004; Blakely et al., 2003a; Boston, 2014; Boston & 
Chapple, 2014; Carter et al., 2013; Creedy et al., 2019; Creedy et al., 2018; Gunasekara et 
al., 2012; Podder & Chatterjee, 2002; Rashbrooke et al., 2017; Rashbrooke, 2013; Stillman 
et al., 2012). There are a few studies that attempt to capture economic uncertainty by 
focusing on income volatility or income mobility. These terms have largely been used 
interchangeably in New Zealand population studies and seek to capture relative or 
absolute changes in personal incomes over time (Moore, 2017). Some studies capture 
both upward and downward movements, while others tend to focus on downward 
movements in income. Tracking temporal changes in New Zealanders’ incomes over time 
has garnered much attention from academics and policymakers in recent years and is 
considered key in understanding the wellbeing of different groups in the population. The 
main technique used in New Zealand studies to measure income changes over time 
focuses on movements up and down the rungs of the income ladder to capture income 
volatility or mobility (Carter & Gunasekara, 2012; Carter et al., 2014; Crawford, 2009; 
Deloitte & Victoria University of Wellington, 2017; Moore, 2017). These rungs are 
typically expressed by income quintiles or income deciles. 
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Crawford (2009) used data from the Linked Income Supplement (LIS) of the 
Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) to explore changes in hourly wages of working 
age New Zealanders from 1997 to 2004 that can be attributed to human capital (proxied 
by educational achievement) and demographic differences. The paper focused on both 
upward and downward movements and found that human capital affects growth in 
earnings. Particularly, higher levels of education are associated with growth in earnings 
and thus movement up the income ladder. 
Carter and Gunasekara (2012) examined income mobility in New Zealand using 
data from the first seven waves of the Survey of Family, Income and Employment (SoFIE) 
to estimate the probability of changing income quintile from one year to the next. They 
report high levels of both upward and downward income mobility from year to year over 
the seven-year period. They found that about 50 percent of individuals in the middle-
income quintiles experience year-on-year income mobility, while the highest and lowest 
income quintiles are the most stable groups. They reported a 72 percent probability of an 
individual remaining in the highest quintile and a 65 percent probability of an individual 
remaining in the lowest quintile. 
Carter et al. (2014) also used longitudinal data from SoFIE to examine income 
mobility in New Zealand over the eight SoFIE waves, from 2002 to 2010. Their paper 
examined the absolute and relative income mobility in disposable income in New 
Zealand. They presented a descriptive analysis of income mobility at two different time 
horizons, the short and long terms. The short-term analysis examined annual changes in 
income while the long-term interval focused on the change over eight years. Their study 
measures the extent of income mobility by examining the proportion of the population 
that move up and down the income ladder, with income deciles as rungs. Their results 
show that over 60 percent of the New Zealand population changed income decile groups 
in the short term over the period of study, with only about 20 percent maintaining the 
same income decile over the 8 years of study, i.e., long-term mobility. The trends were 
similar in both increasing and decreasing income groups. The research did not address 
the reasons for the income changes. 
Moore (2017) measured the degree of volatility of New Zealanders’ incomes using 
data from Statistics New Zealand’s linked employer–employee data (LEED). The study 
estimated the share of the working-age population that fell two or more deciles between 
2000 and 2014. Using the midpoint of each income decile, a two-decile drop is estimated 
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to be about 40 percent of an individual’s income. This method limits the sample size. This 
is because a two-decile income drop cannot be measured for deciles 1 and 2, since these 
groups are the lowest two deciles. This excludes these two important groups for which a 
relatively small income drop in income could represent a significant shock. The author 
found that about one in nine working-age New Zealanders (about 11 percent) are 
susceptible to a two-decile decline in income in any given year and that income volatility 
is cyclical. Unsurprisingly, income volatility peaked at about 12.5 percent of the 
population in 2009 which is most likely capturing the effects of the Global Financial Crisis. 
Moore also used 2010 wealth data from Rashbrooke et al. (2017) to analyze the buffering 
capacity of households. The author found that most individuals do not have sufficient 
wealth to buffer income drops as defined by the study. There are limitations to this 
finding since the wealth data are reported at the household level, while the income 
volatility estimates are for individuals. This makes it difficult to ascertain whether a fall 
in an individual’s income could be buffered by others in their household unit. 
The results of Moore’s study contributed to the State of the State report 2017 
published by Deloitte & Victoria University of Wellington, for which Moore was one of the 
principal authors. The report examined the resilience of New Zealanders in the face of 
uncertainty and explored how sustainable improvements in wellbeing can be achieved 
using a social investment approach. Since the report was based on Moore’s 2017 work, 
the results reported were the same. Their report suggested that New Zealanders from all 
socioeconomic backgrounds are susceptible to economic problems, unforeseen health 
problems or other adverse changes in their lives. However, not all households have the 
resources available to buffer unforeseen shocks, especially low- and middle-income 
households. They also found that the ability to withstand a household shock depends on 
the nature of the shock, with New Zealand’s vulnerabilities being either economic, social 
or environmental. Their report pinpointed that some of the main threats to the overall 
wellbeing of New Zealanders include lack of economic diversification, a low savings rate, 
high external debt and a vulnerable natural environment. These vulnerabilities highlight 
the importance of having a reliable measure of economic insecurity which is one of the 
main policy recommendations of the report. Specifically, the authors call for the 
government to “engage with New Zealanders to build a wellbeing and resilience index” 
(Deloitte & Victoria University of Wellington, 2017, p. 35). The index constructed in my 
study is a vital contribution toward this recommendation. 
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2.3. Design and Construction of an ESI for New Zealand 
The construction of an ESI for New Zealand follows the design developed by 
Hacker et al. (2014) as closely as the data permit. I also adopt the definition of the 
economic security index as put forth in their paper. The authors define the ESI as “an 
annual index that represents the share of individuals who experience at least a 25 percent 
decline in their inflation-adjusted ‘available household income’ from one year to the next 
(except when entering retirement) and who lack an adequate financial safety net to 
replace this lost income until it returns to its original level” (Hacker et al., 2014, p. S8). 
The 25 percent threshold does not change based on individual or household 
characteristics, such as income level, region or ethnic makeup. The ESI for New Zealand 
is constructed using the following formula: 
 
For each household, i (=1,2,…., n), in time, t, 
 








L is defined as: 
 
𝐿𝑖𝑡 =  {
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𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝐻𝑖𝑡−1
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∗ )  ∩ (1 − 𝑅𝑖𝑡) 




where ESIt is the proportion of the population experiencing large losses, Li is the 
household-level insecurity status (whether the household experienced a loss or not), yi is 
total real household income, Mi is annual household out-of-pocket medical spending 
(MOOP), Di is annual household debt service burden and Hi is annual household housing 
costs. ei = [(1*first adulti) + (0.5*additional adultsi) + (0.3*childreni)] and represents the 
OECD-modified family size equivalence scale, which gives less weight to children and 
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each subsequent adult after the head of the household.6 (Wit < Wit*) and (1 - Rit) are 
dichotomous indicators. (Wit < Wit*) is an indicator for “lacking sufficient financial 
wealth” and (1 - Rit) is an indicator for “not transitioning into retirement”. The 
intersection symbol, ∩, signifies that all conditions in Equation 2.2. need to be satisfied 
for 𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 1.7 
The ESI for New Zealand is constructed in a fundamentally similar way to Hacker 
et al. (2014) with a couple of alterations to suit New Zealand’s unique socioeconomic 
landscape. Firstly, housing costs, an important component of household expenditures in 
New Zealand, are added to the economic insecurity formula. Secondly, the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS)-recommended equivalence scale is replaced by the OECD-
modified equivalence scale as the preferred household income equivalization technique. 
The rationale for these changes as well as detailed descriptions of all the ESI components 
are presented in Section 2.4.6. 
New Zealand’s ESI, like the ESI for the US, reports insecurity estimates 
retrospectively, meaning that the estimates for each household in a particular year are 
based on data from the previous year leading up to the report date. This is referred to as 
the ESI year in this study. For example, the 2006 insecurity estimate for ‘Household i’ is 
based on income data reported in the June quarters of 2005 and 2006. 
2.3.1.1. What do Equations (2.1) and (2.2) show? 
ESIt represents the risk of large income losses in the New Zealand population or in 
a subgroup of the population. This rate is based on household losses (mean L in Equation 
(2.1)). Any increases in mean L from one year to the next is considered an increase in 
economic insecurity for that population group and could be a sign of financial instability 
in an economy. At the micro level, a value of Lit=1 indicates that a household, i, in time, t, 
is insecure, while Lit=0 indicates that the household is secure.  
 
6 This study uses the same classification for children and adults as used by Statistics New Zealand. A 
respondent is classed as a child if they are aged 0 to 14. Respondents aged 15 and above are classed as 
adults. 
7 More on this in Section 2.3.1.1. 
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As is shown in Equation (2.2), a household is considered insecure if all three 
conditions in the formula hold. Firstly, there needs to be a 25 percent decline in the 
household’s equivalized disposable income, either due to a fall in income or an increase 
in debt servicing obligations, MOOP expenses or housing costs. Although economic 
insecurity is commonly associated with income loss (for example, from sudden job loss), 
an increase in non-discretionary spending can also constitute significant shocks. For New 
Zealand, this could also include an increase in MOOP expenses, especially for persons 
using the private healthcare system. Any one or combination of these shocks could 
significantly reduce the availability of household disposable income. It is important to 
note here that the extent to which these income shocks may trigger hardship depends on 
public transfers, such as welfare payments or unemployment benefits, as well as private 
transfers, such as gifts from family members or friends. To account for this, the measure 
of household income used in this study is quite broad and incorporates income from as 
many sources as are available in the data. 
Secondly, the household needs to lack sufficient liquid financial wealth to replace 
a 25 percent or greater loss in annual household income. In the context of this study, this 
is represented by households having less than 25 percent of their current household 
income in the form of liquid financial wealth. This liquid financial wealth should be easily 
accessible in the event of an income shock to be considered an adequate buffer. For 
example, a household that must sell an illiquid asset, like its home or farm, when it 
experiences hardship would be considered insecure. This makes the buffering capacity 
of a household reliant on their level of precautionary savings in the form of liquid assets, 
which should be a sufficient financial safety net even if the household experiences very 
large, unanticipated drops in their income. 
Thirdly, the head of the household or the spouse of the head should not have 
transitioned to retirement in the ESI year. This is because retirement is associated with a 
decline in incomes due to the transition away from the labour force. Discretionary 
spending could decline as there would be less disposable income available, but it could 
also increase based on the level of precautionary savings accrued over an individual’s life. 
Non-discretionary spending is likely to decline since things like income tax payments 
typically fall substantially as the individual transitions away from the labour force. 
Moreover, the ability to survive ‘comfortably’ during retirement years, i.e., with an 
adequate safety net to account for the expected fall in income, depends on the financial 
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decisions made by retirees throughout the course of their lives. Such an analysis is 
beyond the scope of this project. Hence, households entering retirement are excluded 
from the ESI calculations in the year the retirement event occurs but will reappear in the 
following years and be analyzed based on their retirement income. 
2.4. Data 
The datasets used in the construction of the ESI for New Zealand were provided 
by Statistics New Zealand through their Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI).8 The IDI is 
a large research database that holds micro-level data about individuals and households, 
all sampled on a statistically representative basis, from rural and urban areas across New 
Zealand. The data in the IDI are de-identified, meaning that identifying information, such 
as names, addresses and dates of birth, have been removed. There are encrypted 
identifiers for each individual or household that are common across all datasets in the 
IDI, which make it easy to link records that belong to the same person or household unit 
using variables they have in common. The data are continually being updated by Statistics 
New Zealand.9  
2.4.1. The Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) and the 
New Zealand Income Survey (NZIS) 
The main dataset of interest in the construction of the ESI is the Household Labour 
Force Survey (HLFS), which includes the New Zealand Income Survey (NZIS) (the income 
supplement). The temporal coverage for both HLFS and NZIS data used for this study is 
1998 to 2019. The HLFS is the official source for New Zealand’s employment and 
unemployment statistics, providing estimates of the number of people employed, 
 
8 The information in Section 2.4 is from unpublished user guides and data dictionaries for the various 
datasets available within the Integrated Data Infrastructure environment, unless other sources are 
explicitly cited.  




unemployed and not in the workforce. Demographic information, such as gender, 
household type, qualifications and ethnicity, are also collected about each individual 
taking part in the survey. The HLFS interviews respondents over eight consecutive 
quarters. Because of this eight-quarter rotating panel design, individuals residing in the 
same household unit can be matched over two years. The questions in the HLFS are 
designed to ask respondents about their activities during the particular reference week. 
The survey comprises of approximately 15,000 private households and about 30,000 
individuals across the North Island, South Island and Waiheke Island. Other New Zealand 
Islands, such as Stewart and Chatham Islands are excluded.10 The NZIS, which is a yearly 
supplement to the HLFS that collects income data from the same individuals and 
households in the HLFS, is run in the June quarter (April to June) of each year. This means 
that there are two successive data points from one year to the next representing income 
data of each respondent in each panel. These are used to calculate the annual change in 
income in the construction of the ESI. The HLFS has been surveying the New Zealand 
labour force since October 1985, while the NZIS was first run in the June quarter of 1997.   
It is important to note that the HLFS was redeveloped in 2016, which included 
changes to some existing variables and the inclusion of new variables. This was the first 
major change to the survey since its introduction in 1985. The main aim was to improve 
the quality and relevance of New Zealand’s labour market statistics. The NZIS was also 
discontinued in June 2016. Since then, some of its content has been integrated into the 
HLFS. The redeveloped HLFS was introduced into the field in April 2016 to collect data 
for the June 2016 quarter. New households were surveyed and, as a result, there are no 
repeat households from 2015 to 2016. This made it impossible to calculate the 
probability of income loss and ESI figures for 2016. Other than this gap in the data, the 




10 The populations of Stewart and Chatham Islands are ~450 and ~600, respectively (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2018a).  
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2.4.2. NZIS Response Rates 
Attrition is a common and expected methodological problem in longitudinal 
studies which can lead to potentially biased results. Individuals drop out from panels for 
a variety of reasons and this could degrade the generalisability of the results if the 
respondents who drop out are different from those who remain (Gustavson et al., 2012). 
Although the HLFS is not a pure longitudinal dataset, it does contain repeated cross-
sectional data over eight consecutive quarters that could suffer from attrition.  
The attrition rates for each NZIS wave are presented in Table 2.1. Since the NZIS 
is run over two consecutive June quarters of the HLFS for each household, the original 
sample members (OSMs) are considered to be the households that responded to the 
income supplement in the first June quarter for their respective ESI year. Hence, the 
attrition rate reported in this section will differ from that of the full HLFS sample. It is 
important to note that Statistics New Zealand routinely imputes income values for 
households with missing values in the NZIS. These imputed incomes are excluded from 
the study sample.11 For comparison purposes, attrition rates are reported both inclusive 
and exclusive of imputed incomes. As expected, removing imputed incomes worsens 





11 For details on Statistics New Zealand’s imputation process, please see Household Labour Force Survey 
sources and methods: 2016, available from www.stats.govt.nz. 
12 Attrition rates for the 2016 ESI year could not be calculated due to the 2016 redevelopment of the HLFS 
(covered in Section 2.4.1.). Moreover, please note that very low attrition rates in earlier ESI years are due 
to the nature of the datasets provided by Statistics New Zealand. Some pre-2007 data were prepared by 
Statistics New Zealand for use by other government agencies and have already removed a large proportion 
of the households that were not matched over two years. 
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Table 2.1: NZIS Attrition Rates by Year 









Rate   
OSMs  





1999 1998-1999 2,949 2,940  0%   2,562 2,238  13% 
2000 1999-2000 2,826 2,805 1%   2,454 2,115 14% 
2001 2000-2001 6,147 6,081 1%   5,235 4,533 13% 
2002 2001-2002 6,222 6,153 1%   5,325 4,647 13% 
2003 2002-2003 6,621 5,547 16%   5,697 4,167 27% 
2004 2003-2004 6,210 4,686 25%   5,472 3,519 36% 
2005 2004-2005 5,970 4,539 24%   5,133 3,333 35% 
2006 2005-2006 5,814 4,467 23%   5,070 3,315 35% 
2007 2006-2007 5,604 5,412 3%   4,503 3,999 11% 
2008 2007-2008 8,976 5,853 35%   8,037 4,362 46% 
2009 2008-2009 8,583 5,658 34%   8,073 4,377 46% 
2010 2009-2010 8,802 5,859 33%   8,193 4,431 46% 
2011 2010-2011 8,976 5,892 34%   8,199 4,353 47% 
2012 2011-2012 9,024 5,988 34%   8,364 4,419 47% 
2013 2012-2013 8,715 5,775 34%   7,977 4,362 45% 
2014 2013-2014 8,559 5,742 33%   8,049 4,461 45% 
2015 2014-2015 9,354 5,985 36%   8,877 4,872 45% 
2018 2017-2018 8,295 5,850 29%   7,869 4,926 37% 
2019 2018-2019 8,487 6,060 29%   8,115 5,130 37% 
*As per Statistics New Zealand's output rules, all counts are randomly rounded (up or down) to the 
nearest multiple of three. 
2.4.3. The Household Economic Survey (HES) 
 Since the HLFS does not contain all the data necessary to construct an ESI, it is 
supplemented by New Zealand’s Household Economic Survey (HES). The HES provides 
information on household income and expenditure, along with demographic information 
on respondents. It collects information both at a household level and for each household 
member, but expenditure data are only reported at the household level. The survey 
consists of about 5,000 private households and is run on a three-yearly basis since March 
1998 in its full form. Since 2007, Statistics NZ has been running a mini version of the HES 
- called HES (Income) - in the years between the full HES in which respondents are given 
the income questionnaire, the household demographic questionnaire, and a reduced 
household expenditure questionnaire. 
HES data are not available prior to 2006 for this study. The HES coverage is from 
2006/2007 to 2015/2016. There is also a net worth supplement to the HES available for 
the 2014/2015 and 2017/2018 HES years. This supplement was used to estimate 
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household savings patterns. Like the HLFS, the HES uses statistically representative 
samples from rural and urban areas across New Zealand.  
2.4.3.1. The Advantages and Disadvantages of HLFS and HES 
 As mentioned previously, the HLFS is a repeated cross-sectional survey, while the 
HES contains cross-sectional data. Each survey has its advantages and limitations when 
considering the design of the ESI, but they are deemed to be the best available options for 
this study on New Zealand. A major advantage of HLFS being a repeated cross-section is 
that such surveys have less of the usual problems associated with panel data, such as 
attrition and non-response (Verbeek, 2008). The NZIS supplement is particularly useful 
for exploring income volatility since income can be matched from one year to the next. 
Since the HES contains demographic information on all the data relevant to the ESI design 
but which is lacking in the HLFS, these data can be matched to the HLFS data using their 
demographic information. 
A major limitation of both the HLFS and the HES is that they are not genuine panel 
surveys. Their cross-sectional natures mean that the same individuals and households 
are not followed over time (maximum of two years in HLFS) making it impossible to 
include the respondents’ histories in our analyses. Moreover, the HLFS and HES contain 
largely different households making matching of key variables derived from HES 
dependent on demographic information rather than household identifiers. The 
demographic data used for matching cover all HES years and a description of the 
matching process is covered in Section 2.4.6. The HES sample is also a much smaller 
dataset than the HLFS, so there could be much variability across households.  
2.4.4. Additional Data Sources 
In addition to the IDI data from Statistics New Zealand, supplemental data, such 
as the Consumer Price Index (CPI), are sourced from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
(2019), and other data from Statistics New Zealand (but outside the IDI), such as fertility 
rates, are also used. These are discussed in Section 2.4.6, as well as more detail regarding 
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the specific variables derived from the HLFS and the HES. Table 2.2 provides a summary 
of the data source(s) for each ESI component. 
 
Table 2.2: Summary of Data Sources for each ESI Component 
ESI Component Data Source 
Real household income  
NZIS, RBNZ & Statistics New 
Zealand 
Annual debt service burden HES 
Medical out-of-pocket expenses (MOOP) HES 
Housing costs HES 
Household savings HES (Net Worth Supplement) 
Demographic information (ethnicity, age, region, 
etc.) HLFS, NZIS & HES 
2.4.5. Datasets used by Hacker et al. (2014) 
For comparison purposes, this section will briefly discuss the datasets used by 
Hacker et al. (2014) in the construction of the ESI for the United States. The main surveys 
they used were the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the March 
Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS). These were supplemented by the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). 
The SIPP is the main survey used by Hacker et al. (2014) for household income 
data. It is a nationally representative, quarterly panel that is available since 1984. Each 
panel is a stratified sample with an overlapping panel design used prior to 1996 and non-
overlapping panels since then. Though the SIPP has the obvious advantage of following 
the same people over time, it also has a very high attrition rate which may reduce the 
coverage of the ESI towards the end of each panel. Unlike the SIPP, the CPS is a repeated 
cross-section. It surveys geographic residences over approximately a year and a half 
regardless of the current occupancy. Like the NZIS which collects income data over two 
consecutive June quarters, the CPS data is available over two consecutive March quarters 
enabling the researchers to match respondents living in the same household unit from 
one year to the next. But what seems to be an obvious limitation of the CPS is that the 
individuals in the households may change causing differences in household composition 
and demographics in the rotating samples. 
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2.4.6. Components of the ESI 
This section outlines the specific variables used in the construction of the ESI. All 
variables are estimated using sample weights provided by Statistics New Zealand, which 
use integrated weighing for each survey to improve the robustness and accuracy of the 
survey estimates. These integrated weights reduce bias by ensuring that the estimates 
are nationally representative by adjusting statistical output to match population 
benchmarks that account for the underrepresentation of specified population groups. 
Both the HES and the HLFS include a ‘FinalWgt’ variable which is the final weight that is 
used to produce outputs using micro data from Statistics NZ. It is set to ‘0’ for individuals 
under 15 and for people out of scope. Respondents are considered to be ‘out of scope’ if 
they are deceased, have moved overseas for at least one year or have permanently moved 
into certain institutions. The weights allow for consistent estimation at both individual 
and household levels. Sections 2.4.6.1 to 2.4.6.7 provide descriptions and notes on the 
construction of each variable used in the ESI’s construction.  
2.4.6.1. Annual Real Household Income (yi) 
 The data used in the calculation of total annual real household income (yi) are from 
the NZIS. The variable is the sum of gross weekly household income earned by all 
individuals in the household, aged 15 and over, from all income sources in the income 
module. Hence, every individual within a household will have the same value for total 
household income. Household income includes wage and salary income from 
employment, self-employment income, Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) 
payments, other transfer payments (excluding ACC), private insurance payments, NZ 
superannuation and veteran pension, private superannuation or pension, student 
allowances and training benefit, and family support payments. Investment income is 
excluded by Statistics New Zealand due to confidentiality constraints. Net income would 
be preferred to have a more accurate estimate of each household’s after-tax earnings; 
however, these data are unavailable and are tricky to estimate. 
These income data are collected in the NZIS in the June quarter of each year. Only 
households that provided income data in both years of the survey are kept in the sample 
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as this is required to calculate the probability of a 25 percent decline in household income 
from one year to the next. Zero values and negative income are both kept in the dataset 
for the analysis. A zero value signifies that the respondent did not receive income from 
any source in the reporting period, while negative income values could be reported by 
self-employed individuals if they experience a net loss of income. Negative income values 
accounted for less than 0.01 percent of the sample and did not have a large impact on the 
ESI results. 
Since the weekly household income figures reported are for the reporting periods 
that correspond with the income module, they do not capture any changes in the price 
level, i.e., they are not inflation-adjusted. To adjust for the effects of inflation, CPI figures 
are sourced from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2019) and Statistics New Zealand 
(2019a). The percentage change in the CPI statistics is used as a measure of inflation 
which is then used to calculate real household incomes for all New Zealand households 
included in the survey. The base year is 2017, June quarter. 
2.4.6.2. Annual Debt Service Burden (Di) 
The annual debt service burden variable represents the annual amount required 
to cover both the interest and principal on a debt for a given year. Annual debt service 
burden data are computed using household expenditure data in the HES. The variable 
used is the sum of credit card interest payments, personal loan payments and other 
miscellaneous debt (for example, debt service on sports or recreational equipment) 
accumulated by households. These data are cross-sectional and are available on a yearly 
basis by combining data from the full three-yearly HES survey and the mini (reduced) 
yearly HES supplement, which is run in the years in between the full HES. Since the debt 
service data are from the HES and had to be used in conjunction with HLFS data to 
construct the ESI, it was not possible to match by household ID as there are largely 
different households surveyed in the HES and the HLFS. In order to overcome this 
problem, the debt service burden data from HES are matched to the respondents in the 
HLFS dataset using demographic characteristics that are common to both datasets. 
For the matching process, the HES dataset, which contains the variable of interest 
(derived debt service), was first appended to the HLFS dataset. Debt service was then 
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regressed on observed demographic characteristics common to both datasets. Stata’s 
predict command was run in postestimation to create a new variable containing 
“predicted values” of debt service burden for all possible observations in the HLFS 
dataset, whether they were used in fitting the model or not.13 After debt service statistics 
were estimated for each household in each survey year, the HES data were then dropped 
from the ESI master data. The linear regression specification for the matching process 
takes the form: 
 
 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (2.3) 
 
where 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 represents the annual debt service burden for household, i, in time, 
t, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of demographic characteristics (ethnicity, age, gender, region, education, 
income and relationship status) and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term.14 The predicted values for 
annual debt service burden were then used in the calculation of each household’s 
insecurity in Equation (2.2). 
All other variables that are derived from the HES dataset are matched to the HLFS 
master dataset using this same process. Hence, this matching process holds for the 
derivation of MOOP expenses, housing costs and savings (proxy for liquid financial wealth 
- (𝑊𝑖𝑡 < 𝑊𝑖𝑡
∗ )). 
2.4.6.3. Medical Out-of-Pocket Expenses (Mi) 
New Zealand has a mixed public-private healthcare system. About 80 percent of 
total healthcare expenditure is funded by the New Zealand government and about 18 
percent is out-of-pocket health expenditure, including voluntary private health insurance 
(PHI) (Ministry of Health, 2016; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2017). Government spending on healthcare represents about 11 percent 
of GDP, while out-of-pocket medical spending represents about 2.2 percent of household 
 
13 All statistical analyses for Chapter 2 are performed using Stata/MP 15.1. 
14 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study are presented in Table B1 in Appendix B. Stata’s 
aweight option is used to apply analytical weights to the descriptive statistics. Appendix B also covers how 
ethnic groups are classified in the context of this study. 
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consumption (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2017). As a 
result of such large public funding, the majority of the New Zealand population receives 
healthcare services provided by the public health system. There can be long wait times in 
the public system so, for convenience, some households voluntarily choose to pay out of 
pocket for private healthcare. It is estimated that about 35 percent of adults and about 28 
percent of children are covered by PHI in New Zealand (Ministry of Health, 2016). For 
these reasons, it is assumed that any income shocks associated with MOOP could have a 
strong effect on household insecurity in New Zealand, but the effects may be significantly 
less in magnitude than it is for the United States. 
The MOOP expenses data were computed using household expenditure data in the 
HES. MOOP represents the annual sum of all medical and other healthcare-related 
expenses by New Zealand households. As with the other HES-derived variables, MOOP 
expenses were estimated by using the same procedure outlined in Section 2.4.6.2. The 
linear regression specification for the matching process takes the form: 
 
 𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (2.4) 
 
where 𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 represents the annual medical out-of-pocket expenses for household, i, in 
time, t, and all the independent variables are the same as in Equation (2.3). 
2.4.6.4. Housing Costs (Hi) 
Housing costs are a unique addition to the economic insecurity formula. They are 
deemed an important inclusion since they represent the largest proportion of household 
expenditures in New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2020c). For the year ended June 
2019, about a third of all New Zealand households spent more than 30 percent of their 
total household income on housing costs (Statistics New Zealand, 2020d). The housing 
costs variable comprises of all expenses related to owning and renting property that are 
available in the HES. This is the sum of mortgages, rent, property rates, building-related 
insurance, household maintenance costs, household operations costs, domestic fuel costs, 
power costs and other property costs. 
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The housing costs data are computed using household expenditure data in the 
HES. As with the other HES-derived variables, housing costs are estimated by using the 
same procedure outlined in Section 2.4.6.2. The linear regression specification for the 
matching process takes the form: 
 
 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (2.5) 
 
where 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 represents the annual housing costs for household, i, in time, t, 
and all the independent variables are the same as in Equation (2.3). 
2.4.6.5. Family Size Equivalence Scale (ei) 
In the ESI calculation, the indicator eit is used to represent a family size 
equivalence scale. Equivalised annual household income gives different weightings to 
each household member in order to account for variation in resource requirements. The 
equivalence scale used gives less weight to children and each subsequent adult after the 
head of the household. The rationale for this is that as a household expands, the resource 
needs of each additional member increases, but not in a proportional way (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2013). This is due to economies of scale in 
consumption as household size increases. Not only does the size of the household matter, 
but so does the composition. For instance, ceteris paribus, a three-person household that 
comprises of two adults and one child will likely have greater resource needs than a 
three-person household with one adult and two children for the two households to have 
comparable standards of living. This is because children generally consume less than 
adults. Hence, it is important to use an equivalisation technique to adjust for both 
household size and composition. 
There are several different methods available for equivalisation. Martin (2017) 
recommends that the equivalence scale chosen should depend on a country’s welfare 
system. The assumption is that the more expenses that are covered by the welfare system, 
the less the economic burden would be on households. For this reason, I veer away from 
the equivalisation method used in Hacker et al. (2014). In Hacker et al.’s 2014 paper, the 
authors employ the NAS-recommended equivalence scale in their insecurity formula, 
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where [eit = ((0.7*childreni) + (adultsi))0.7]. The NAS-recommended equivalence scale for 
the poverty line adjusts household income to give less weight to children assuming a 
concave relationship between the size of the household and their needs (Hacker et al., 
2014). My study uses the OECD-modified equivalence scale, where [eit = ((1*first adulti) 
+ (0.5*additional adultsi) + (0.3* childreni))]. The OECD-modified equivalence scale, first 
proposed by Hagenaars et al. (1994), has become an international standard and is the 
technique recommended by Statistics New Zealand (2019b) in the measurement of child 
poverty. 
One of the main reasons for using the OECD-modified equivalisation technique is 
the setup of New Zealand’s healthcare system. Since the majority of New Zealanders’ 
healthcare expenses is publicly funded, it is assumed that MOOP expenses, which includes 
doctor’s/dentist’s fees, hospital fees and prescription drugs, have less of an effect on the 
economic security of New Zealanders compared to that of Americans. The NAS-
recommended equivalence scale specifically recommends the incorporation of MOOP 
expenses in determining poverty, since healthcare spending reduces disposable income 
(Burtless & Siegel, 2001; Citro & Michael, 1995; Hacker et al., 2014) and could represent 
a significant part of household expenditure in the United States. In addition to healthcare 
being subsidised in New Zealand, tertiary education is also partially covered by the New 
Zealand government. Since healthcare expenses and higher education are subsidised by 
the New Zealand government, the cost of subsequent adults and children in New Zealand 
households is assumed to be lower than in the United States. Hence, the decision was 
made to use the OECD-modified equivalence scale as the main equivalisation technique.15 
2.4.6.6. Indicator for “Lacking Sufficient Financial Wealth” 
(𝑾𝒊𝒕 <  𝑾𝒊𝒕
∗ ) 
Savings is the proportion of household income not spent on current expenditures, 
i.e., deferred consumption (Le et al., 2010). It is an important part of the insecurity 
 
15 A comparison of the NAS-recommended equivalence scale and the OECD-modified equivalence scale, as 
well as important notes on deriving household composition for the OECD-modified equivalence scale 
computations, are presented in Appendix C. 
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calculation since its high liquidity means that it reduces insecurity. The indicator used for 
“lacking sufficient financial wealth” (𝑊𝑖𝑡 <  𝑊𝑖𝑡
∗) is proxied by household savings and is 
estimated using net worth data from the HES. Since this represents households’ buffering 
capacity for income shocks, only liquid financial assets are considered as savings. The 
rationale is that these can be readily accessed without having to convert non-liquid assets 
(such as property, vehicles or jewellery) to cash and without losing any use value. 
Since household savings rates for New Zealanders are not routinely collected in 
the HES or the HLFS, household annual savings data were computed using the HES Net 
Worth Supplement for 2014/2015 and 2017/2018 HES years. This is the only dataset 
available from Statistics New Zealand that can be used to obtain a measure of liquid 
financial assets consistent with the definition used in this study. Each household’s 
precautionary savings figure was calculated using several categories of household 
financial assets available in the HES net worth supplement that have high use value (high 
liquidity). It represents the sum of deposits and any other cash or currency held by each 
household. The specific components of household savings are presented in Appendix D. 
As with the other HES-derived variables, savings are estimated by using the same 
procedure outlined in Section 2.4.6.2. The linear regression specification for the matching 
process takes the form: 
 
 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (2.6) 
 
where 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 represents the annual savings for household, i, in time, t, and all the 
independent variables are the same as in Equation (2.3). 
The (𝑊𝑖𝑡 <  𝑊𝑖𝑡
∗) indicator used in this study differs from the one outlined in 
Hacker et al.’s paper. According to Hacker et al. (2014), an “adequate financial safety net” 
is defined as liquid financial wealth sufficient to cover a 25 percent drop in income based 
on the median recovery path (time and magnitude) for a typical individual with similar 
characteristics. Since the data used to compute precautionary savings are available on a 
cross-sectional basis only, I am unable to observe the duration of time it takes individuals 
with similar characteristics and with similar magnitudes of income loss to return to their 
original income after a large income loss. For the purpose of this study, the definition of 
“adequate financial safety net” is therefore simplified to ‘liquid financial wealth sufficient 
 
 34 
to cover at least a 25 percent drop in household income for a given year’. W and W* are 
redefined as follows: 
 
W = available liquid financial assets (precautionary savings) 
W* = minimum liquid financial assets required to cover at least a 25 percent loss in 
income  
2.4.6.7. Indicator for “Not Transitioning into Retirement” (1 - 
Rit)  
The indicator for “not transitioning to retirement” is constructed using HLFS data. 
This is an indicator variable coded as “0” and “1”. “1” represents a “retirement event” 
which establishes whether the household head transitioned to retirement in the ESI year. 
In the construction of the ESI, if a household experienced a 25 percent fall in household 
income in an ESI year which coincides with the household head transitioning to 
retirement, then that household is not counted as insecure. This is because a fall in income 
is expected when an individual transitions away from the workforce.  
In the context of this study, an individual transitions to retirement if two 
conditions are met: (1) they are aged 65 or over in the ESI year, and (2) the number of 
hours worked declines from a positive number (>10 hours) to 10 hours or less over the 
ESI year. This definition of retirement is adopted since retirement data are not routinely 
collected by Statistics New Zealand and there is currently no official retirement age in 
New Zealand. This means that New Zealand residents can retire before or after the age of 
65, aside from a few exceptions where retirement age is written into law, for example, 
coroners and judges. Nonetheless, the New Zealand Government’s website states that 
many people stop working around the age of 65 which coincides with the beginning of 
New Zealand’s superannuation and other forms of pension payments (New Zealand 
Government, 2019); hence, the choice of age 65 as the minimum for a retirement event.  
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2.5. Findings of the ESI and Discussion 
This section presents a descriptive analysis of economic insecurity in New 
Zealand. In Section 2.5.1, I explore the raw insecurity estimates. In Section 2.5.2, I look at 
the average marginal effects of being insecure, using statistical tests for time trends and 
differences between groups. 
2.5.1. Raw Insecurity Estimates 
Table E1 in Appendix E presents the raw insecurity estimates (unconditional 
means) for the period 1999 to 2019. The estimates represent the probability of income 
loss for the entire New Zealand population and by subgroups of the population as 
estimated using Equations (2.1) and (2.2).  
The raw estimates show that economic insecurity was on a downward trajectory 
in the early 2000s, but rose during the GFC and has remained at a somewhat elevated 
level since. Insecurity also appears to follow the business cycle, tracking closely with the 
unemployment and GDP growth rates. Insecurity peaked in 2009, where 13.6 percent of 
the population was insecure, which is likely picking up the effects of the GFC. Another 
spike in insecurity was recorded in 2012, which is likely capturing the effect of the 
Canterbury earthquakes and a severe drought in 2012.16 The temporal changes in 




16 More on this in Section 2.5.3. 
17 Real GDP growth rate and unemployment rate are sourced from Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2020a, 
2020b). Unemployment is defined as the proportion of people who are without paid work, where a person 
is available for and actively searching for employment. GDP growth rate is given by the year-over-year 
annual percentage change in production-based real GDP. These figures are seasonally adjusted (Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand, 2020a). 
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Figure 2.1: Raw Economic Insecurity Estimates, Unemployment and GDP Growth, 
June 1999 to June 2019 
 
 
When examining subgroups of the population, another key finding in the raw 
estimates is that insecurity varies by ethnicity, with ethnic minorities exhibiting 
relatively higher levels of economic insecurity. Specifically, the likelihood of experiencing 
economic insecurity is approximately double for Māori and more than double for Pacific 
peoples when compared to Pākehā.18 Other population subgroups which are more 
susceptible to experiencing insecurity include young adults, households with children, 
persons with a university degree, persons whose relationships ended over the ESI year, 
persons in higher income brackets, persons living in rural areas, persons employed in 
certain industries (for example, mining, agriculture, accommodation and food services) 
and those on full-time employment contracts. The raw data also show that insecurity 
varies across regions in New Zealand, ranging from 7.26 percent of the population of the 
Nelson/Tasman/Marlborough/West Coast region to 13.62 percent in Waikato. 
 
18 Pākehā is a Māori-language word for a New Zealander of European descent (Te Aka Online Māori 
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While some of these results seem sensible, some are surprising. For instance, one 
would expect individuals with higher educational qualifications and those in higher 
income brackets to be less insecure, as is shown in Hacker et al. (2014). It is possible that 
these unconditional means may be biased by other observable and/or unobservable 
characteristics. Hence to test the reliability of these estimates, the next section estimates 
the marginal effects for each group to see if these results hold when several demographic 
characteristics are controlled for. 
2.5.2. Marginal Effects of Being Economically Insecure 
The regression analysis explores economic insecurity by estimating the average 
marginal effects, i.e., the rate at which economic insecurity changes with respect to a 
change in a variable of interest while holding all covariate values constant (Leeper, 2018). 
This is analysed using linear probability models (LPM) as well as generalised linear 
models (GLM). The following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model is specified to 
determine the linear probability of being insecure: 
 
 𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (2.7) 
 
where 𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡  is a binary variable representing household i’s experienced economic 
insecurity in year t and 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is a vector of demographic characteristics (ethnicity, age 
group, gender, region, education, employment status and an indicator for partnership 
dissolution over the ESI year).19 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 and the quadratic term, 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡−1
2 , represent 
equivalised real annual household income. This examines whether household income has 
a non-linear relationship with economic insecurity. A small sample of outliers with 
extreme incomes of less than NZD -$400,000 and more than NZD $1,000,000 are removed 
from the regression sample to decrease variability and increase statistical power. 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 
 
19 In the context of this study, partnerships include anyone living with a significant other, be it by marriage, 
de facto relationship or civil union. The variable for partnership dissolution was constructed to indicate 
whether the household head’s relationship ended over the ESI year. No explicit reason is given for 
partnership dissolution in the data, but could be due to factors such as divorce, separation, death or any 
other circumstance that may cause the dissolution of a partnership.  
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represents the ESI year. Since ESI is a retrospective measure, all demographic variables 
(except year and partnership dissolution) are lagged to capture each household’s 
circumstances at the beginning of the ESI year. All independent variables are categorical 
to show marginal effects, except for the income variables. εit is the error term.20 
All regressions were run using sample weights provided by Statistics New 
Zealand. Since the data used in this analysis are repeated cross-sections, it is possible that 
respondents may be nested within clusters which can potentially bias the standard errors 
(Moulton, 1990). For instance, households that share observable characteristics, such as 
region or socioeconomic status, may also share unobservable characteristics, such as 
motivation, that would lead to correlation in the regression errors. To address this 
potential bias, all standard errors are clustered at the demographic group level so that 
they are robust to heteroscedasticity and within-group correlation.21 
For the OLS model given in Equation (2.7), the average marginal effect of a variable 




=  𝛽𝑗 
(2.8) 
 
where the index j refers to the jth independent variable; so, if, for instance, there are five 
independent variables, there will be five coefficients estimated. The marginal effect is a 
constant (𝛽𝑗) and does not depend on anything else; hence the estimated coefficients of 
the OLS model can be interpreted directly. 
 
20 The variable labour force status was dropped from the regression models due to multicollinearity. 
Industry and urban/rural code were also dropped since there are data missing for these variables for 
several years early in the time series, specifically all pre-2003 data. The Stata command vif (variance 
inflation factor) is run in postestimation to ensure multicollinearity is not present in the preferred model. 
The test estimated vif < 10 and 1/vif > 0.10 for all variables, except for income and income squared. This is 
expected since income has a quadratic relationship with insecurity. I conclude that multicollinearity is 
unlikely to be a problem. 
21 Sandwich robust standard errors are clustered by demographic group level (ethnicity, gender, age and 
income) using the Stata’s vce(robust clustvar) command. The pweight option is used to apply population 
weights to the regression models. 
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There are well-known limitations to using LPM to determine the drivers of 
economic insecurity considering that the dependent variable, ESI, is binary. A problem 
with using LPM for binary outcomes is heteroscedasticity. Linear regression models are 
based on the assumption that the variance of the errors is constant. With binary outcome 
variables, the variance is not constant as the mean changes. Another fundamental 
problem of LPM is that it is possible to get a probability below zero or above one for a 
fitted regression, which is outside the range of probabilities. To overcome these 
problems, I also run a GLM model (probit) which is specifically designed to account for 
binary outcome variables, where the predicted probabilities are constrained to lie 
between 0 and 1. To derive the probability of being insecure using probit, the following 
model is specified: 
 
𝑃𝑟 (𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑿𝑖𝑡) =  𝜙(𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡) (2.9) 
where 𝑿 is a matrix of all explanatory variables, 𝜙(⋅) is the cumulative distribution 
function of the standard normal distribution and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error term. The variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1, 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡−1, 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡−1
2  and 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 are the same as in Equation (2.7). Equation (2.9) basically 
models the conditional probability of 𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 1. 
 Since GLM models involve a non-linear transformation, their results cannot be 
interpreted directly as in OLS models, so estimating the marginal effects requires the 
application of partial derivatives (Leeper, 2018).22 The marginal effects for the probit 
model are obtained by computing the derivative of the conditional mean function with 




= 𝜙(𝐗′𝛽)𝛽𝑗  
(2.10) 
 
while the average marginal effects are estimated as the average of the individual marginal 
effects in the following equation: 
 
 









 𝛽𝑗  
(2.11) 
 
Most of the independent variables used in the regression analysis are categorical, 
namely ethnicity, age group, gender, region, education, relationship status and 
employment status. Marginal effects are computed differently for categorical 
independent variables. Specifically, marginal effects measure the discrete change, i.e., the 
change in the predicted probabilities that come about from a change in the independent 
variable (Leeper, 2018). To compute partial effects for discrete variables, predict the 
probabilities of two discrete values of a variable and take the difference: 
 
 𝐹(?̂?0 + ?̂?1(𝑘 + 1)) − 𝐹(?̂?0 + ?̂?1(𝑘)) (2.12) 
2.5.3. Regression Results 
The results of the most parsimonious LPM and GLM models are presented in Table 
2.3. The estimates show the marginal effects vary over time and for different subgroups 
of the population. Both the LPM and GLM models produce largely similar point estimates 
and standard errors. Considering this, it is likely that little or no predicted probabilities 
fall outside the unit interval in the LPM model. Hence, the estimated parameters of the 
linear regression are assumed to be consistent and unbiased. 
LPM is therefore used as the preferred model in this analysis because it is more 
straightforward to interpret. Hence, the results discussed in Sections 2.5.3.1 and 2.5.3.2 
are from the LPM model, after controlling for each household’s observable 
characteristics. It is important to note that the results do not assume causality. The study 
is unable to control for group-level correlation based on the demographic factors that are 
used to construct ‘predicted’ values for MOOP expenses, housing costs, debt service and 
savings for use in the ESI formula. Also, like in most social or behavioural science studies, 
it is unlikely that all the relevant predictors would be captured by the regression models. 
For instance, unobservable characteristics such as conscientiousness and other 




 Table 2.3: Determinants of Economic Insecurity in New Zealand23  
 Economic Insecurity 
  LPM Probit 
Ethnicity (Reference Category: NZ European) 
New Zealand Maori 0.095** 0.091** 
 (0.035) (0.032) 
Pacific Peoples 0.170*** 0.173*** 
 (0.046) (0.045) 
Asian 0.093* 0.096** 
 (0.036) (0.037) 
Age Group (Reference Category: 15-24) 
25-34 0.009 0.013 
 (0.028) (0.027) 
35-44 -0.017 -0.013 
 (0.030) (0.028) 
45-54 -0.069** -0.062** 
 (0.024) (0.021) 
55-64 -0.113*** -0.102*** 
 (0.031) (0.026) 
65+ -0.120*** -0.138*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) 
Household Income (in NZD $100,000s) 0.398*** 0.336*** 
 (0.045) (0.037) 
Household Income Squared (in NZD $100,000s) -0.039*** -0.050*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) 
Education (Reference Category: Post-School Qualification) 
University Degree -0.034*** -0.029*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
High School -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
No Qualification 0.016*** 0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Not Specified -0.010 0.007 
  (0.011) (0.012) 
…Table continues on next page  
 
23 Full LPM regression models are presented in Appendix F. The results for insecurity by gender are not 
discussed in the results section since gender is reported for the principal earner, typically the household 
head, who responds to income questions in the HLFS and the HES. This captures the gender of the 
responder, but not gender of their partner in the case of a multiple-adult household. There is a high 
likelihood that the gender of household heads are uncorrelated, considering that less than 4 percent of the 
New Zealand population identify as being in same-sex relationships (Statistics New Zealand, 2019c). Hence, 
reporting the findings on gender may not be a true representation of gender differences in insecurity. I 
disregard this reasoning for the results of the other demographic characteristics (for example, age and 
education), since these are more likely to be positively correlated. For instance, highly educated individuals 
generally tend to marry individuals of similar educational status. 
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Table 2.3 (continued): Determinants of Economic Insecurity in New Zealand 
 Economic Insecurity 
  LPM Probit 
Relationship Status (Reference Category: With Partner) 
Relationship Ended Over ESI Year 0.079** 0.071** 
 (0.024) (0.023) 
Region (Reference Category: Auckland)   
Northland 0.050*** 0.049*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Waikato 0.071*** 0.072*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) 
Bay of Plenty 0.052*** 0.050*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) 
Gisborne/Hawke's Bay 0.068*** 0.071*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) 
Taranaki 0.077*** 0.079*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) 
Manawatu-Wanganui 0.076*** 0.083*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) 
Wellington 0.025*** 0.023*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Nelson/Tasman/Marlborough/West Coast 0.029*** 0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Canterbury 0.053*** 0.053*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
Otago 0.059*** 0.063*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
Southland 0.074*** 0.078*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
Full-time/Part-time Code (Reference Category: Full-Time) 
Part-Time Employment 0.028*** 0.020*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Household Composition (Reference Category: Single Parent) 
Two or More Adults with Kids -0.020 -0.016 
 (0.012) (0.010) 
Two or More Adults without Kids 0.002 -0.012 
 (0.014) (0.012) 
Single Person Household 0.028** 0.006 
  (0.010) (0.009) 
…Table continues on next page  
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Table 2.3 (continued): Determinants of Economic Insecurity in New Zealand 
 Economic Insecurity 
  LPM Probit 
Year (Reference Category: 1999)   
2000 -0.018 -0.014 
 (0.011) (0.013) 
2001 -0.025** -0.023* 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
2002 -0.035*** -0.031*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
2003 -0.033*** -0.032** 
 (0.009) (0.011) 
2004 -0.054*** -0.055*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
2005 -0.047*** -0.045*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
2006 -0.058*** -0.058*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
2007 -0.030** -0.038** 
 (0.010) (0.012) 
2008 -0.019 -0.028* 
 (0.012) (0.014) 
2009 -0.014 -0.023 
 (0.011) (0.013) 
2010 -0.028** -0.036** 
 (0.010) (0.012) 
2011 -0.041*** -0.048*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) 
2012 -0.033** -0.040*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) 
2013 -0.038*** -0.045*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) 
2014 -0.051*** -0.055*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) 
2015 -0.065*** -0.068*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
2017 -0.082*** -0.085*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
2018 -0.104*** -0.101*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
2019 -0.094*** -0.094*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Constant -0.021  
 (0.033)  
   
Observations~ 89,736 89,736 
R-squared 0.165   
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05   
~Observations are randomly rounded (up or down) to the nearest multiple of three given 




2.5.3.1. Insecurity by Year 
Table 2.3 presents the yearly marginal effects on the probability of being insecure 
compared to 1999. All else held constant, insecurity appears to be affected by changes in 
the business cycle. The apparent cyclical nature of insecurity is reflected in its correlation 
with two of the country’s key macroeconomic indicators – unemployment and GDP 
growth. Figure 2.2 compares the trend in insecurity with these two indicators and clear 
patterns emerge. Economic insecurity appears to be positively correlated with the 
unemployment rate and negatively correlated with GDP growth. This is the case in most 
years except in 2001, when New Zealand experienced a recession associated with the 
2001 slowdown triggered by the Dotcom crash in technology stocks. A possible reason 
for not seeing a spike in insecurity at this time is that the slowdown did not have a strong 
impact on the New Zealand economy, even though there was a negative output gap in 
2001 (Reddell & Sleeman, 2008). Reddell and Sleeman (2008) put forth several reasons 
that might explain this. Firstly, as part of their monetary policy to lessen the effects of the 
Dotcom crash, as well as a precaution for the possible effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
in the United States, the RBNZ progressively made cuts in the official cash rate (OCR) from 
March 2001. However, interest rates were at a historic low by New Zealand standards at 
that time, so cuts started from an initial OCR of 6.5 percent. Secondly, international 
commodity prices for New Zealand exports remained stable throughout the downturn. 
Thirdly, there was a record low real exchange rate in late 2000. And lastly, the country 
did not experience any significant macroeconomic imbalances during that period. So, 
although the world was experiencing an economic slowdown, business and consumer 
confidence were likely still strong in New Zealand at that time. Also, unemployment 
figures remained fairly stable and actually improved to 0.2 percentage points lower at 
the end of 2001 compared to the end of 2000 (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2020a). This 
could explain why the country also experienced lower economic insecurity.  
For the remainder of the early- to mid-2000s (pre-GFC), falling levels of economic 
insecurity coincided with relatively low volatility in GDP tied with falling unemployment 
rates. In December 2007, New Zealand reported an unemployment rate of 3.3 percent, 
which was its lowest level since 1986 (Statistics New Zealand, 2018c). Following this, the 
country entered an economic recession due to the effects of the GFC. New Zealand 
experienced consecutive falls in real GDP which began in 2007 and continued contracting 
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until 2009. The unemployment rate as well as economic insecurity rose during the GFC 
years, with insecurity peaking in 2009. New Zealand’s recession was reported by the New 
Zealand Treasury (2015) as being amongst the first to enter the recovery stage and was 
considered shallow compared to other advanced economies. Economic recovery in the 
years following the recession may have been slowed down by another uptick in insecurity 
over the 2012/2013 ESI years, which may be capturing the effects of a severe drought in 
2012 and the Canterbury earthquakes (September 2010 and February 2011).24  
 
Figure 2.2: Economic Insecurity, Annual Percentage Change in Real GDP and 
Unemployment Rate, New Zealand, June 1999 to June 2019  
 
 
24 Canterbury and surrounding areas experienced two major earthquakes in September 2010 and February 
2011. On Saturday 4th September 2010, a magnitude 7.1 earthquake occurred at Darfield near Christchurch. 
It was the largest earthquake to hit New Zealand since 1931. On Tuesday 22nd February, a magnitude 6.3 
earthquake (considered an aftershock of the 2010 quake) struck Canterbury with the epicentre near 
Lyttelton. Multiple aftershocks occurred throughout 2011. These quakes caused 185 casualties and 
significant damage to infrastructure. Christchurch’s central business district as well as the economy of New 
Zealand experienced significant economic costs due to this natural disaster shock (Te Ara - The 
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2.5.3.1.1. COVID-19 Implications 
The first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic hit New Zealand in late February 2020. 
Considerable efforts by the New Zealand government to tackle community transmission 
of coronavirus led to its eradication by May 2020. However, a second wave emerged in 
Auckland in August 2020 which has since been contained by the government.  
The lockdowns and border closures which were key in eliminating the spread of 
coronavirus in New Zealand also had a significant negative impact on the economy. Key 
macroeconomic indicators for the first half of 2020 show that the effects of the pandemic 
are already becoming apparent. In the March 2020 quarter, consumer spending fell by 
0.3 percent, business confidence declined, unemployment rose by 5 percent and GDP fell 
by 1.6 percent (Statistics New Zealand, 2020a, 2020e; The Treasury New Zealand, 2020). 
In September 2020, Statistics New Zealand announced that GDP fell by 12.2 percent in 
the June 2020 quarter, plunging New Zealand into the worst economic recession on 
record (Statistics New Zealand, 2020b). 
The unpredictability of the pandemic makes it difficult to accurately forecast the 
full future impacts of the current recession, but the ESI can provide a useful guide to 
estimating how ‘at-risk’ the New Zealand population is to ever-changing economic 
circumstances. It appears that experiencing insecurity may be involuntary for a large 
proportion of New Zealand households since the phenomenon closely follows the 
business cycle. Although it is too soon to use the ESI to estimate how the COVID-19 
pandemic has affected household insecurity, I expect insecurity to rise as it did during 
past downturns. The greater the effects of the recession, the greater the likelihood of 
experiencing insecurity. Government stimulus packages are expected to help buffer the 
rise in insecurity, but household preparedness is also key in determining how New 
Zealanders fare. In addition to the obvious financial instability that accompanies 
insecurity, it is possible that insecurity could have other harmful effects on society or 
potentially exacerbate social problems, such as mental wellbeing, crime rates, suicide 
rates and substance abuse issues. 
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2.5.3.2. Insecurity by Demographic Characteristics 
In addition to temporal variation in insecurity, Table 2.3 suggests that insecurity 
varies by subgroups of the population. Of all the demographic characteristics examined, 
statistically significant differences were found by ethnicity, age group, 
education/qualification, income, relationship status, region, household composition and 
employment status. These results are also depicted graphically in Figure 2.3, which show 
the average marginal effects with a 95 percent confidence interval (CI) by different 
demographic characteristics.25 
2.5.3.2.1. Insecurity by Ethnicity 
The results in Table 2.3 suggest that the probability of experiencing insecurity 
varies by ethnicity.26 The results suggest that Pākehā is the least insecure ethnic group in 
New Zealand. Economic insecurity rates for Māori are likely to be about 9-10 percentage 
points higher than for Pākehā, all else held constant. This result is statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level. This means that if, for example, insecurity is estimated to be 10 
percent for Pākehā and 19 percent for Māori (a difference of 9 percentage points), then 
Māori would be ~90 percent more insecure than Pākehā.27 This is consistent with the 
findings of the raw insecurity data which show that economic insecurity for Māori (~19.3 
percent) is almost twice that of Pākehā (~9.6 percent). Moreover, economic insecurity 
rates amongst Asians are likely to be about 9 percentage points higher than for Pākehā 
(p<0.05), while for Pacific peoples, it is likely to be more than 15 percentage points higher 
than for Pākehā (p<0.001). 
 
25 The coefplot command was used in Stata to plot the point estimates and their confidence intervals from 
the regressions. 
26 As part of the ethics approval process, Ngāi Tahu Research Consultation Committee was consulted at the 
beginning of this study and they consider this research to be of importance to the Māori community. A 
process to report the findings from Chapters 2 through 4 to Māori health organisations, including the local 
Te Kaika health centre and to Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, was established. 




 𝑋 100. 
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Figure 2.3: Average Marginal Effects of Being Insecure with 95% CI by Demographic Characteristics, New Zealand Households, 











…Figure continues on next page 
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Figure 2.3 (continued): Average Marginal Effects of Being Insecure with 95% CI  




5. Household Composition 
 
 




…Figure continues on next page 
 
28 Reg 1 to Reg 12 respectively: (1) Northland, (2) Auckland, (3) Waikato, (4) Bay of Plenty, (5) Gisborne/Hawke's Bay, (6) Taranaki, (7) Manawatu / Wanganui, (8) 
Wellington, (9) Nelson / Tasman / Marlborough / West Coast, (10) Canterbury, (11) Otago and (12) Southland. 
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Figure 2.3 (continued): Average Marginal Effects of Being Insecure with 95% CI  
by Demographic Characteristics, New Zealand Households, 1999 to 2019 
 
7. Household Income 
 









To explain the ethnic disparities in economic insecurity, I propose an argument 
for what I will refer to as a “prosperity tax”. This concept came about from observed 
similarities in the way ethnic minorities in New Zealand distribute their household 
incomes to what is termed the “black tax” in parts of Africa and the United States. Black 
tax is a phenomenon that typically refers to the social and economic burden faced by 
gainfully employed middle-class ethnically black professionals who consider it a duty to 
share their income with extended family members, especially if they are the first ones to 
succeed in their family (Magubane, 2017; Mhlongo, 2019; Ngwadla, 2019). This form of 
income redistribution decreases the income available for their own personal 
development, savings and investment (Magubane, 2017). A possible reason for the black 
tax could be that ethnic minorities are only recently being treated fairly in the workplace 
in many countries and were not able to grow family wealth over the past generations in 
social and economic systems that largely favoured the dominant ethnic group, leading to 
an ethnic wealth divide. 
Similarly, ethnic minority communities in New Zealand are expected to provide 
social and economic support to their kinship networks. A study by Fleming (1997) shows 
that the way in which New Zealand households distribute their earnings varies by 
ethnicity and is largely related to each ethnic group’s definition of family.29 For Pacific 
peoples and Asians, the extended family is considered as part of the family unit, while for 
Māori people the whānau30 is a significant part of their family life and tribal structure; 
conversely, for Pākehā, the family unit typically consists of a couple and their children 
living together in a household (Fleming, 1997; New Zealand Law Commission, 2017). 
Fleming (1997) finds that it is each group’s definition of family that determines what they 
consider to be their primary social and economic unit.  
Hence, Pacific peoples and Māori find it their duty to tend to the economic 
demands of not just their immediate households, but also their extended families and 
 
29 Households that partook in this study were interviewed in 1992 and 1993. The sample consisted of 20 
Māori families, 32 Pacific Island households and 59 Pākehā couples (Fleming, 1997). 
30 Whānau is a Māori-language word typically used to refer to the extended family or a family group of 
traditional Māori society (Te Aka Online Māori Dictionary, 2020b). In a more modern context, it could also 
include friends who may not be related to other members. The term is based on a tribal world view making 
its definition multi-layered and complex, and could extend past the definition used here. See Te Ara - The 
Encyclopedia of New Zealand (2020) and Te Aka Online Māori Dictionary (2020b) for further information.  
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whānau, with Pacific peoples considering it selfish and individualistic if they do not 
(Fleming, 1997). Similarly, in Asian culture, the responsibility of financial care for both 
immediate and extended family members tends to fall on the earning members of the 
family (Rahman, 2015). It is also important to note that these extended family units are 
not just local but could also extend across country borders. For example, there are strong 
economic ties between New Zealand and the Pacific Islands, which include economic 
cooperation through labour mobility and remittances (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (MFAT), 2020). MFAT estimates that about 12,850 workers come to New Zealand 
from the Pacific Islands for work and send remittances back to their home countries 
valued at about NZD$37.5 million per year. That is almost NZD$3,000 per person. For 
Pākehā, on the other hand, family money is not distinguishable from household money 
and tends to be passed down the generations from parents to children (Fleming, 1997). 
These differences put an extra financial burden on ethnic minorities in the form of 
a “prosperity tax” and make it more difficult for them to save and grow wealth to the same 
level as Pākehā can. In line with this postulation, the savings statistics estimated for this 
study using the HES net worth supplement show that the weighted median savings for 
Pākehā is more than 1.5 times higher than the median savings for Asians, more than 5 
times higher than for Māori and more than 8 times higher than for Pacific peoples. A 
higher savings rate could lessen the chance of experiencing unbuffered income losses. It 
could also possibly be related to more positive feelings of subjective economic security. 
The assumption is that having higher levels of precautionary savings reduces anxiety and 
worry about encountering financial loss because one has a financial safety net. For 
instance, consider a New Zealand resident of European descent. Since this group earns 
higher incomes on average and is likely to have a higher level of savings, they could 
possibly comfortably invest in the stock market with a portion of their wealth because 
they feel secure in their buffering capacity in the event of a drop in the value of their 
shares or unforeseen expenses. Conversely, an individual of Pacific descent may have less 
leeway for such activities and may be more risk averse when making financial decisions.  
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2.5.3.2.2. Insecurity by Age Group 
The results in Table 2.3 show that, all else held constant, the marginal effects of 
being insecure persistently decline with increasing magnitude with increasing age. This 
effect becomes statistically significant from around the age of 45. These estimates suggest 
that young adults, aged 15 to 45, the bulk of whom are millennials, are the most 
financially insecure group in New Zealand and that insecurity falls as an individual gets 
older. Compared to persons aged 15 to 24, economic insecurity is estimated to be ~7 
percentage points lower for persons aged 45 to 54 (p<0.01), ~11 percentage points lower 
for persons aged 55 to 64 (p<0.001), and ~12 percentage points lower for retirees 
(p<0.001). 
These results are unsurprising since millennials, more than any other generation, 
are oftentimes reported as being the most financially insecure (e.g., Charles Schwab & Co. 
Inc., 2019; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, 2019).31 In Schwab’s 2019 Modern Wealth 
report on millennials in the United States, it is reported that even though about 60 
percent of millennials report feeling financially insecure and live paycheck-to-paycheck, 
they also spend upwards of US $500 each month on non-essential purchases and almost 
half typically carry a negative credit card balance. The trend is similar in other countries 
across the globe as is reported in the Deloitte Global Millennial Survey 2019, which 
surveyed 13,416 millennials from 42 countries, of which 300 respondents were from 
New Zealand.  
The survey also reports that millennials are generally pessimistic about the 
economic, political and social environments in their respective countries, are sceptical of 
the motives of businesses and believe that their generation faces high barriers to social 
mobility. A main reason cited for the lack of optimism is the Global Financial Crisis of the 
late 2000s, which saw millennials entering the job market at that time being met with 
uncertain and unstable job prospects that negatively impacted their future wages and 
career paths. The report observes that millennials typically had lower real incomes than 
the previous generations at comparable ages, coupled with fewer assets and higher levels 
 
31 The Millennial Generation includes individuals born between 1981 to 1997, Generation X between 1965 
and 1980 and Baby Boomers between 1946 and 1964 (Fry, 2016). Different sources may show slight 
variations in the starting and ending birth years for each cohort. 
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of debt. Moreover, unlike the period following World War II, where globalization was 
taking hold in many economies and economic expansion benefited the majority of 
populations, the post-2007 recession period has arguably led to a rise in inequality, a 
decline in social safety nets, a rise in ‘divisionist’ governments and major changes to 
employment contracts (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, 2019). 
Continuing along the spectrum, Baby Boomers tend to be especially secure and 
wealthier as they were born in years marked with economic expansion and opportunities 
for upward mobility - opportunities that also benefited Generation X. Retirees are the 
most economically secure in New Zealand, which is possibly linked to the country’s social 
welfare system. Most New Zealand residents get superannuation when they turn 65 
and/or local or overseas pension from their employer or union. In addition, a large 
proportion of the population also save for retirement through a voluntary work-based 
savings scheme called KiwiSaver which was introduced in 2007 to supplement the NZ 
Superannuation. As of October 2019, almost 3 million New Zealand residents were 
enrolled in the KiwiSaver scheme (KiwiSaver, 2019). Other welfare benefits such as 
public healthcare as well as lifetime savings could also contribute to more economic 
security for over 65s.  
2.5.3.2.3. Insecurity by Household Income 
The results in Table 2.3 suggest an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
economic insecurity and household income, all else held constant. This result is 
significant at the 0.1 percent level. I apply a differential calculus approach to find the 
vertex (or turning point) of the real quadratic function of the form: 
 
 𝑓: ℝ→ℝ, 𝑓(𝑥) =  𝑎𝑥2 + 𝑏𝑥 + 𝑐 (2.13) 
 
where a, b and c are real numbers and a  0. The turning point occurs when the first 
derivative 𝑓′(𝑥) =  2𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏 is equal to zero or 𝑥∗ = −
𝑏
2𝑎
 (Kojić & Škrinjarić, 2019). This 




The existence of a turning point suggests that there is a non-linear relationship 
between insecurity and income where the likelihood of being insecure rises with income 
up to the turning point, after which insecurity declines as income increases. Although this 
inverted U-shaped relationship exists, the turning point falls into the top 0.01 percent of 
income earners in the sample. This suggests that New Zealand’s ultra-rich are shielded 
from experiencing insecurity, but for the majority of the population, there is a positive 
relationship between insecurity and income. This seems a counter-intuitive finding as 
most would assume that low-income individuals would be most insecure with insecurity 
falling with higher incomes. However, New Zealand’s relatively high minimum wage 
could be driving the limited variability in low incomes. This study’s finding corroborates 
the findings of a study on income dynamics in New Zealand carried out by Carter and 
Gunasekara (2012). Using data from SoFIE, the authors found more stability in incomes 
in the highest and lowest income quintiles, with the most volatility being concentrated in 
the middle-income groups.32  
A possible reason for more year-on-year variation as income rises could be related 
to increased flexibility in employment contracts in modern times, which has decreased 
the stigma associated with changing employers or career paths over the course of life. 
Highly skilled and educated workers, which tend to command relatively higher salaries, 
may be more comfortable switching jobs or careers since they tend to be more 
marketable. In contrast, low-skilled individuals, which tend to command relatively lower 
salaries, may hold on to jobs longer because it may be difficult to find another one. 
Moreover, households with higher incomes are more likely to have multiple working 
adults. If there are two or more people contributing to household income, there is a 
higher probability that one may lose their job, or choose to stop working, than for single-
earner households. 
Another possible reason for the mostly positive relationship between insecurity 
and household income finding may be related to the nature of careers that command 
higher incomes, such as the non-standard careers of self-employed contractors and 
entrepreneurs. For example, large long-term government contractors could register large 
income gains in one year and close to none in the following years. Higher income earners 
may also be more likely to accumulate enough wealth to make investments in financial 
 
32 For more on this, see the literature review in Section 2.2.2 of this chapter.  
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instruments such as stocks and bonds, which may be more susceptible to changes in the 
macroeconomic environment. Arguably, as income increases, it may be more financially 
prudent to hold fewer liquid assets.  
For the proportion of households that fall into the over NZD $490,000 income 
category (that is, above the turning point), it is assumed that with such high incomes, 
there is a greater capacity to save and create a sufficient financial safety net to buffer 
income shocks. 
2.5.3.2.4. Insecurity by Education/Qualification 
The marginal effects by education/qualification presented in Table 2.3 are 
analysed with reference to New Zealanders with post-school qualifications. All else held 
constant, the results show that there is no significant difference between persons with 
high school education and those with post-school qualifications. An explanation for this 
could be related to New Zealand’s heavy reliance on primary industries, like agriculture 
and tourism. Such industries are quite diverse in New Zealand and may require tertiary 
training in some cases; however, jobs in these fields are also highly accessible with a high 
school degree coupled with on-the-job training, vocational training or other training 
qualifications specific to each industry making tertiary education unnecessary. In this 
way, these qualifications may be comparable, to an extent, in the labour market. 
Unsurprisingly, New Zealanders with no formal qualifications appear to be the 
most insecure category, while university graduates appear to be the least insecure, all 
else held constant. This is likely due to the positive correlation between education and 
economic outcomes that is found in many studies. The New Zealand government, as well 
as private individuals and their families, invest heavily in tertiary education and the 
advancement of human capital every year, which translates into economic payoffs for 
New Zealanders. According to research by Nair et al. (2007), investment in tertiary 
education, both private and public, leads to greater social and economic outcomes for 
New Zealanders. These benefits include higher earnings and a higher likelihood to gain 
and sustain employment, especially during economic recessions (Nair et al., 2007). Their 
research suggests that there is more stability in labour market outcomes from investment 
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in tertiary education, while HLFS data show that individuals with tertiary education have 
lower unemployment rates. 
2.5.3.2.5. Insecurity by Region 
The marginal effects by region are analysed with reference to Auckland, New 
Zealand’s largest region. Holding all else constant, the results in Table 2.3 suggest that all 
regions have higher levels of economic insecurity compared to Auckland, but to varying 
degrees. This finding is statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level for all regions. 
Auckland is the most economically secure region in New Zealand, followed closely by 
Wellington. At the other end of the spectrum, Manawatu-Wanganui appears to have the 
highest levels of insecurity, estimated at almost 8 percentage points higher than 
Auckland. Figure 2.4 presents a visual representation of these findings.33 
 
Figure 2.4: Regional Economic Insecurity 
New Zealand Households, 1999 to 2019 (Base: Auckland) 
 
 
33 Figure 2.4 was created by the author on mapchart.net. 
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Auckland and Wellington, New Zealand’s most secure regions, are also the 
country’s main urban centres. They tend to stand out when compared to the other 
regional economies for several reasons, many of which may explain their relatively lower 
levels of economic insecurity. Firstly, Auckland is New Zealand’s largest regional 
economy, followed by Wellington (Statistics New Zealand, 2019d). Auckland’s regional 
specialisation is quite varied and is mainly driven by professional, scientific and technical 
services; construction; wholesale trade; financial and insurance services; and education 
and training (Eaqub & Stephenson, 2014; Statistics New Zealand, 2019d). Wellington’s 
main regional specialisation is in financial and insurance services, professional, scientific, 
technical, administrative and support services, public administration, defence and safety 
(Eaqub & Stephenson, 2014). Auckland is commonly considered New Zealand’s 
“economic powerhouse” while Wellington is the country’s political capital. There are high 
levels of specialisation and diversity in both regions creating high concentrations of 
skilled and high-paying jobs. This feature tends to attract high levels of human capital and 
business investment to both regions. This also means that these regional economies are 
less economically volatile and more resistant to economic shocks (Eaqub & Stephenson, 
2014). Wellington’s economic security could also be attributed to its large proportion of 
stable government jobs. The region has the largest share of the country’s national 
defence, safety and public administration industries. These services are arguably quite 
valuable and necessary to modern societies, even during economic downturns. They 
ensure the implementation of government policy which drives the smooth functioning of 
society and offers citizens protection from external or internal threats. This could 
contribute to more stable regional economies. 
Manawatu-Wanganui is the country’s most insecure region and tends to rank 
relatively low on many economic metrics compared to other regions. Manawatu-
Wanganui’s main specialisation is in agriculture and to a lesser extent, public 
administration, defence and safety (Eaqub & Stephenson, 2014). The region’s heavy 
reliance on exports from primary industry (mainly agriculture) makes it highly 
susceptible to commodity price volatility and natural disasters. Susceptibility to such 
economic shocks contribute to high volatility in the region’s incomes. For example, there 
were fluctuations in the prices for milk, forestry products, meat, coal, and oil over the 
period of study, and these were reflected in large swings in the value of the region’s 
primary industries (Statistics New Zealand, 2014, 2019c). Moreover, the 2012-2013 
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drought affected primary production in many parts of the country, especially in the North 
Island. The effects were severe in the Manawatu-Wanganui region where sheep, beef and 
dairy farming all declined (Statistics New Zealand, 2014). These examples demonstrate 
the region’s susceptibility to economic shocks. 
2.5.3.2.6. Insecurity by Household Composition 
The household composition results are estimated with reference to single-parent 
households. What is clearly coming through from the results in Table 2.3 is that 
households with two or more adults, whether they have children or not, tend to be less 
insecure than single-adult households, all else held constant.  
This likely reflects more stability in joint incomes and the sharing of 
responsibilities with others who can form a support system in good and bad economic 
times. It is unsurprising that single-parent households are more insecure than multi-
adult household since single parents are most vulnerable to being economically 
disadvantaged in New Zealand, both in absolute terms as well as when compared to two-
parent households (Centre for Social Research and Evaluation, 2010). 
A surprising finding is that single-person households are likely to be ~2.8 
percentage points more insecure than single-parent households. This could possibly be 
due to single parents getting extra support from the other parent or from the New 
Zealand Government through programmes like the Sole Parent Support (Ministry of 
Social Development, 2020). Also, living alone is likely more expensive than living with 
others since one has no opportunity to benefit from decreased living expenses due to the 





2.5.3.2.7. Insecurity by Relationship Status 
The results in Table 2.3 suggest that economic insecurity for persons whose 
relationships ended over the ESI year is ~8 percentage points higher than for those who 
maintained a stable relationship over the ESI year (p<0.01), all else held constant. This is 
likely because people living together as partners may have dual incomes and contribute 
jointly to household expenses. In such cases, the household’s lifestyle may be set up with 
dual incomes in mind. If such a partnership ends over the ESI year, causing the household 
to transition from dual incomes to a single income, this may have a significant impact on 
the ability of the household to meet their regular expenses.   
2.5.3.2.8. Insecurity by Employment Status 
The results in Table 2.3 suggest that economic insecurity for persons on part-time 
employment contracts are likely to be ~2.8 percentage points higher than those on full-
time employment contracts (p<0.001), all else held constant. Considering insecurity’s 
close link to the labour market, this is an unsurprising finding. This link is so important 
that job insecurity is a commonly used proxy for economic insecurity in the literature.  
Precarious employment contracts have been increasing in the past few decades 
globally.34 However, part-time workers typically, but not always, have less stable 
employment contracts, are usually paid less and are less likely to receive employment 
benefits (Haines III et al., 2018; Hirsch, 2005; Zeytinoglu & Cooke, 2005). Less stability in 
incomes might hinder an individual’s ability to effectively plan for their financial future, 
especially if their income stream and job security is uncertain. 
2.5.4. Comparison with the United States 
This section compares the findings of the New Zealand ESI to those for the United 
States. This comparison is made with the latest publicly available insecurity data for the 
United States and are obtained from the official ESI website run by Jacob Hacker and his 
 
34 More on this in Chapter 4. 
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colleagues through Yale University’s Institution for Social and Policy Studies (2020). The 
website presents an integrated measure of insecurity for the United States based on the 
work of Hacker et al. (2014) and covers the period 1986 to 2012. 
A comparison of both indexes shows largely mixed findings. Although New 
Zealand and the United States are both classified as high-income, advanced economies, 
there are very distinct differences between the two in areas such as culture, size, 
population, income inequality, human rights and social welfare. This could account for 
the diverse findings when comparing the two. 
 
i. The Similarities 
 
There are several trends in insecurity that are similar in New Zealand and the 
Unites States. Temporal changes in insecurity are found to be related to the business cycle 
in both countries. This is unsurprising as the risk of income loss tends to increase during 
economic downturns. Patterns of insecurity by ethnicity, education and household 
composition are also largely similar in both countries. In both countries, minority ethnic 
groups are more insecure than people of European descent, which make up the majority 
in both populations. Individuals with higher educational levels are more secure as it is 
generally expected that income and job stability improve with educational advancement. 
Households with multiple adults (with or without children) are generally more secure 
than single-adult households. However, a difference here is that single-person 
households are more secure than single-parent households in the United States, but less 
secure in New Zealand. 
 
ii. The Differences 
 
There is less variation in insecurity levels in New Zealand than in the United States 
across regions and states respectively. The large disparity in land mass and population 
size between the two countries could likely be driving these differences. Because of its 
size, US states can vary substantially in terms of governance, culture, values, etc., whereas 
the differences amongst New Zealand regions may be subtler. 
There are also marked differences in insecurity by age. The trend in insecurity by 
age group is completely reversed in the United States when compared to New Zealand. In 
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the US, retirees are the most insecure by age group, whereas in New Zealand they are the 
most secure. This may be due to differences in each country’s welfare systems. The US 
estimates may be partially reflective, at least in the latter ESI years, of the effects of the 
GFC on retirement accounts, where Americans have witnessed declining social security 
benefits, defaults on pensions, and substantial loss on the real values of their 401(k)s and 
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) (Whitehouse, 2009). Another likely explanation 
is the differences in healthcare systems. Unlike New Zealanders who can benefit from the 
public healthcare system, especially since health deteriorates with age, Americans 
without healthcare coverage may incur higher costs as they age. 
Another interesting difference is that insecurity has an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with income in New Zealand but is negatively related to income in the United 
States. For both countries, persons earning the highest level of income are the most 
secure. However, in New Zealand, a positive relationship holds for the majority of the 
population (except the top 0.01 percent), whereas for the United States insecurity falls as 
income rises throughout the income distribution. 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter presents an ESI for New Zealand. Economic insecurity is deemed as 
important to social and economic policy, since it is a phenomenon that could affect 
individuals from all backgrounds. This distinguishes it from the concept of poverty or 
even income inequality. The ESI is a novel contribution to the literature since it is the first 
index constructed for New Zealand that aims to integrate key characteristics of insecurity 
into a single measure. The main contributing factors are income volatility, out-of-pocket 
medical expenditures, debt servicing, housing costs and household wealth in the form of 
liquid financial assets, which act as a potential buffer to economic shocks. Past studies on 
New Zealand have largely focused solely on income volatility. 
The findings of the index show that insecurity is cyclical in New Zealand, tending 
to increase in times of economic downturns and decrease in times of economic booms. 
Insecurity also closely tracked GDP growth and unemployment, suggesting that much of 
the changes may be involuntary and related to economic shocks. This could mean that 
there is a major and challenging role for policymakers to play in ensuring stability in 
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incomes in unstable economic times, especially with consideration to the current COVID-
19 pandemic. It is difficult to predict what the effects of the pandemic will be because of 
its unpredictability, but I expect a spike in economic insecurity as New Zealanders 
experience job losses and precarious financial circumstances as a result. The magnitude 
of the expected spike in insecurity will depend on the length and depth of the recession, 
each household’s buffering capacity and the effectiveness of government stimulus 
packages. 
There also exist differences in insecurity amongst population subgroups. The 
results of LPM and GLM regressions suggest that ethnic minorities, young adults, people 
with no educational qualifications, single-adult households, persons whose relationships 
ended over the ESI year, high-income households and persons on temporary employment 
contracts are more likely to be insecure. The ethnic differences in insecurity are of key 
importance, since the findings of the ESI suggest that ethnic minority groups experience 
relatively high levels of insecurity compared to Pākehā. Specifically, Asians and Māori are 
almost twice as likely to experience insecurity compared to Pākehā, while Pacific peoples 
are more than twice as likely to be insecure compared to Pākehā. Insecurity also varies 
across regions, with Auckland and Wellington being the least insecure regions and 
Manawatu-Wanganui being the most insecure. These results are all statistically 
significant. 
The use of a large representative sample spanning over 20 years means that the 
index can be used to make generalisations about the wellbeing of the New Zealand 
population which could prove vitally important to policymakers in assessing how ‘at-risk’ 
different demographic groups are to economic shocks. 
2.6.1. Limitations 
The ESI for New Zealand is a comprehensive indicator of objective economic 
insecurity, but it is not without its limitations. Although the HLFS contains repeated 
cross-sectional data, the lack of genuine panels in New Zealand spanning back to the 
1980s (similar to those used in Hacker et al. (2014)) is not ideal. The major limitation 
here is that the same individuals are not followed over time which takes away from the 
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richness of the dataset, and consequently the robustness of the results.35 Moreover, 
predicting savings, debt service and MOOP expenses data from the HES, which surveys 
largely different household than the HLFS, meant that the data had to be matched by 
household demographic information. This, therefore, reduces the accuracy of the 
estimates for each household. 
One of the advantages of the ESI is that it uses data on household income and 
expenditure patterns, making it an objective indicator of wellbeing. However, an even 
more comprehensive approach would combine objective factors with subjective 
perceptions of individuals when constructing an index. Using the ESI as a solitary 
measure of insecurity will thus have its limitations when it comes to overall welfare of a 
household, which spans past financial measures. There will be subjective factors that are 
not captured by the ESI, but which may play an important role in establishing insecurity. 
Individuals’ subjective feelings about their current situation as well as their expectations 
about their futures could vary substantially, even if they share similar observable 
characteristics, and these differences could influence their savings and consumption 
patterns. There could also be other factors inherent in the dynamics of a household that 
affect a household’s future prospects which may be difficult to capture in the data. These 
include things like culture, gender equality, mental stability, personal motivation, sense 
of optimism/pessimism, abilities and so on. 
A main disadvantage of using survey data is the possible lack of validity and 
reliability in the survey responses. Respondents may be dishonest in their responses, 
there may be misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the survey questions and 
individuals may not have the proper literacy skills to answer some questions. 
Respondents may also avoid sensitive survey questions. These could lead to response 
errors. The assumption is that these problems are negligible. Moreover, even though the 
HLFS is not a genuine panel, respondents are surveyed over eight quarters which can lead 
to attrition. This sampling frame means that household members are followed over time, 
but only while they continue to live at a particular address. Hence, attrition occurs not 
only due to non-responses, but also because of address changes between waves 
 
35 A second version of New Zealand’s ESI is presented in Chapter 3 for comparison purposes. This index is 
constructed using SoFIE which is a longitudinal survey that follows the same participants over eight waves 
(from 2002 to 2010). 
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(Crawford, 2009). On top of attrition, respondents who did not respond in both income 
quarters were dropped, thus decreasing the sample size. 
2.6.2. Policy Recommendations 
A key recommendation is that the ESI developed in this study be adapted by 
Statistics New Zealand and published on an annual basis. This will make the ESI an official 
government statistic that will be available for researchers and policymakers. The ESI will 
provide policymakers a powerful tool to monitor the changes in insecurity over time and 
by demographic groups, which can help inform policy decisions. This chapter outlines the 
adjustments made to the ESI methodology in order to estimate some of the key 
components that are not directly available in the HLFS, such as household savings and 
debt service. This may be a problem for some researchers. To overcome this issue, an 
“unbuffered” version of the ESI could also be published. 
Although New Zealand already boasts a comprehensive welfare system, I propose 
some additions to the current redistributive policies. Primarily, providing welfare 
support that is not based on a set of pre-determined conditions, but reaches all 
sociodemographic groups could help lessen the impact of household insecurity, 
especially in recessionary times. Universal Basic Income (UBI) with an opt-out option 
could provide an inbuilt safety net that reaches all households. I am not proposing that 
UBI be large enough to offset the large income losses envisaged in the ESI, since this can 
vary largely by household. Instead, the intent is to help New Zealand households maintain 
a decent standard of living in times of economic loss. UBI could lessen the stress that 
comes from financial uncertainty, since households that experience large negative 
income shocks will still able to maintain a certain standard of living until the income 
returns to its original level. This will provide a sense of financial security for households. 
Moreover, UBI could encourage self-development and innovation because it remains 
constant if individuals lose their jobs. For instance, UBI could make it possible for persons 
to get skills training or even open new businesses in the event of job loss. This will help 
stimulate aggregate demand after economic downturns. A way in which the government 
can provide additional support for UBI payments is by introducing a tax on inherited 
wealth and capital gains. However, to determine whether an effective UBI scheme is 
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affordable, a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis is needed, which is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
Taking preventative measures to address insecurity before the fact could be a 
useful strategy for policymakers. One way to do this is by investing in people by providing 
households with the tools to improve the likelihood of preventing insecurity before it 
occurs. Education at all stages of life, not just in adulthood, is key in this regard. Having 
financial literacy programmes in schools could be a good start. One of the observations of 
Statistics New Zealand in surveying the population for net worth information is that some 
of the respondents appear to lack basic financial literacy skills, suggesting a need for 
financial literacy programmes. These programmes should be mandatory in all schools 
and introduced as early as possible. These programmes should focus on providing 
individuals with the skills to effectively manage their financial resources by making 
informed decisions through the course of life. An important focus should be on preparing 
for financial shocks. 
Another recommendation is to increase public spending on preventative 
healthcare programmes, with the aim to help residents avoid illnesses. Health is a major 
component of human capital that can lead to a decrease in productivity and ability if 
diminished. Hence, poor health could possibly result in voluntary or involuntary job loss, 
which can increase the likelihood of being insecure. Developing good health habits could 
lead to improved productivity and stability in work attendance, which could further 
translate to stability in social and economic circumstances. Preventative healthcare 
programmes should focus on improving health outcomes by focusing on how to take care 
of physical and mental health, and by providing information on the resources available to 
help. Mindfulness training, up-to-date nutrition courses, physical activity support 
services, mandatory vaccinations and mental healthcare programmes, should be offered 
in workplaces and schools. 
New Zealand’s vulnerable natural environment makes the country susceptible to 
the effects of natural disasters and extreme weather, as is discussed in Section 2.5.3.1. It 
appears that the country experienced an increase in insecurity in the years affected by 
severe drought and earthquakes. A vulnerable natural environment can lead to financial 
instability amongst households, especially those which are unprepared for such a shock. 
Natural disasters can be very expensive for households and insurance companies, lead to 
job losses and can lead to an increase in the cost of necessities like food and fuel. Such 
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severe adverse economic consequences on households typically happen in the short-
term as a result of disasters, but can also have long-lasting effects on the most vulnerable 
subgroups of the population. Although natural disasters cannot be prevented, through 
innovation the government can mitigate the effects of these shocks which could translate 
to greater economic security for households. One way this can be lessened is through 
government funding towards research and the development of critical infrastructure that 
can withstand the effects of natural disasters. For example, investment in the design and 
construction of structures capable of withstanding strong ground motions can be key in 
mitigating the effects of earthquakes, while building angled walls, roads, etc. can help 
steer water and debris away from populated areas in the event of an earthquake-
triggered tsunami. 
2.6.3. ESI Application Software 
This ESI would be most useful if the information is shared with different 
stakeholders in New Zealand, not only with academics and policymakers. In order to do 
so, it is a future goal of this study to create a website to share New Zealand’s economic 
insecurity data. This website would explain what the ESI is and have an interactive tool 
to explore economic insecurity in New Zealand by year, regions and demographic groups. 
This website would be consistently updated as new micro-level data becomes available.  
In addition, an interactive application software (app), both computer-based and 
mobile-device-based, could be quite useful. The proposed app would allow individuals 
and households to estimate their level of economic insecurity by inputting the relevant 
household data needed to estimate insecurity. The app would also allow users to make 
comparisons with other households based on demographic information. This 
information would, of course, be anonymised and could provide a useful source of data 
to do future upgrades of the ESI as well as to provide information to policymakers, 




2.6.4. Who can use the ESI? 
The ESI is a practical tool that could benefit many different stakeholders. Table 2.4 
provides a list of possible uses. This is not an exhaustive list.  
 
Table 2.4: Possible Uses of the ESI by Different Stakeholder Groups  
Stakeholder Possible Uses 
Government & 
Policymakers  
1. To determine which subgroup(s) of the population are most 
susceptible to income loss.  
  
2.  To develop or make changes to national policies, e.g. minimum and 
maximum wages. 
  
3.  To develop appropriate welfare programmes (or adjust existing 
programmes) to assist insecure households. 
  4. To determine what factors contribute to economic insecurity. 
Academics & Researchers 
1.  To carry out further work on the economic security index in terms 
of changes or upgrades. 
  
2.  To carry out further research on how insecurity relates to social, 
political, economic or health issues.  
General Public / 
Households 
1.  To understand their likelihood of being insecure. 
  
2.  To aid in financial planning. For example, it can help households 
estimate the level of savings necessary to provide a sufficient safety net 
in the event of economic shocks. 
  
3.  To plan and prepare for significant life changes, e.g. making fertility 
decisions. 
 Businesses 
1.  To aid in making business decisions. For example, the ESI can 
provide insight as to how a company can diversify their offerings 
across regions and demographic groups. 
  
2. To help in making decisions surrounding corporate social 
responsibility. For example, it can help in determining which groups to 
target with social assistance. 
Other Countries 1.  To make comparisons for further development in their own country. 
  
2.  To help decide what aid packages and other social assistance 
programmes that could be used to assist another country's residents. 
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2.6.5. Recommendations for Future Research 
The ESI for New Zealand was constructed to provide an objective measure of 
economic insecurity, but it is by no means perfect or complete. It has limitations which 
warrant further research to complement it and to help improve its reliability. 
The objective nature of the ESI is one of its main strengths. As a complement to 
this, creating a survey of subjective measures of insecurity would be a useful comparison 
to see if the ESI results match the general sentiment of New Zealand residents. National 
surveys which assess New Zealanders’ perceptions of economic security, such as the 
General Social Survey (GSS), could be used or a new set of opinion polls can be embedded 
in one or more of the other surveys that sample economic wellbeing, such as HLFS, HES, 
CENSUS or an updated version of SoFIE. These could survey households about their 
perceived risk of income loss as well as their perception of their household’s buffering 
capacity. Implementing this change could provide answer to questions relevant to 
economic security such as ‘how reasonable is the 25 percent threshold?’, ‘how long could 
their household survive after income loss before experiencing hardship?’, ‘does the 
household have emergency funds for unexpected expenses?’, ‘how difficult would it be to 
replace your current income if you lost your job?’ and ‘is income loss voluntary or 
involuntary?’. In line with this recommendation, it has been recently reported that 
following the effects of COVID-19, Statistics New Zealand has included questions on job 
security in the June 2020 quarter of the HLFS. These questions were targeted at employed 
individuals. About 7 percent of respondents felt that the chances of losing their job(s) 
over the next year is high or almost certain (Statistics New Zealand, 2020f). The collection 
of such data can be useful in providing a clearer picture of the state of insecurity in New 
Zealand. 
Exploring how insecurity relates to various social and economic outcomes could 
be an interesting way to use the index and to provide vital information to stakeholders 
across society. Some of the areas that could be explored include insecurity’s relationship 
with health outcomes (such as obesity, mental illness, fertility and life expectancy), 
economic mobility, social issues (such crime and domestic violence), environmental 
issues (such as pollution and urban sprawl), welfare preferences, business confidence, 
consumer expectations, economic downturns (including the ongoing COVID-19 
pandemic), travel and immigration decisions (for example, are New Zealanders moving 
 
 70 
to Australia for better opportunities because they feel insecure at home?) and the deep 
determinants of insecurity. Also, research on the prevalence of the concept of a 
“prosperity tax” amongst New Zealand ethnic groups could be useful. 
This list is not exhaustive. In line with exploring relationships, Chapter 4 focuses 
on how insecurity relates to mental wellbeing in New Zealand. In that study, household 
level insecurity will be matched by demographic characteristics to respondents in SoFIE 
to examine the insecurity-mental health nexus in New Zealand.   
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Appendix A: ESI Formula (Hacker et al., 2014) 
 
For each household, i, in time, t,  
 
𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑡 =  
∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑡
 (𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑜 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠) 
(A1) 
 
where Loss (L), is defined as: 
 
𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓  (






𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝐷𝑖𝑡−1
𝑒𝑖𝑡−1
) ∩ (𝑊𝑖𝑡 < 𝑊𝑖𝑡
∗)  ∩ (1 − 𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
(A2) 
  𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝑂 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒. 
 
where yi is total household income (inflation-adjusted), Mi is household out-of-pocket 
medical spending and Di is annual household debt service burden. ei represents a family 
size equivalence scale, which gives less weight to children than adults and assumes a 
concave relationship between household size and needs: ei = [0.7(childreni) 
+1(adultsi)]0.7. (Wit < Wit*) and (1 - Rit) are dichotomous indicators. (Wit < Wit*) is an 
indicator for “lacking sufficient financial wealth” and (1 - Rit) is an indicator for “not 




Appendix B: Characteristics of the Sample 
 
Table B1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables36 Mean Std. Dev. 
Insecurity 0.1231 0.3285 
Household Income (NZD $) 69843.89  64780.42 
Equivalised Household Income (NZD $) 43364.73 38851.92 
Debt Service (NZD $) 761.01 230.76 
Medical Out-of-Pocket Expenses (NZD $) 287.20 66.24 
Housing Costs (NZD $) 4021.32 1664.75 
Savings (NZD $) 28518.11 22226.50 
Ethnicity: European / Pākehā 0.6593 0.4739 
Ethnicity: Māori 0.0847 0.2784 
Ethnicity: Pacific Peoples 0.0364 0.1872 
Ethnicity: Asian 0.0628 0.2427 
Ethnicity: Male 0.4060 0.4911 
Ethnicity: Female 0.4632 0.4986 
Age 47.1085 19.0006 
Age: 15-24 0.1152 0.3193 
Age: 25-34 0.1490 0.3561 
Age: 35-44 0.1538 0.3608 
Age: 45-54 0.1400 0.3470 
Age: 55-64 0.1285 0.3346 
Age: 65+ 0.3134 0.4639 
Region: Northland 0.0342 0.1817 
Region: Auckland 0.2657 0.4417 
Region: Waikato 0.0835 0.2767 
Region: Bay of Plenty 0.0565 0.2309 
Region: Gisborne/Hawke's Bay 0.0412 0.1988 
Region: Taranaki 0.0234 0.1512 
Region: Manawatu / Wanganui 0.0490 0.2158 
Region: Wellington 0.0988 0.2985 
Region: Nelson / Tasman / Marlborough / West Coast 0.0362 0.1867 
Region: Canterbury 0.1154 0.3195 
Region: Otago 0.0447 0.2067 
Region: Southland 0.0206 0.1421 
Education: University Degree 0.1729 0.3782 
Education: Post School Qualification 0.2852 0.4515 
Education: High School  0.1921 0.3939 
Education: No Qualification 0.2130 0.4094 
Relationship Status: Relationship Ended Over ESI year 0.0271 0.1623 
Relationship Status: With Partner 0.9729 0.1623 
   
Observations   326,013  
…Table continues on next page  
 
36 As per Statistics New Zealand’s output rules, all counts are randomly rounded (up or down) to the nearest 
multiple of three, and minimum and maximum values are suppressed. 
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Table B1 (continued): Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
Household Composition: Single Parent Household 0.1010 0.3014 
Household Composition: Two or More Adults with Kids 0.2647 0.4412 
Household Composition: Two or More Adults without 
Kids 0.2646 0.4411 
Household Composition: Single Person Household 0.2386 0.4262 
Labour Force Status: Employed 0.5277 0.4992 
Labour Force Status: Unemployed 0.0301 0.1709 
Labour Force Status: Not in Labour Force 0.3098 0.4624 
Full-time Employment 0.3258 0.4687 
Part-time Employment 0.0944 0.2924 
Year: 1998 0.0375 0.1899 
Year: 1999 0.0378 0.1906 
Year: 2000 0.0392 0.1941 
Year: 2001 0.0397 0.1953 
Year: 2002 0.0404 0.1969 
Year: 2003 0.0378 0.1907 
Year: 2004 0.0381 0.1913 
Year: 2005 0.0386 0.1927 
Year: 2006 0.0681 0.2519 
Year: 2007 0.0469 0.2114 
Year: 2008 0.0474 0.2126 
Year: 2009 0.0474 0.2126 
Year: 2010 0.0485 0.2147 
Year: 2011 0.0486 0.2149 
Year: 2012 0.0491 0.2160 
Year: 2013 0.0489 0.2156 
Year: 2014 0.0497 0.2172 
Year: 2015 0.0505 0.2190 
Year: 2016 0.0454 0.2082 
Year: 2017 0.0465 0.2105 
Year: 2018 0.0462 0.2098 
Year: 2019 0.0479 0.2136 
   
Observations   326,013  




Table B1 (continued): Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
Urban  0.6494 0.4771 
Rural 0.0757 0.2644 
Industry: Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 0.0306 0.1723 
Industry: Mining 0.0013 0.0361 
Industry: Manufacturing 0.0517 0.2214 
Industry: Electric, Gas, Water and Waste Services 0.0033 0.0573 
Industry: Construction 0.0377 0.1904 
Industry: Wholesale Trade 0.0208 0.1428 
Industry: Retail Trade 0.0449 0.2071 
Industry: Accommodation and Food Services 0.0211 0.1438 
Industry: Transport, Postal and Warehousing 0.0193 0.1377 
Industry: Information Media and Telecommunications 0.0084 0.0910 
Industry: Financial and Insurance Services 0.0144 0.1191 
Industry: Rental, Hiring & Real Estate Services 0.0197 0.1389 
Industry: Professional, Scientific and Technical 
Services 0.0351 0.1841 
Industry: Administrative and Support Services 0.0193 0.1377 
Industry: Public Administration and Safety 0.0315 0.1746 
Industry: Education and Training 0.0347 0.1830 
Industry: Health Care and Social Assistance 0.0424 0.2015 
Industry: Arts and Recreation Services 0.0066 0.0807 
Industry: Other Services 0.0144 0.1189 
Industry: Not Elsewhere Included 0.0012 0.0347 
   




B1.1 Ethnic Groups Classifications 
 
Respondents are grouped into four ethnic groups for this study. They are described as 
follows:  
 
(1) New Zealand European / Pākehā - Persons who identify as being of full 
European descent. 
(2) New Zealand Māori - Persons who identify as Māori or persons who are of mixed 
descent that includes Māori. 
(3) Pacific peoples / Pacifika - All Pacific peoples and persons who are of mixed 
descent that includes Pacifika, but excludes New Zealand Māori  
(4) Asian - Persons who identify as Asian and who are of mixed descent that includes 
Asian, but excludes Māori and Pacifika.  
 
Households that identify as multi-ethnic or mixed, but do not fall into one of the four 
categories outlined above, are captured by the “other” ethnic category, which was 




Appendix C: Additional Notes on Equivalence Scales  
 
Table C1: Comparison of OECD-Modified Equivalence Scale  
and NAS-Recommended Equivalence Scale by Household Composition 







First Adult/Household Head 
1.0 1.0 
Second and Each Subsequent 
Adult 0.5 1.0 
Each Child Aged Under 14 (NAS)/ 
Under 15 (OECD) 0.3 0.7 
Source: Adapted from Hacker et al. (2014) and Eurostat (2018). 
 
C1.1 Notes on deriving household composition for the computation of the OECD-
Modified Equivalence Scale. 
 
This study uses the OECD-modified equivalisation technique in estimating 
economic insecurity, where [eit = ((1*first adulti) + (0.5*additional adultsi) + (0.3* 
childreni))]. Since data on the number of adults and the number of children in each 
household unit are not explicitly available in the IDI, these figures had to be imputed from 
a household type variable in order to calculate the family size equivalence scale. The 
household type variable breaks down New Zealand households by either couples or single 
parents, and is then further broken down by number of dependent and adult children 
based on age and labour force status. It also identifies if there are any ‘other’ people living 
in the household who are unrelated (non-family members). Single-person households are 
also identified. Using this information, I am able to construct variables for the number of 
children and the number of adults per household by making a few assumptions. 
Firstly, the assumption is made that the average New Zealand woman gives birth 
to two children. This figure is computed using fertility data from Statistics New Zealand 
(2018b) for which the average fertility rate between 1998 and 2019 is found to be 2.1. 
Hence, when deriving household composition variables for this study, the number of 
children is capped at two per household if the number of children is unspecified and is 
capped at four per household when the description specifies “three or more dependent 
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children”. This assumption holds for households with both dependent children (aged 
under 15 years) and adult children living in the same household. 
The second assumption is that “other” people (i.e., unrelated/non-family 
members) would be capped at one adult. Additionally, single-person households will be 
classified as containing one adult, dependent children are classified as “children” and 




Appendix D: Components of Household Savings  
 
Table D1: Components of Household Savings (Liquid Financial Wealth) 
Currency  
1   Prepaid foreign currency travel cards worth at least NZ $1,000 in total. 
2   Travellers cheques worth at least NZ $1,000 in total in any currency. 
3   Gift vouchers worth at least NZ $1,000 in total. 
4   Over NZ $1,000 in any currency that is not held in a bank. 
Deposits 
5   Deposits with banks or other financial institutions that have generated income. 
6   Deposits with banks or other financial institutions that have not generated income. 
7   Deposits with a mixture of financial institutions that have not generated income. 





Appendix E: Raw Economic Insecurity Estimates for New Zealand 
 
Table E1: Probability of a 25 percent drop in household income  
for subgroups of the New Zealand population (1999 to 2019) 
Variables37 Economic Insecurity 
New Zealand Long-Run Total (1999-2019) 0.1151 
Year: 1999 0.1068 
Year: 2000 0.1170 
Year: 2001 0.1110 
Year: 2002 0.1068 
Year: 2003 0.1048 
Year: 2004 0.0891 
Year: 2005 0.0881 
Year: 2006 0.0831 
Year: 2007 0.1168 
Year: 2008 0.1281 
Year: 2009 0.1361 
Year: 2010 0.1287 
Year: 2011 0.1174 
Year: 2012 0.1355 
Year: 2013 0.1179 
Year: 2014 0.1197 
Year: 2015 0.1119 
Year: 2017 0.1142 
Year: 2018 0.1028 
Year: 2019 0.1179 
Ethnicity: European / Pākehā 0.0966 
Ethnicity: Māori 0.1935 
Ethnicity: Pacific Peoples 0.2417 
Ethnicity: Asian 0.1725 
Ethnicity: Male 0.1084 
Ethnicity: Female 0.1205 
Age: 15-24 0.1918 
Age: 25-34 0.2029 
Age: 35-44 0.1662 
Age: 45-54 0.1316 
Age: 55-64 0.0690 
Age: 65+ 0.0155 
Income Quintile 138 0.0322 
Income Quintile 2 0.0393 
Income Quintile 3 0.0863 
Income Quintile 4 0.1361 
Income Quintile 5 0.2768 
 ….Table continues on next page 
 
37 Estimates for Urban/Rural and Industry are for the period 2003-2019. 
38 Quintile 1 represents the lowest quintile, while quintile 5 represents the highest.  
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Table E1 (continued): Probability of a 25 percent drop in household income  
for subgroups of the New Zealand population (1999 to 2019) 
Variables Economic Insecurity 
Relationship Status: Partnership Ended Over ESI year 0.1931 
Relationship Status: With Partner 0.1086 
Education: University Degree 0.1390 
Education: Post School Qualification 0.1166 
Education: High School  0.1193 
Education: No Qualification 0.0942 
Region: Northland 0.0981 
Region: Auckland 0.1136 
Region: Waikato 0.1362 
Region: Bay of Plenty 0.1097 
Region: Gisborne/Hawke's Bay 0.1226 
Region: Taranaki 0.1261 
Region: Manawatu / Wanganui 0.1239 
Region: Wellington 0.1295 
Region: Nelson / Tasman / Marlborough / West Coast 0.0726 
Region: Canterbury 0.1118 
Region: Otago 0.1057 
Region: Southland 0.1244 
Household Composition: Single Parent Household 0.1068 
Household Composition: Two or More Adults with Kids 0.1449 
Household Composition: Two or More Adults without Kids 0.1049 
Household Composition: Single Person Household 0.0993 
Full-Time Employment 0.1709 
Part-Time Employment 0.1277 
Labour Force Status: Employed 0.1583 
Labour Force Status: Unemployed 0.1131 
Labour Force Status: Not in Labour Force 0.0532 
Urban Areas 0.1147 
Rural Areas 0.1317 
Industry: Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 0.1997 
Industry: Mining 0.2090 
Industry: Manufacturing 0.1604 
Industry: Electric, Gas, Water and Waste Services 0.1561 
Industry: Construction 0.1859 
Industry: Wholesale Trade 0.1512 
Industry: Retail Trade 0.1559 
Industry: Accommodation and Food Services 0.2012 
Industry: Transport, Postal and Warehousing 0.1590 
Industry: Information Media and Telecommunications 0.1729 
Industry: Financial and Insurance Services 0.1599 
Industry: Rental, Hiring & Real Estate Services 0.1647 
Industry: Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 0.1666 
 ….Table continues on next page 
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Table E1 (continued): Probability of a 25 percent drop in household income  
for subgroups of the New Zealand population (1999 to 2019) 
Variables Economic Insecurity 
Industry: Administrative and Support Services 0.1320 
Industry: Public Administration and Safety 0.1426 
Industry: Education and Training 0.1282 
Industry: Health Care and Social Assistance 0.1359 
Industry: Arts and Recreation Services 0.1720 
Industry: Other Services 0.1485 
Industry: Not Elsewhere Included 0.1765 
 
E1.1 Sensitivity to Changing ESI Formula 
 
Table E1 shows that the long-run population-level ESI for the period 1999-2019 
is ~11.51 percent. In Section 2.4.6.3, it was established that MOOP expenses may not have 
a large effect on insecurity in New Zealand since the majority of the population receives 
healthcare services from the public healthcare system. In line with this postulation, 
excluding MOOP expenses from the ESI formula is found to have an effect on New 
Zealand’s long-run ESI, albeit this effect is inconsequential. When MOOP expenses are 
excluded, long-run ESI is estimated as ~11.50 percent. 
Another variation explored is a change to the condition that households must have 
at least 25 percent of their equivalised annual income in the form of liquid financial 
wealth to be considered economically secure. This threshold was used to remain true to 
Hacker et al.’s formula for the United States, but it is arbitrary for the New Zealand 
population. One might argue that having 25 percent of a household’s income in liquid 
assets may not be financially prudent, particularly for higher income households. An 
alternative formula with a threshold of 10 percent was tested which increased the long-







Appendix F: Determinants of Economic Insecurity in New Zealand (Full Regressions) 
 
Table F1: Determinants of Economic Insecurity in New Zealand (Full) 
 Economic Insecurity (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Ethnicity (Reference Category: NZ 
European)           
New Zealand Māori 0.097** 0.097** 0.072* 0.102** 0.095* 0.093* 0.090* 0.096** 0.096** 0.095** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
Pacific Peoples 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.121** 0.148** 0.144** 0.140** 0.166*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.170*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Asian 0.074* 0.074* 0.037 0.050 0.060 0.058 0.079* 0.091* 0.092* 0.093* 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Gender (Reference Category: Male)           
Female  0.005 0.014 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.023 
  (0.028) (0.020) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Age Group (Reference Category: 15-24)           
25-34   0.014 0.001 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.009 
   (0.021) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) 
35-44   -0.017 -0.027 -0.021 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 -0.020 -0.017 
   (0.021) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) 
45-54   -0.051** -0.069** -0.067** -0.074** -0.074** -0.073** -0.067** -0.069** 
   (0.017) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
55-64   -0.110*** -0.108*** -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.112*** -0.108*** -0.103** -0.113*** 
   (0.019) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
65+   -0.164*** -0.108*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.111*** -0.102*** -0.105*** -0.120*** 
      (0.020) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) 
….Table continues on next page  
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Table F1 (continued): Determinants of Economic Insecurity in New Zealand (Full) 
….Table continues on next page  
 Economic Insecurity (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Household Income (in NZD 
$100,000s)    0.331*** 0.351*** 0.351*** 0.361*** 0.384*** 0.399*** 0.398*** 
    (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.045) 
Household Income Squared (in NZD 
$100,000s)    -0.027* -0.030** -0.030** -0.031** -0.035** -0.038*** -0.039*** 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Education (Reference Category: Post-School 
Qualification)          
University Degree     -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.040*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.034*** 
     (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
High School     -0.013* -0.012* -0.010* -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 
     (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
No Qualification     0.019*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
     (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Not Specified     -0.050*** -0.047*** -0.049*** 0.001 -0.008 -0.010 
     (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Relationship Status (Reference Category: 
With Partner)          
Partnership Ended over ESI Year      0.067** 0.069** 0.068** 0.068** 0.079** 
      (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Region (Reference Category: Auckland)           
Northland       0.047*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
       (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Waikato       0.070*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 
       (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Bay of Plenty       0.049*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 
       (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Gisborne/Hawke's Bay       0.067*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
       (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Taranaki       0.074*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 
              (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
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Table F1 (continued) : Determinants of Economic Insecurity in New Zealand (Full) 
 Economic Insecurity (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Region continued (Reference Category: 
Auckland)           
Manawatu-Wanganui       0.075*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 
       (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Wellington       0.027*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 
       (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Nelson/Tasman/Marlborough/West 
Coast       0.026*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
       (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Canterbury       0.051*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 
       (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Otago       0.060*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.059*** 
       (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Southland       0.071*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 
       (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Year (Reference Category: 1999)           
2000        -0.009 -0.010 -0.018 
        (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
2001        -0.016* -0.017* -0.025** 
        (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
2002        -0.025** -0.026** -0.035*** 
        (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
2003        -0.022* -0.023* -0.033*** 
        (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
2004        -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.054*** 
        (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
2005        -0.035** -0.036*** -0.047*** 
                (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 




Table F1 (continued): Determinants of Economic Insecurity in New Zealand (Full) 
….Table continues on next page 
  
 Economic Insecurity (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Year continued (Reference Category: 
1999)           
2006        -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.058*** 
        (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
2007        -0.032** -0.021* -0.030** 
        (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
2008        -0.020 -0.009 -0.019 
        (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
2009        -0.016 -0.006 -0.014 
        (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
2010        -0.030** -0.019* -0.028** 
        (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
2011        -0.044*** -0.033** -0.041*** 
        (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
2012        -0.035*** -0.025* -0.033** 
        (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
2013        -0.041*** -0.030** -0.038*** 
        (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
2014        -0.053*** -0.043*** -0.051*** 
        (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
2015        -0.068*** -0.058*** -0.065*** 
        (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
2017        -0.085*** -0.075*** -0.082*** 
        (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
2018        -0.106*** -0.097*** -0.104*** 
        (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
2019        -0.097*** -0.087*** -0.094*** 
                (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
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Table F1 (continued): Determinants of Economic Insecurity in New Zealand (Full) 
 Economic Insecurity (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Full-time/Part-time Code (Reference Category: Full-
Time)          
Part-Time Employment         0.025*** 0.028*** 
         (0.007) (0.006) 
Household Composition (Reference Category: Single 
Parent)          
Two or More Adults with Kids          -0.020 
          (0.012) 
Two or More Adults without Kids          0.002 
          (0.014) 
Single Person Household          0.028** 
          (0.010) 
Constant 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.166*** 0.021 0.019 0.016 -0.028 0.000 -0.032 -0.021 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.033) 
           
Observations~ 89,778 89,778 89,736 89,736 89,736 89,736 89,736 89,736 89,736 89,736 
R-squared 0.016 0.016 0.055 0.143 0.146 0.149 0.156 0.162 0.163 0.165 
Robust standard errors in parentheses           
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05           
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Economic Insecurity in New 





The results in this chapter are not official statistics. They have been created for research 
purposes from the Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI), managed by Statistics New 
Zealand.  
 
The opinions, findings, recommendations, and conclusions expressed in this chapter are 
those of the author(s), not Statistics NZ. 
  
Access to the anonymised data used in this study was provided by Statistics NZ under the 
security and confidentiality provisions of the Statistics Act 1975. Only people authorised 
by the Statistics Act 1975 are allowed to see data about a particular person, household, 
business, or organisation, and the results in this paper have been confidentialised to 
protect these groups from identification and to keep their data safe.  
 
Careful consideration has been given to the privacy, security, and confidentiality issues 
associated with using administrative and survey data in the IDI. Further detail can be 
found in the Privacy impact assessment for the Integrated Data Infrastructure available 




One of the main limitations of the Economic Security Index (ESI) constructed for 
New Zealand in Chapter 2 is that the data were not sourced from genuine panel surveys. 
The only appropriate panel survey available from Statistics New Zealand that contains 
the relevant data to construct an ESI is the Survey of Family, Income and Employment 
(SoFIE). SoFIE is a longitudinal survey that provides information about the changes in the 
economic wellbeing of individuals and families over time. This short chapter 
supplements the analysis in Chapter 2 by creating a second ESI for New Zealand using 
SoFIE for comparison purposes and for use in the analysis in Chapter 4. To avoid 
confusion in this chapter, the ESI constructed in Chapter 3 using the HLFS & HES datasets 
- the “main” index - will be referred to as ESIhlfs while the SoFIE version will be referred 
to as ESIsof. 
There are two main reasons why the ESIhlfs is considered the main index in this 
thesis. Firstly, ESIhlfs has greater temporal coverage. ESIhlfs covers the period 1999 to 
2019, while ESIsof is limited to the period 2003 to 2010. Secondly, there are limitations of 
the SoFIE panel that may challenge the representativeness of the results. These are 
covered in Section 3.2. 
After controlling for several demographic and socioeconomic characteristics in 
OLS and probit regressions, the results of ESIsof and ESIhlfs show largely similar trends in 
economic insecurity across population subgroups; however, there is variation in the 
effect sizes. Moreover, the temporal changes in insecurity are largely uncorrelated across 
the two indexes. The differences are likely attributable to the limitations of the SoFIE 
dataset. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 covers the data used in 
this study. Section 3.3 covers the methodology. Section 3.4 presents the results of the 
ESIsof and compares the findings with the ESIhlfs. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
 89 
3.2. Data  
This chapter uses data from SoFIE to construct a second version of the ESI for New 
Zealand.39 SoFIE collected information on the economic wellbeing of households over 
time focusing on areas such as employment, income, net worth and household/family 
circumstances. SoFIE followed the same individuals over eight waves from October 2002 
to September 2010. Data are collected on an annual basis, with each interview cycle, or 
wave, conducted from October to September each year. It is a regional survey and 
consists of approximately 22,000 individuals in 11,500 households and 7,500 children 
aged under 15 years. The target population for the first wave is the usually resident 
population living in private dwellings in the North and South Islands (including Waiheke 
Island, but excluding other offshore islands) during the year ended 30 September, 2003. 
“Eligible” respondents in wave 1 were all individuals which Statistics New Zealand 
attempted to survey, whether they received a response or not. These are referred to as 
the original sample members (OSMs). For subsequent waves, people who were no longer 
available, for example, individuals who moved overseas, died or moved into institutions, 
were no longer considered eligible. Hence, the original target population consistently 
declined with each wave. SoFIE also contains a health supplement in waves 3, 5 and 7 
which will be utilised in the study in Chapter 4. Information about assets and liabilities 
are collected in waves 2, 4, 6 and 8. 
3.2.1. SoFIE Response Rates  
The response rates for each SoFIE wave are presented in Table 3.1. Approximately 
63 percent of OSMs responded in every wave. Attrition rates were particularly high for 
Māori and Pacific peoples, single parents, young people and low-income individuals 
(Carter et al., 2010a; Carter & Gunasekara, 2012). SoFIE’s attrition rate appears to be as 
expected since studies have found it to be comparable to other international longitudinal 
 
39 The information presented in this chapter on the SoFIE dataset is informed by unpublished user guides 
and data dictionaries available within the Integrated Data Infrastructure environment, unless other 
sources are explicitly cited. 
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surveys such as the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) (~69 percent) and the 
Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey (HILDA) (~67 percent) 
(Buck et al., 2006; Carter & Gunasekara, 2012; Carter et al., 2014; Wilkins et al., 2011). 
Sample weights were provided by Statistics New Zealand to account for attrition. 
3.2.2. Removed Responses 
In addition to attrition, this study is dealing with a more recent methodological 
problem. A large proportion of SoFIE data were removed by Statistics New Zealand in 
April 2018 due to confidentially issues. The removed data were of all the respondents, 
and their children, who did not consent to have their data linked to their health records. 
Table 3.1 presents a breakdown of the removed data. When the data removal is accounted 
for, and in addition to attrition, only ~48 percent of OSMs responded in all eight waves.40  
The removed data creates a sample selection problem for my analysis that could 
potentially lead to bias in the results. Unfortunately, since there are no other longitudinal 
data available through Statistics New Zealand that are appropriate for my analysis, I 
decided to proceed with the study on the assumption that the non-consenters are a 
random subgroup of respondents since the removal was apparently not based on any 
particular set of observable or unobservable characteristics. Hence, the removed 
responses are treated as attrition. Sample weights have not been revised since the large 
data removal, so weights are not employed for this analysis. 
3.2.2.1. A Note on the Representativeness of the Results 
using SoFIE 
The data removal will challenge the representativeness of the results for the 
studies that use SoFIE data in this thesis. To observe the extent to which the data removal 
may degrade the representativeness of the studies using SoFIE, the sample means for 
demographic characteristics for the SoFIE sample used in this thesis are compared with 
 
40 In this current analysis, all individuals who responded in at least two waves are included; hence the 
analysis is not restricted to OSMs who responded in all eight waves. 
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the sample means  from wave 1 of SoFIE, which were presented in a cohort profile of 
SoFIE conducted by Carter et al. (2010a). These comparisons are presented in Table G1 
in Appendix G. The comparison table shows that there are variations in the sample means 
for most demographic characteristics. Some vary more than others. For example, the 
sample means for ethnicity have less variation as opposed to the sample means for 
education and partnership status. Regardless, SoFIE still remains the best longitudinal 
dataset available from Statistics New Zealand for this study, but caution is recommended 
in generalising the results. 
 
Table 3.1: SoFIE Response Rates Before and After Data Removal, Waves 1-841 
SoFIE 
Wave 










Adults   Total  
Remaining 
OSMs 
1  7,520 22,270 29,790 100% 5,700 18,200 23,900 80% 
2  6,095 20,420 26,515 89% 4,500 16,300 20,800 70% 
3  5,160 19,260 24,420 82% 3,600 15,100 18,700 63% 
4  4,510 18,470 22,980 77% 3,100 14,500 17,600 59% 
5  3,910 17,870 21,780 73% 2,700 14,000 16,700 56% 
6  3,335 17,345 20,680 69% 2,300 13,600 15,900 53% 
7  2,830 16,825 19,655 66% 2,000 13,200 15,200 51% 
8  2,440 16,210 18,650 63% 1,700 12,700 14,400 48% 
3.3. Methodology 
The components as well as the methodology used to construct ESIsof are the same 
as in ESIhlfs.42 The only difference is that ESIsof does not adjust for medical out-of-pocket 
(MOOP) expenses and debt service since these data are not available in SoFIE. ESIsof is 
constructed using the following formula: 
 
41 Response rates before data removal sourced from Carter et al. (2014). Response rates after data removal 
are rounded to the nearest 100, given Statistics New Zealand’s rounding rule. 
42 See Chapter 2 for the extended methodology. All computations, variable descriptions and assumptions 
remain the same, unless otherwise specified. 
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For each household, i, in time, t, 
 








where L, is defined as: 
 
𝐿𝑖𝑡 =  {









) ∩ (𝑊𝑖𝑡 < 𝑊𝑖𝑡
∗)  ∩ (1 − 𝑅𝑖𝑡)                                                     




where ESIt is the proportion of the population experiencing large losses, Li is the 
household-level insecurity status (whether the household experienced a loss or not), yi is 
total inflation-adjusted household income, Hi is annual household housing costs, 𝑒𝑖 
represents the OECD-modified family size equivalence scale, (Wit < Wit*) is an indicator 
for “lacking sufficient financial wealth” and (1 - Rit) is an indicator for “not transitioning 
into retirement”. The intersection symbol, ∩, means that all conditions in Equation 4.4. 
need to be satisfied for 𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 1. 
 In order to make a fair comparison between ESIsof and ESIhlfs, the components of 
ESIhlfs were reduced to incorporate the same formula used in this chapter (i.e., Equations 
(3.1) and (3.2)) and to cover the same time period (2004 to 2010). 
3.4. Results and Discussion 
The raw insecurity estimates for both indexes are presented in Table H1 in 
Appendix H. The insecurity results are mixed, and the estimates are generally smaller in 
ESIsof than in ESIhlfs. I also run OLS and probit regressions to determine the linear 
probability of being insecure using data from both indexes, controlling for demographic 
and socioeconomic characteristics. The following regression models are specified to 
determine the marginal effects. Equation (3.3) represents the OLS model and Equation 





𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝑖𝑡 (3.3) 
 
𝑃𝑟 (𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑿𝑖𝑡)
=  𝜙(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡) 
     (3.4) 
 
where 𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡  is a binary variable representing the proportion of individuals who 
experience loss (25 percent or greater decline in household income) and 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is a vector 
of demographic characteristics (ethnicity, gender, region, education, partnership 
dissolution and household composition). 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 and the quadratic term, 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑡−1
2 , 
represent equivalised real annual household income43. 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 and the quadratic term, 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1
2 , represent age of the respondent. 𝑿 is a matrix of the explanatory variables. All 
demographic variables are lagged to capture each household’s circumstances at the 
beginning of the ESI year. εit is the error term. All standard errors are clustered at the 
household level. 
 The results of the regression analysis comparing the marginal effects of being 
economically insecure using ESIhlfs and ESIsof are presented in Table 3.2. Figure 3.1 shows 
the plots displaying the point estimates and their confidence intervals from the 
regression estimation. The signs of the coefficients are largely the same for both ESIhlfs 
and ESIsof showing similar patterns in insecurity for most subgroups. However, there is 
much variation in the effect sizes between the two indexes. For instance, although all the 
results show that ethnic minorities have a higher likelihood of being insecure compared 
to Pākehā, the magnitude is greater in ESIsof, when compared to ESIhlfs. Similarly, I observe 
larger effect sizes in ESIsof for age group, education, region and household composition. 
With reference to year, ESIsof shows a lower likelihood of being insecure in all years 
following 2005, whereas ESIhlfs paints a different picture. The results from ESIhlfs show no 
significant difference between most of the years, except in 2009, where insecurity was as 
its highest point since 2004. This could be picking up the effects of the GFC.  
 
43 A small sample of outliers with extreme incomes are removed from the regression sample in both 
indexes. For ESIsof, these are individuals who earn less than NZD -$500,000 and more than NZD $1,000,000, 
while for ESIhlfs, these are individuals who earn less than NZD -$400,000 and more than NZD $1,000,000. 
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Table 3.2: Determinants of Economic Insecurity in New Zealand  
(ESIhlfs vs ESIsof Comparison) 
 
Economic Insecurity 
(HLFS)   
Economic Insecurity 
(SoFIE) 
Variables LPM Probit   LPM Probit 
Ethnicity (Reference Category: NZ European) 
New Zealand Maori 0.084*** 0.078***  0.144*** 0.096*** 
 (0.010) (0.009)  (0.012) (0.009) 
Pacific Peoples 0.149*** 0.153***  0.200*** 0.169*** 
 (0.015) (0.014)  (0.023) (0.020) 
Asian 0.084*** 0.086***  0.132*** 0.112*** 
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.019) (0.016) 
Age Group (Reference Category: 15-24)      
25-34 -0.003 -0.000  -0.098*** -0.095*** 
 (0.011) (0.010)  (0.014) (0.013) 
35-44 -0.030** -0.026**  -0.196*** -0.189*** 
 (0.010) (0.010)  (0.013) (0.012) 
45-54 -0.075*** -0.067***  -0.234*** -0.223*** 
 (0.010) (0.009)  (0.013) (0.012) 
55-64 -0.103*** -0.100***  -0.357*** -0.348*** 
 (0.010) (0.009)  (0.012) (0.011) 
65+ -0.100*** -0.141***  -0.345*** -0.368*** 
 (0.010) (0.009)  (0.011) (0.011) 
Household Income (in NZD $100,000s) 0.394*** 0.319***  0.404*** 0.233*** 
 (0.016) (0.015)  (0.014) (0.021) 
Household Income Squared (in NZD 
$100,000s) -0.035*** -0.045***  -0.030*** -0.013 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.007) 
Education (Reference Category: Post-School Qualification) 
University Degree -0.026*** -0.021***  -0.091*** -0.050*** 
 (0.007) (0.006)  (0.009) (0.006) 
High School -0.008 -0.008  -0.022** -0.021*** 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.005) 
No Qualification 0.017*** 0.020***  0.092*** 0.086*** 
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Not Specified 0.011 0.029  0.071* 0.038 
 (0.080) (0.090)  (0.034) (0.028) 
Relationship Status (Reference Category: With Partner) 
Relationship Ended over ESI Year 0.067*** 0.059***  0.047*** 0.047*** 
  (0.010) (0.009)   (0.009) (0.008) 




Table 3.2 (continued) – Determinants of Economic Insecurity  
in New Zealand (ESIhlfs vs ESIsof Comparison) 
 
Economic Insecurity 
(HLFS)   
Economic Insecurity 
(SoFIE) 
Variables LPM Probit   LPM Probit 
Region (Reference Category: Auckland)      
Waikato 0.067*** 0.068***  0.138*** 0.112*** 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.010) (0.008) 
Wellington 0.023** 0.020**  0.080*** 0.061*** 
 (0.008) (0.007)  (0.009) (0.007) 
Rest of North Island 0.054*** 0.056***  0.119*** 0.095*** 
 (0.006) (0.005)  (0.008) (0.006) 
Canterbury 0.054*** 0.056***  0.088*** 0.073*** 
 (0.008) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.006) 
Rest of South Island 0.045*** 0.046***  0.141*** 0.113*** 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.009) (0.007) 
Year (Reference Category: 2004)      
2005 0.005 0.007  0.005 0.013 
 (0.008) (0.009)  (0.008) (0.008) 
2006 -0.003 -0.001  -0.074*** -0.068*** 
 (0.008) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.007) 
2007 0.003 0.005  -0.017* -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.007) 
2008 0.008 0.010  -0.095*** -0.088*** 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.007) 
2009 0.017* 0.019*  -0.039*** -0.019* 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) 
2010 -0.000 0.004  -0.096*** -0.080*** 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Household Composition (Reference Category: Single Parent) 
Two or More Adults with Kids -0.014 -0.012  -0.026 -0.015 
 (0.008) (0.007)  (0.013) (0.009) 
Two or More Adults without Kids -0.011 -0.019*  -0.054*** -0.029*** 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.012) (0.009) 
Single Person Household -0.006 -0.024**  -0.059*** -0.049*** 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.012) (0.008) 
Constant -0.039**   0.188***  
 (0.012)   (0.017)  
      
Observations~ 31,740 31,740  27,117 27,117 
R-squared 0.158     
Number of IDs (SoFIE)~       10,296   
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05      
~Observations and number of IDs are randomly rounded (up or down) to the nearest multiple of 




Figure 3.1: Marginal Effects of Being Insecure with 95% CI by Demographic 
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Figure 3.1 (continued): Marginal Effects of Being Insecure with 95% CI by  
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 Figure 3.1 (continued): Marginal Effects of Being Insecure with 95% CI by  
Demographic Characteristics, New Zealand Households, 2004 to 2010 
Household Composition (ESIhlfs) 
 








The results from both indexes show largely similar trends in insecurity in New 
Zealand, but there is variation in magnitudes. This variation could possibly be related to 
the limitations in the SoFIE dataset. For instance, I do not use longitudinal weights in 
SoFIE because of attrition and missing data, which will diminish the representativeness 
of the results. This could have introduced selection bias into the regression estimates. 
Regardless of the data limitations, the coefficient signs from both indexes are largely 
consistent and the general trends for subgroups of the population are considered reliable, 
but one should be cautious in interpreting the magnitude of the SoFIE results.  
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Appendix G: SoFIE Sample Means Comparison 
 







Wave 144 Difference 
Ethnicity: Pākehā 0.683 0.687 -0.004 
Ethnicity: Māori 0.166 0.164 0.002 
Ethnicity: Pacific Peoples 0.073 0.072 0.001 
Ethnicity: Asian 0.056 0.059 -0.003 
Gender: Male 0.466 0.477 -0.011 
Gender: Female 0.515 0.523 -0.008 
Age: 15-24 0.151 0.128 0.023 
Age: 25-34 0.140 0.126 0.014 
Age: 35-44 0.132 0.153 -0.021 
Age: 45-54 0.132 0.127 0.005 
Age: 55-64 0.115 0.098 0.017 
Age: 65+ 0.186 0.116 0.070 
Education: University Degree 0.077 0.130 -0.053 
Education: Post School 
Qualification 0.179 0.321 -0.142 
Education: High School  0.134 0.279 -0.145 
Education: No Qualification 0.129 0.269 -0.140 
Relationship Status: No Partner 0.286 0.500 -0.214 
Relationship Status: With  
Partner 0.221 0.499 -0.278 
Region: Auckland 0.128 0.287 -0.159 
Region: Waikato 0.052 0.092 -0.040 
Region: Wellington 0.078 0.123 -0.045 
Region: Rest of North Island 0.134 0.229 -0.095 
Region: Canterbury 0.096 0.143 -0.047 
Region: Rest of South Island 0.077 0.128 -0.051 
  
 




Appendix H: Raw ESI Estimates (ESIhlfs vs ESIsof) 
 
Table H1: Probability of a 25 percent drop in household income  
for subgroups of the New Zealand population (2003 to 2010) 
 Economic Insecurity 
Variables HLFS Estimates SoFIE Estimates 
New Zealand Long-Run Total 0.1060 0.0601 
Year: 2004 0.0832 0.1179 
Year: 2005 0.0805 0.1026 
Year: 2006 0.0800 0.0420 
Year: 2007 0.1100 0.0775 
Year: 2008 0.1143 0.0303 
Year: 2009 0.1297 0.0615 
Year: 2010 0.1205 0.0296 
Ethnicity: European 0.0908 0.0696 
Ethnicity: Maori 0.1868 0.0532 
Ethnicity: Pacific Peoples 0.2154 0.0263 
Ethnicity: Asian 0.1613 0.0409 
Gender: Male 0.0980 0.0514 
Gender: Female 0.1126 0.0683 
Age: 15-24 0.1863 0.0870 
Age: 25-34 0.1924 0.0823 
Age: 35-44 0.1589 0.0909 
Age: 45-54 0.1235 0.1055 
Age: 55-64 0.0629 0.0498 
Age: 65+ 0.0106 0.0217 
Region: Auckland 0.1074 0.0812 
Region: Waikato 0.1325 0.1519 
Region: Wellington 0.1226 0.1279 
Region: Rest of North Island 0.1041 0.1331 
Region: Canterbury 0.1091 0.1307 
Region: Rest of South Island 0.0899 0.1392 
Education: University Degree 0.1342 0.1332 
Education: Post School Qualification 0.1080 0.1259 
Education: High School  0.1120 0.1245 
Education: No Qualification 0.0878 0.1276 
Relationship Status: Relationship Ended Over ESI year 0.1911 0.1025 
Relationship Status: With Partner 0.0993 0.0573 
Income Quintile 1 0.0273 0.1033 
Income Quintile 2 0.0309 0.0947 
Income Quintile 3 0.0879 0.0521 
Income Quintile 4 0.1250 0.1307 
Income Quintile 5 0.2933 0.2638 
Household Composition: Single Parent Household 0.1122 0.1425 
Household Composition: Two or More Adults with Kids 0.1463 0.1701 
Household Composition: Two or More Adults without Kids 0.0962 0.1292 
Household Composition: Single Person Household 0.0830 0.0883 
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Chapter 4  
The Effect of Economic Insecurity 





The results in this chapter are not official statistics. They have been created for research 
purposes from the Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI), managed by Statistics New 
Zealand.  
 
The opinions, findings, recommendations, and conclusions expressed in this chapter are 
those of the author(s), not Statistics NZ. 
  
Access to the anonymised data used in this study was provided by Statistics NZ under the 
security and confidentiality provisions of the Statistics Act 1975. Only people authorised 
by the Statistics Act 1975 are allowed to see data about a particular person, household, 
business, or organisation, and the results in this paper have been confidentialised to 
protect these groups from identification and to keep their data safe.  
 
Careful consideration has been given to the privacy, security, and confidentiality issues 
associated with using administrative and survey data in the IDI. Further detail can be 






Chapters 2 and 3 introduced the concept of Economic Insecurity and 
systematically covered the process of constructing an ESI for New Zealand based on the 
ESI for the United States developed by Hacker et al. (2014). The main ESI was constructed 
using HLFS and HES survey data (ESIhlfs), while SoFIE was used to create a second ESI 
(ESIsof). 
This chapter uses both versions of the ESI along with longitudinal health data from 
SoFIE to examine the relationship between economic insecurity and the mental wellbeing 
of New Zealanders over the ESI years 2004 to 2010. The relationship between different 
forms of economic risk and both mental and physical health outcomes has been 
extensively analysed in the social sciences and health literature since the 1990s. The 
conventional wisdom is that insecurity leads to adverse health outcomes which include 
mental health disorders (Benach et al., 2014; Catalano, 1991; Kopasker et al., 2018; Mucci 
et al., 2016; Rohde et al., 2016), obesity (Bowers et al., 2009; Offer et al., 2010; Smith et 
al., 2016; Watson, 2015; Wisman & Capehart, 2010), heart disease (Ferrie et al., 2013; 
Lee et al., 2004; Mucci et al., 2016) and suicide (Catalano, 1991; Houle & Light, 2014; 
Mucci et al., 2016; Nandi et al., 2012). 
The primary investigation in this study models the causal impact of economic 
insecurity on the self-rated mental health (SRMH) of New Zealanders. Mental health 
problems are increasing throughout the world and are more widely perceived as a public 
health issue in modern times (Chiu et al., 2020). The 2017/2018 New Zealand Health 
Survey (NZHS) found that about 16.6 percent of New Zealand adults are diagnosed with 
a common mental disorder at some point in their lives. These disorders include bipolar 
disorders, anxiety disorders and depression. New Zealand also has one of the highest 
youth suicide rates in the OECD, with more than 500 people dying from suicide each year 
(Ministry of Health, 2017). People identifying as Māori and Pacifika are more likely to 
suffer from psychological distress than Pākehā and Asians, and these rates are higher for 
women and young people (Statistics New Zealand, 2016b). The economic burden of 
mental illness in New Zealand is estimated at about NZD $12 billion per year, 
approximately 5 percent of GDP (Ministry of Health, 2017). 
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In this study, I employ two commonly-used indicators for psychological distress – 
the Kessler 10 (K10) depression scale and the Short Form 36 health survey, version 2 
(SF-36v2).45 For the SF-36 health survey, both the Mental and Physical Component 
Summary (MCS and PCS) Measures are used. Psychological distress can be described as 
a “state of emotional suffering associated with stressors and demands that are difficult to 
cope with in daily life” (Arvidsdotter et al., 2016, p. 687). It is a well-known risk factor for 
mental illness, and can have profound effects on not only the individuals inflicted, but 
also on their families, society and the economy (Ministry of Health, 2019; Statistics New 
Zealand, 2017). I acknowledge that exploring the determinants of mental wellbeing is a 
very complex issue and there are many factors linked to the phenomenon, the majority 
of which are outside the scope of this study. These could include chemical imbalances in 
the brain, neurological injuries, life experiences (for example, stress, abuse and trauma), 
life choices (social and cultural) and prenatal causes (for example, viruses and substance 
abuse) (Kopinak, 2015).  
This study contributes to the existing literature by providing the first causal 
estimate of the impact of economic insecurity on mental wellbeing in New Zealand. To 
model the causal relationship between insecurity and mental wellbeing, this study relies 
on fixed effects (FE) models, using both exogenously assigned ESI values from ESIhlfs 
(‘predicted economic insecurity’) as well as insecurity values estimated in ESIsof (‘lived 
insecurity events’). Using FE models should tackle any endogeneity problems by 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and/or possible reverse causality. Moreover, 
the ESI is novel for New Zealand, so this particular measure of wellbeing has not yet been 
used before. There is only a handful of studies that have looked at the relationship 
between certain components of insecurity on mental health in New Zealand, including 
job insecurity/unemployment (Blakely et al., 2003b; Fergusson et al., 2007; Keefe et al., 
2002) or food insecurity (Carter et al., 2011). However, until now, none has integrated all 
the components of the ESI into a single measure. 
In line with the growing body of evidence in the literature, this study finds 
evidence to suggest that economic insecurity negatively impacts mental wellbeing, as 
proxied by the K10 scores and the mental component summary of the SF-36. However, 
the results are not statistically significant. The study also finds that experiencing a ‘lived 
 
45 The characteristics of the sample are presented in Appendix I.  
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insecurity event’ improves physical wellbeing, albeit the results are not statistically 
significant, whereas ‘predicted economic insecurity’ worsens physical wellbeing 
(p<0.01). All results are robust to the inclusion of several demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics in the regression models. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 gives a review of the 
literature on the insecurity-health nexus. Section 4.3 discusses the data and methodology 
employed in this study. Section 4.4 presents the econometric analysis and a discussion of 
the findings. Section 4.5 concludes with a summary of the findings, limitations, policy 
recommendations and suggestions for further research. 
4.2. Insecurity and Health Literature 
The insecurity-health nexus has been studied a great deal in the literature. 
However, since there is not yet an agreed-upon measure of economic insecurity, the 
forms and measurement of insecurity used to study this relationship vary.46 Insecurity is 
undoubtedly linked to the labour market and for this reason, job insecurity is probably 
the most common measure of insecurity used. Job insecurity is often understood in terms 
of unstable financial circumstances due to unemployment or precarious employment 
which makes one anxious about the future (Catalano, 1991; Menéndez-Espina et al., 
2019). Insecure jobs have increased significantly over the past few decades. Deregulation 
of labour markets, the Great Recession, globalization and increasing competition are 
some of the factors that have led to the rise in temporary or short-term employment 
contracts (Caldbick et al., 2014; Ferrie, 2001; László et al., 2010; Menéndez-Espina et al., 
2019). This concept is often referred to as ‘flexibilization’ in the job market, whereby 
employment stability arising from union agreements, labour laws, training systems, etc., 
have become more relaxed (Caldbick et al., 2014 ; Hadden et al., 2007). As a result, 
countries have been moving away from stable employment models towards more flexible 
employment arrangements in recent times, resulting in a decline in full-time and 
permanent work contracts, lower wages, less benefits, less regulatory protection, 
financial instability and lower levels of job security (Hadden et al., 2007; Lewchuk et al., 
 
46 See Chapter 2 for in-depth literature review on this topic.  
 
 105 
2008; Menéndez-Espina et al., 2019; Vives et al., 2013). Additionally, some economic 
insecurity measures may include other factors that may cause large drops in income from 
situations other than job insecurity, such as unforeseen expenses (for examples, medical 
bills from illnesses), familial breakup (for example, separation or divorce), economic 
shocks (for example, recessions or natural disaster) and/or old age (Hacker et al., 2010; 
Hacker et al., 2014; Osberg, 1998, 2015; Osberg & Sharpe, 2002, 2005; Rohde et al., 2015; 
Romaguera‐de‐la‐Cruz, 2019). Hence, financial instability, whatever form it may take, 
plays an important role in determining economic insecurity. 
Another form of insecurity that is largely linked to health outcomes is food 
insecurity, although this is arguably indirectly linked to the economic circumstances of 
households. This is because this form of insecurity mainly arises from lack of sufficient 
financial resources to cover food costs (Alaimo, 2005; Bowers et al., 2009; Carter et al., 
2011; Carter et al., 2010b; Gundersen & Ziliak, 2015; Parnell et al., 2001; Stuff et al., 2004; 
Vozoris & Tarasuk, 2003). Food insecurity can be understood as the lack of consistent 
access to sufficient, safe, nutritious and affordable food that has been acquired in a 
socially acceptable manner (Atuoye & Luginaah, 2017; Bowers et al., 2009; Carter et al., 
2011; Carter et al., 2010b; Compton, 2014; Stuff et al., 2004). From a nutritional 
standpoint, populations with high levels of food insecurity, especially in developing 
regions, have been linked to malnutrition in children (Atuoye & Luginaah, 2017; Black et 
al., 2009; FAO et al., 2012). In the United States, this form of insecurity is most commonly 
linked to obesity caused by poor food quality and poor dietary choices (Stuff et al., 2004). 
Recent studies have shown that food insecurity can also affect individuals’ mental health, 
especially from the distress that arises from the inability to access proper food, and to 
feed themselves and their families (Carter et al., 2011; Cole & Tembo, 2011; Maes et al., 
2010; Pryor et al., 2016; Stuff et al., 2004; Tribble et al., 2020). 
Whatever the proxy for insecurity, there is an extensive body of international 
research linking insecurity to a host of adverse physical health and social outcomes 
(Benach et al., 2014; Breiding et al., 2017; Caldbick et al., 2014; Caroli & Godard, 2016; 
Catalano, 1991; Ferrie et al., 2013; Giunchi et al., 2019; Kopasker et al., 2018; László et al., 
2010; Lewchuk et al., 2008; Menéndez-Espina et al., 2019; Mucci et al., 2016; Smith et al., 
2016; Sverke et al., 2002; Vives et al., 2013; Watson, 2015; Wisman & Capehart, 2010), as 
well as an emerging body of evidence which shows that insecurity is related to worse 
mental health outcomes (Benach et al., 2014; Carter et al., 2011; Catalano, 1991; De Witte, 
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1999; Ferrie, 2001; Ferrie et al., 1995; Godin et al., 2005; Green, 2011; Hoff et al., 1997; 
Houle & Light, 2014; Kasl, 1983; Marchand & Blanc, 2011; Meltzer et al., 2010; Mucci et 
al., 2016; Nandi et al., 2012; Rohde et al., 2016; Stansfeld & Candy, 2006; Stuff et al., 2004; 
Sverke et al., 2002; Thomas et al., 2005; Watson, 2015; Watson & Osberg, 2017; Wilson 
et al., 1993). However, the association varies in magnitude across studies. Some studies 
reported a strong correlation (for example, De Witte, 1999; Godin et al., 2005; Mandal et 
al., 2011; Meltzer et al., 2010; Niedzwiedz et al., 2017; Rohde et al., 2017a; Thomas et al., 
2005; Watson & Osberg, 2017; Wilson et al., 1993), others found a moderate to weak 
relationship (for example, Caroli & Godard, 2016; De Witte, 1999; Rohde et al., 2016), 
while some found no significant relationship (for example, Fox & Chancey, 1998; Keefe et 
al., 2002). Moreover, Kopasker et al. (2018) used various measures of insecurity in their 
study, and although they concluded that economic insecurity is a socioeconomic 
determinant of mental health, they find that the effect varies based on the measure used. 
Their results show that perceived future risks specifically related to the labour market 
are more detrimental to mental health than realised volatility, observing that there can 
be diminished mental health without the actual occurrence of an event. 
Some early researchers use natural experiments to study the relationship 
between financial insecurity and mental health (Ferrie et al., 1995; Kasl, 1983). Both 
studies examined the mental health effects of job loss and found that anticipated factory 
closure adversely affects mental health. Because of the cost, complexity and ethical issues 
surrounding natural experiments, more recent studies typically use cross-sectional 
(Blakely et al., 2003b; Caroli & Godard, 2016; Meltzer et al., 2010) or longitudinal (Ferrie, 
2001; Green, 2011; Kopasker et al., 2018; Mandal et al., 2011; Marchand & Blanc, 2011; 
Niedzwiedz et al., 2017; Rohde et al., 2017a; Rohde et al., 2016; Thomas et al., 2005; 
Watson & Osberg, 2017) datasets to examine the insecurity-health nexus. Longitudinal 
studies tend to be the most popular choice in determining causal effects. 
There is also a recently emerging portion of the literature that extends past the 
negative effects of contemporaneous insecurity and focuses on repeated exposure to 
insecurity (Niedzwiedz et al., 2017; Rohde et al., 2017a; Watson & Osberg, 2017). These 
studies have strong findings to suggest that repeated exposure is more deleterious to 
health than transient exposure to insecurity. Watson and Osberg (2017) presented 
robust findings which show that working-age Canadian males have higher levels of 
psychological distress when they suffer repeated incidences of insecurity compared to if 
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it were a one-off occurrence. However, they also tend to recover from past insecurity 
experiences if they have recently become economically secure. Results were insignificant 
for females. Rohde et al. (2017a) found evidence to suggest that sustained increases in 
economic insecurity lead to increased body mass index (BMI). They also found that 
persons of lower socio-economic standing are more likely to experience this repeated 
phenomenon. Lastly, Niedzwiedz et al. (2017) observed worsened metabolic and 
inflammatory biomarkers in individuals who experienced sustained economic insecurity 
during the Great Recession when compared to those who were economically stable. This 
is an emerging portion of the literature and should be explored more in future studies. 
Although the relationship between insecurity and health is well documented, it is 
oftentimes difficult to ascertain whether economic insecurity leads to poor health 
outcomes or if the opposite is true, that is, if poor health leads to economic insecurity. 
The majority of the studies reviewed in this section estimate multivariate linear or 
logistic regression models that are possibly biased due to endogeneity issues. However, 
there are some that have aimed to establish causation by using various identification 
strategies to control for omitted variables bias (time-invariant and time-varying) and/or 
reverse causality. To do this, authors have used an instrumental variables (IV) approach 
(Caroli & Godard, 2016; Kopasker et al., 2018; Reichert & Tauchmann, 2011; Smith et al., 
2007), fixed-effects models (Godin et al., 2005; Green, 2011; Kopasker et al., 2018; Rohde 
et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2007; Watson, 2015), random-effects models 
(Fergusson et al., 2007; Green, 2011; Mandal et al., 2011) or a differences-in-differences 
(DID) approach (Ferrie et al., 1995; Rathelot & Romanello, 2012; Rohde et al., 2017a). 
The majority have found that insecurity is a significant predictor of adverse health 
outcomes; however, the magnitude of the effect typically tends to be less after they 
control for endogeneity. 
This highlights the importance of having a good identification strategy to ensure 
that results are not biased. For instance, Caroli and Godard (2016) found that job 
insecurity is related to worse health outcomes when they do not account for endogeneity 
of job insecurity. Their findings became largely mixed when they implemented an IV 
model to overcome endogeneity issues. In the IV estimations, the negative effect of 
perceived job insecurity on health outcomes were confined to only a limited subgroup of 
health outcomes, namely headaches/eyestrain and skin problems. The impact on all 
remaining health outcome variables (self-rated health, backache, muscular pain, stomach 
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ache, cardiovascular diseases, depression or anxiety, overall fatigue and sleep difficulties) 
were insignificant. The authors concluded that simply feeling insecure about one’s 
employment circumstances may be less dangerous to one’s health than actually 
experiencing job loss. They also pinpointed that their study may have suffered from weak 
instrument issues. Moreover, meta-analyses conducted by Sverke et al. (2002) and 
Stansfeld and Candy (2006), based on thirty-seven and eleven samples respectively, 
conclude that job insecurity is related to adverse mental health. However, the association 
was found to be more modest in the study by Stansfeld and Candy (2006) whose analysis 
focused mainly on causal studies employing longitudinal datasets. 
4.2.1. Summary of New Zealand-Specific Studies 
There is a small group of studies that investigate the relationship between 
insecurity and mental health outcomes in New Zealand. These studies mostly relate 
insecurity to suicidal behaviour. Keefe et al. (2002) carried out a comparative study of 
employees from two meat processing plants in the Hawkes Bay region in a retrospective 
cohort study covering the years 1986 to 1994. The study compared the effects on the 
morbidity and mortality of employees who lost their jobs following the unexpected 
closure of one of the plants in 1986 to that of employees in a nearby plant which remained 
operational until 1994. During the eight-year follow-up period, the study found that the 
risk of self-harm leading to death or hospitalisation for at least 24 hours was more than 
double for the cohort that was exposed to involuntary job loss when compared to the 
employed cohort. However, their findings were not statistically significant. 
 Blakely et al. (2003b) examined the relationship between labour force status and 
socioeconomic status with death by suicide in a cohort of 2.04 million New Zealand 
adults, aged 18 to 64, using 1991 census and mortality records. Their findings suggest 
that being unemployed and not in the labour force, as well as being from a lower 
socioeconomic class were associated with death by suicide within three years following 
the survey. This relationship held after controlling for demographic characteristics. 
 Fergusson et al. (2007) used fixed-effects logistic and Poisson regression models 
to investigate the relationship between unemployment and suicidal behaviours 
(attempted suicide and suicidal ideation) in young New Zealand adults, aged 16 to 25 
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years. The data were sourced from the Christchurch Health and Development study 
(CHDS), which is a longitudinal study following children born in Christchurch in mid-
1977 at several age intervals from birth to 25 years of age. They found statistically 
significant results to suggest that unemployment is associated with both forms of suicidal 
behaviour. Individuals who had unemployment exposure were about 2.5 to 3 times more 
likely to portray suicidal behaviour. After adjusting for fixed effects and observed time-
varying covariates, the rate fell to between 1.4 and 1.7 and the relationship between 
unemployment and suicide attempts became insignificant. They conclude that a 
moderate relationship exists between unemployment exposure and suicidal behaviour. 
 Carter et al. (2011) used data from SoFIE to examine the relationship between 
food insecurity and psychological distress in New Zealand. Respondents were considered 
to be food insecure if they bought cheaper food in order to cover other expenses, used 
food grants/banks or went without fresh fruits and vegetable on a regular basis. The 
authors carried out a logistic regression analysis using a staged modelling approach and 
found a strong relationship between food insecurity and psychological distress; however, 
this relationship weakened after controlling for demographic characteristics. This 
association was found to be higher for females than for males. 
4.3. Data and Methodology 
4.3.1. Dependent Variables 
SoFIE, which was introduced in Chapter 3, is used in this study.47 SoFIE is a 
longitudinal survey which collected information on the economic circumstances of New 
Zealand households over eight years (or waves), from 2002 to 2010. The survey contains 
a health supplement for waves 3 (2004/2005), 5 (2006/2007) and 7 (2008/2009) which 
is the source of the health data used in this chapter. The SoFIE health supplement 
contains information on both physical and mental health, as well as tobacco and alcohol 
consumption, deprivation scores and the access to- and utilisation of- primary health care 
services (Carter et al., 2010a). The dependent variables used in this analysis are the 
 
47 A more detailed overview of SoFIE is presented in Chapter 3. 
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Kessler-10 Psychological Distress Scale (K10) and the Short Form 36 Health Survey (SF-
36). Both indicators are constructed using a group of ordinal indicators of psychological 
distress and physical health available in SoFIE. The components of the K10 psychological 
distress scale and the SF-36 heath survey are presented in Appendix J. 
4.3.1.1. Kessler-10 Psychological Distress Scale (K10) 
The K10 scale is widely used to screen for non-specific psychological distress, 
including depressive, somatic or anxiety disorders, but not suicidal ideation (Hanlon et 
al., 2015). The scale has psychometric properties which make it an ideal measure of 
generalized psychological distress (Sampasa-Kanyinga et al., 2018). Higher scores are 
predictive of depressive symptoms and anxiety disorders. Studies have shown that the 
K10 scale is a consistent and valid tool for detecting a variety of mental disorders in a 
wide range of individuals in the general population, including pregnant women, 
adolescents, alcoholics, drug users, HIV-infected individuals and older individuals, as well 
as individuals in military populations (Anderson et al., 2013; Arnaud et al., 2010; Chan & 
Fung, 2014; Donker et al., 2010; Fassaert et al., 2009; Hanlon et al., 2015; Hides et al., 
2007; Kessler et al., 2003; Sampasa-Kanyinga et al., 2018; Slade et al., 2011; Spies et al., 
2009a; Spies et al., 2009b; Tesfaye et al., 2010). K10 is used in numerous countries 
around the world and is deemed an appropriate screening tool in population health 
surveys (Australian Department of Health, 2002). Oakley-Browne et al. (2006) report 
that New Zealanders with relatively high K10 scores (exceeding 21) have a greater 
likelihood of being diagnosed with a mental disorder. This makes K10 an ideal indicator 
to include in this analysis. 
Table J1 presents a sample K10 questionnaire. To get the overall score, the score 
for each indicator is summed to give a minimum score of 10 and a maximum score of 50. 
To interpret the scores, a set of cut-off scores were created by the 2001 Victorian 
Population Health Survey as a guide for screening for psychological distress (Cantor, 






Likelihood of having a mental disorder based on K10 Score: 
• 10 – 19 (Low): Likely to be well 
• 20 – 24 (Moderate): Likely to have a mild disorder 
• 25 – 29 (High): Likely to have a moderate disorder 
• 30 – 50 (Very High): Likely to have a severe disorder 
 
The computation of the K10 scores shows that ~6 percent of respondents in the 
study sample are likely to have a mild psychological disorder, ~3 percent are likely to 
have a moderate disorder and ~2 percent are likely to have a severe disorder.48 
4.3.1.2. Short Form 36 Health Survey (SF-36) 
The SF-36 is a widely-used 36-item health survey that has been extensively 
validated across different countries (Bunevicius, 2017; Jenkinson et al., 1999; Rohde et 
al., 2017b; Salim et al., 2017; Witt et al., 2019; Yarlas et al., 2018). It captures an 
individual’s self-rated mental and physical wellbeing in the previous four weeks. The 
survey measures eight health domains: (1) physical functioning (PF), (2) role limitations 
due to physical health problems (RP), (3) bodily pain (BP), (4) general health (GH), (5) 
vitality (VT), social functioning (SF), role limitations due to emotional problems (RE), and 
(8) mental health (MH). There is also a ninth, unscaled domain, self-evaluated transition 
(SET), where respondents are asked to rate their health now compared to one year ago. 
The abbreviated item content for health domain scales is presented in Table J2 in 
Appendix J. For each of the eight domain scales, raw item scores are summed and 
transformed to a scale ranging from 0 to 100, with higher scores representing better 
health states. This is then used to construct two standardised summary scores - the 
mental health component summary (MCS) and the physical component summary (PCS). 
The MCS is the main variable of interest in this study; however, since there are possible 
flow-on effects, the PCS is also used.  
 
48 As per Statistics New Zealand’s output rules, percentages are calculated based on counts randomly 
rounded (up or down) to the nearest multiple of three. 
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4.3.2. Main Independent Variable 
The independent variable of interest is economic insecurity. These estimates are 
derived from the indexes constructed in Chapters 2 (ESIhlfs) and 3 (ESIsof). These are 
objective measures of insecurity that show the proportion of New Zealand households 
that are susceptible to experiencing a 25 percent income drop from one year to the next, 
and who lack a sufficient wealth buffer to cover such a loss.  
Insecurity estimates from ESIhlfs represent group-level means, while insecurity 
estimates from ESIsof are household-level binary indicators. ESIhlfs and ESIsof measure 
different dimensions of insecurity. ESIhlfs provides a measure of ‘predicted economic 
insecurity’, i.e., exogenously assigned insecurity values which are derived from HLFS 
data, which surveys largely different households than SoFIE; ESIsof is constructed using 
data on individuals within the SoFIE panel and provides a measure of ‘lived insecurity 
events’, such as an individual losing their job or getting divorced. To distinguish between 
the two in the econometric analysis in Section 4.4, insecurity estimated in ESIhlfs uses the 
notation, esi, while insecurity estimated in ESIsof uses the notation, L.  
4.4. Econometric Analysis 
This section tests the hypothesis that economic insecurity leads to adverse mental 
wellbeing amongst New Zealanders. In determining a causal link between the two, an 
important concern is that there might be relevant unobserved variables that are 
correlated with the observed variables under study, that is, influencing both economic 
insecurity and mental wellbeing at an individual level. This causes bias in the model 
estimates making any statistical inferences erroneous. For instance, some individuals 
may be inherently mentally strong making them better able to manage stressful 
situations, while others may not be. Reverse causality could also be an issue if, perhaps, 
some individuals possess genetic traits that predispose them to have an irrational fear of 
interpersonal interactions, making them more likely to miss work and have unstable jobs. 
Hence, evaluating a causal link between economic insecurity and mental health requires 
a stable identification strategy to obtain consistent parameter estimates.  
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This study employs panel fixed effects (FE) regression models to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. FE models assume that there are individual-specific traits, 
which may be correlated with both economic insecurity and mental wellbeing, that need 
to be controlled for. FE can remove bias caused by omitted variables if all relevant 
unobserved variables are also time invariant, even if those variables are not included in 
the model. Another important assumption is that the time-invariant characteristics are 
individual-specific and should not be correlated with other individual characteristics. The 
idea is that if the unobserved characteristics are time-invariant, then changes in the 
mental and physical wellbeing must be due to some other influences (Stock & Watson, 
2017). Hence, FE models will likely show if economic insecurity leads to adverse health 
outcomes. 
Furthermore, economic insecurity estimated from ESIhlfs (esi) was matched to the 
SoFIE panel using exogenous characteristics, specifically ethnicity, age, gender and year. 
This eliminates individual-level endogeneity from this measure of insecurity. This study 
assumes that esi is not correlated with unobserved characteristics of the individuals in 
SoFIE because the measure was constructed using data on a different sample of 
individuals in HLFS. To ensure that this assumption holds, the datasets were checked for 
matching identifiers present in both the HLFS and SoFIE samples. The respondents in the 
HLFS dataset were found to be largely different than those in SoFIE, with less than 0.1 
percent of individual identifiers present in both datasets. To preserve esi’s exogeneity, 
these observations were dropped from ESIhlfs before introducing insecurity estimates to 
the SoFIE panel. 
The FE regressions are specified in four ways for this study: (1) using  esi as the 
independent variable of interest, (2) using L as the independent variable of interest, (3) 
controlling for both esi and L, and (4) including esi, L and an interaction term (esi*L). The 




𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 +  𝑖𝑡 (4.1) 
𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 +  𝑖𝑡 (4.2) 






where 𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 represents the psychological distress indicators (K10 or SF-
36) for individual, i, at time, t, 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡 represents ‘predicted economic insecurity’ for 
individual, i, at time, t, using exogenously assigned insecurity estimates from ESIhlfs, 𝐿𝑖𝑡 
represents ‘lived insecurity events’ for individual, i,  at time, t, 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡 • 𝐿𝑖𝑡 interacts esi and 
L, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of standard controls (age, age squared, equivalised real household 
income, region and an indicator for partnership dissolution), 𝛿𝑖is the individual fixed 
effect, 𝛾𝑡 is the year fixed effect and 𝑖𝑡 is the within-individual error.49 Since variables 
such as ethnicity and gender are time invariant, these are dropped from the FE 
estimation. Robust standard errors are clustered at the household level for all regression 
specifications to account for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.50  
The regressions specified in Equations (4.1) to (4.4) are also run replacing mental 
wellbeing with physical wellbeing - proxied by the physical component summary of the 
SF-36 - as the outcome variable. 
4.4.1. Regression Results 
The regression analysis tests the hypothesis that experiencing economic 
insecurity worsens the mental and physical wellbeing of New Zealanders using FE 
models. Section 4.4.1.1 presents results based on K10 scores, Section 4.4.1.2 presents 
 
49 Descriptive statistics for the variables used are presented in Table I1 in Appendix I. 
50 All statistical analyses for Chapter 4 are performed using Stata/MP 15.1. The data are declared as panel 
data using Stata’s xtset command based on each respondent’s unique ID and year. All regressions in this 
chapter are specified using Stata’s suite of xt commands devoted specifically to panel data, e.g., xtreg, 
xtivreg and xtprobit. The fe option is included to specify fixed effects. Longitudinal weights are not 
employed in the regression analysis since they were not recalculated by Statistics New Zealand following 
recent data removal. See Chapter 3 for more details. 
𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡




results based on the mental component summary of the SF-36, and Section 4.4.1.3 
presents results based on the physical component summary of the SF-36. 
4.4.1.1. Results Based on K10 Scores 
The regression results of the FE estimations using K10 as the outcome variable 
are presented in Tables 4.1 to 4.4. The results show a positive relationship between 
economic insecurity and each respondent’s overall K10 score. Specifically, the results 
suggest that (1) a 10 percentage point increase in predicted insecurity increases a 
person’s K10 score by about 0.27 points, all else being equal (see Table 4.1), and (2)  
experiencing a ‘lived insecurity event’ increases an individual’s K10 score by about 0.15 
points, all else being equal (see Table 4.2). Table 4.3 presents the results when both esi 
and L are controlled for in the same regression model. The results show that (1) a 10 
percentage point increase in predicted insecurity increases a person’s K10 score by about 
0.13 points, all else being equal, and (2)  experiencing a ‘lived insecurity event’ increases 
an individual’s K10 score by about 0.14 points, all else being equal. The findings suggest 
that insecure individuals have an increased likelihood of suffering a mental disorder; 
however, the results are not statistically significant. The regression in Table 4.4 which 
adds an interaction term (esi*L) shows a similar trend. 
4.4.1.2. Results Based on the Mental Component Summary 
(MCS) of the SF-36 
Table 4.5 shows that a 10 percentage point increase in predicted insecurity 
decreases an individual’s standardised MCS score by about 0.5 points, all else being equal. 
Table 4.6 shows that experiencing a ‘lived insecurity event’ decreases an individual’s 
standardised MCS score by about 0.1 points, all else being equal. Table 4.7 presents the 
results when both esi and L are controlled for in the same regression model. The results 
show that (1) a 10 percentage point increase in predicted insecurity decreases an 
individual’s standardised MCS score by about 0.06 points, all else being equal, and (2) 
experiencing a ‘lived insecurity event’ decreases an individual’s standardised MCS score 
by about 0.12 points, all else being equal. Lower MCS scores signify worsening mental 
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wellbeing. Results are not statistically significant. The regression in Table 4.8 which adds 
an interaction term (esi*L) shows that this increases MCS scores. 
 
4.4.1.3. Results Based on the Physical Component Summary 
(PCS) of the SF-36 
Table 4.9 shows that a 10 percentage point increase in the probability of being 
economically insecure decreases an individual’s standardised PCS score by about 1.4 
points, all else being equal. The results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 4.10 shows that experiencing a ‘lived insecurity event’ increases an individual’s 
standardised PCS score by about 0.19 points, all else being equal. The results are not 
statistically significant. Table 4.11 presents the results when both esi and L are controlled 
for in the same regression model. The results show that (1) a 10 percentage point 
increase in the probability of being economically insecure decreases an individual’s 
standardised PCS score by about 1.9 points, all else being equal (p<0.01), and (2) 
experiencing a ‘lived insecurity event’ increases an individual’s standardised MCS score 
by about 0.16 points, all else being equal (insignificant result). Lower PCS scores signify 
worsening physical wellbeing. The regression in Table 4.12 shows that interacting esi and 





Table 4.1: Impact of Predicted Economic Insecurity on Mental Wellbeing (K10) 
 Kessler 10 Psychological Distress Scale (Fixed Effects)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Economic Insecurity (Predicted Values) 0.450 3.477 3.574 2.703 2.692 
 (2.253) (2.681) (2.680) (2.778) (2.775) 
Age  -0.255*** -0.246*** -0.229** -0.235*** 
  (0.064) (0.067) (0.070) (0.070) 
Age Squared  0.002*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education (Reference Category: Post-School Qualification) 
University Degree   -0.507 -0.641 -0.637 
   (0.543) (0.587) (0.588) 
High School   -0.481 -0.604 -0.588 
   (0.429) (0.473) (0.474) 
No Qualification   0.310 0.105 0.079 
   (0.561) (0.583) (0.586) 
Region (Reference Category: Auckland)      
Waikato    0.022 0.023 
    (0.640) (0.639) 
Wellington    -0.271 -0.276 
    (0.597) (0.597) 
Rest of North Island    0.940 0.931 
    (0.574) (0.570) 
Canterbury    1.080 1.048 
    (0.689) (0.691) 
Rest of South Island     0.033 0.009 
    (0.639) (0.639) 
Relationship Status (Reference Category: With Partner) 
Relationship Ended Over ESI Year     0.424 
     (0.260) 
Constant 13.419*** 20.715*** 20.583*** 20.041*** 20.158*** 
 (0.250) (1.826) (1.961) (2.100) (2.102) 
      
Observations~ 18,705 18,705 18,705 17,886 17,886 
R-squared 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
Number of IDs~ 11,091 11,091 11,091 10,785 10,785 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1      
~Observations and Number of IDs are randomly rounded (up or down) to the nearest multiple of three given 




Table 4.2: Impact of Lived Insecurity Event on Mental Wellbeing (K10) 
 Kessler 10 Psychological Distress Scale (Fixed Effects)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Lived Insecurity Event 0.179 0.139 0.141 0.152 0.147 
 (0.154) (0.155) (0.155) (0.162) (0.162) 
Age  -0.294** -0.299** -0.321** -0.333** 
  (0.098) (0.101) (0.111) (0.112) 
Age Squared  0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education (Reference Category: Post-School Qualification) 
University Degree   -0.920 -1.007 -1.015 
   (0.728) (0.779) (0.789) 
High School   -0.862 -0.916 -0.895 
   (0.551) (0.644) (0.651) 
No Qualification   -0.448 -0.763 -0.781 
   (0.758) (0.771) (0.776) 
Region (Reference Category: Auckland) 
Waikato    -0.204 -0.217 
    (1.034) (1.033) 
Wellington    -0.264 -0.280 
    (1.020) (1.019) 
Rest of North Island    1.592 1.567 
    (1.009) (1.003) 
Canterbury    0.107 0.032 
    (1.105) (1.108) 
Rest of South Island     0.076 0.006 
    (0.997) (0.998) 
Relationship Status (Reference Category: With Partner) 
Relationship Ended Over ESI Year     0.448 
     (0.399) 
Constant 13.537*** 21.982*** 22.595*** 23.401*** 23.610*** 
 (0.029) (2.949) (3.113) (3.480) (3.499) 
      
Observations~ 11,748 11,748 11,748 11,058 11,058 
R-squared 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 
Number of IDs~ 7,311 7,311 7,311 7,035 7,035 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1      
~Observations and Number of IDs are randomly rounded (up or down) to the nearest multiple of three given 




Table 4.3: Impact of Predicted Insecurity and Lived Insecurity Event on Mental 
Wellbeing (K10) 
 Kessler 10 Psychological Distress Scale (Fixed Effects)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Lived Insecurity Event 0.180 0.141 0.143 0.148 0.143 
 (0.154) (0.155) (0.155) (0.162) (0.163) 
Predicted Economic Insecurity 0.779 2.443 2.468 1.422 1.342 
 (3.050) (3.729) (3.728) (3.956) (3.952) 
Age  -0.297** -0.301** -0.322** -0.334** 
  (0.098) (0.101) (0.111) (0.112) 
Age Squared  0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education (Reference Category: Post-School Qualification) 
University Degree   -0.924 -1.045 -1.053 
   (0.732) (0.783) (0.794) 
High School   -0.848 -0.921 -0.899 
   (0.564) (0.645) (0.652) 
No Qualification   -0.432 -0.757 -0.777 
   (0.760) (0.770) (0.774) 
Region (Reference Category: Auckland)      
Waikato    0.485 0.473 
    (0.917) (0.916) 
Wellington    -0.144 -0.162 
    (1.016) (1.015) 
Rest of North Island    1.866+ 1.839† 
    (0.994) (0.987) 
Canterbury    -0.070 -0.152 
    (1.051) (1.054) 
Rest of South Island     0.278 0.200 
    (1.013) (1.014) 
Relationship Status (Reference Category: With Partner) 
Relationship Ended Over ESI Year     0.480 
     (0.401) 
Constant 13.448*** 22.104*** 22.686*** 23.330*** 23.541*** 
 (0.306) (2.955) (3.119) (3.499) (3.516) 
      
Observations~ 11,592 11,592 11,592 10,917 10,917 
R-squared 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.007 
Number of IDs~ 7,206 7,206 7,206 6,939 6,939 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1      
~Observations and Number of IDs are randomly rounded (up or down) to the nearest multiple of three given 






Table 4.4: Impact of Predicted Insecurity and Lived Insecurity Event on Mental 
Wellbeing (K10) (Including Interaction Term) 
 Kessler 10 Psychological Distress Scale (Fixed Effects)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Lived Insecurity Event 0.202 0.181 0.184 0.118 0.111 
 (0.231) (0.231) (0.231) (0.235) (0.234) 
Predicted Economic Insecurity 0.796 2.485 2.512 1.385 1.303 
 (3.046) (3.728) (3.728) (3.953) (3.948) 
Lived Insecurity Event * Predicted Economic 
Insecurity -0.186 -0.332 -0.344 0.261 0.276 
 (1.904) (1.901) (1.901) (2.020) (2.018) 
Age  -0.297** -0.301** -0.322** -0.334** 
  (0.099) (0.102) (0.111) (0.112) 
Age Squared  0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education (Reference Category: Post-School Qualification) 
University Degree   -0.923 -1.046 -1.054 
   (0.732) (0.783) (0.794) 
High School   -0.850 -0.921 -0.899 
   (0.565) (0.645) (0.652) 
No Qualification   -0.431 -0.759 -0.779 
   (0.760) (0.768) (0.773) 
Region (Reference Category: Auckland)      
Waikato    0.482 0.469 
    (0.918) (0.916) 
Wellington    -0.142 -0.160 
    (1.016) (1.015) 
Rest of North Island    1.864† 1.837† 
    (0.995) (0.988) 
Canterbury    -0.064 -0.146 
    (1.052) (1.056) 
Rest of South Island     0.279 0.201 
    (1.013) (1.014) 
Relationship Status (Reference Category: With Partner) 
Relationship Ended Over ESI Year     0.480 
     (0.401) 
Constant 13.447*** 22.114*** 22.698*** 23.319*** 23.529*** 
 (0.305) (2.961) (3.127) (3.511) (3.528) 
      
Observations~ 11,592 11,592 11,592 10,917 10,917 
R-squared 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.007 
Number of IDs~ 7,206 7,206 7,206 6,939 6,939 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1      
~Observations and Number of IDs are randomly rounded (up or down) to the nearest multiple of three given Statistics 





Table 4.5: Impact of Predicted Economic Insecurity on Mental Wellbeing (SF-36 
MCS) 
 SF-36 Mental Component Summary (Fixed Effects)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Predicted Economic Insecurity -3.105 -5.849 -5.850 -5.321 -5.255 
 (4.213) (4.787) (4.794) (4.973) (4.962) 
Age  0.254* 0.259* 0.242† 0.255† 
  (0.118) (0.124) (0.130) (0.131) 
Age Squared  -0.002† -0.002† -0.002 -0.002† 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education (Reference Category: Post-School Qualification) 
University Degree   1.134 1.157 1.166 
   (1.107) (1.203) (1.208) 
High School   0.771 0.705 0.673 
   (0.830) (0.897) (0.897) 
No Qualification   0.650 0.621 0.677 
   (1.065) (1.132) (1.138) 
Region (Reference Category: Auckland)      
Waikato    0.765 0.752 
    (1.297) (1.298) 
Wellington    0.732 0.728 
    (1.339) (1.346) 
Rest of North Island    -0.995 -0.972 
    (1.197) (1.195) 
Canterbury    0.352 0.408 
    (1.429) (1.439) 
Rest of South Island     1.750 1.829 
    (1.315) (1.320) 
Relationship Status (Reference Category: With Partner) 
Relationship Ended Over ESI Year     -1.022† 
     (0.562) 
Constant 54.815*** 48.158*** 47.488*** 47.276*** 47.072*** 
 (0.501) (3.186) (3.462) (3.777) (3.793) 
      
Observations~ 17,679 17,679 17,679 16,863 16,863 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 
Number of IDs~ 10,686 10,686 10,686 10,380 10,380 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1      
~Observations and Number of IDs are randomly rounded (up or down) to the nearest multiple of three given 




Table 4.6: Impact of Lived Insecurity Event on Mental Wellbeing (SF-36 MCS) 
 SF-36 Mental Component Summary (Fixed Effects)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Lived Insecurity Event -0.167 -0.133 -0.131 -0.138 -0.124 
 (0.280) (0.282) (0.282) (0.296) (0.296) 
Age  0.276 0.291 0.343† 0.370† 
  (0.176) (0.181) (0.196) (0.201) 
Age Squared  -0.002† -0.003† -0.003† -0.003† 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education (Reference Category: Post-School Qualification) 
University Degree   0.856 1.673 1.688 
   (1.650) (1.707) (1.734) 
High School   0.054 0.183 0.137 
   (1.287) (1.300) (1.313) 
No Qualification   2.709† 2.412 2.465 
   (1.518) (1.612) (1.619) 
Region (Reference Category: Auckland)      
Waikato    3.817 3.845† 
    (2.332) (2.330) 
Wellington    1.374 1.408 
    (2.243) (2.241) 
Rest of North Island    -0.676 -0.616 
    (2.328) (2.317) 
Canterbury    5.862* 6.009* 
    (2.538) (2.549) 
Rest of South Island     3.775 3.969 
    (2.526) (2.527) 
Relationship Status (Reference Category: With Partner) 
Relationship Ended Over ESI Year     -1.058 
     (0.815) 
Constant 54.335*** 47.400*** 46.158*** 41.853*** 41.332*** 
 (0.057) (5.014) (5.291) (6.072) (6.138) 
      
Observations~ 10,794 10,794 10,794 10,113 10,113 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.008 
Number of IDs~ 6,933 6,933 6,933 6,657 6,657 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1      
~Observations and Number of IDs are randomly rounded (up or down) to the nearest multiple of three given 





Table 4.7: Impact of Predicted Insecurity and Lived Insecurity Event on Mental 
Wellbeing (SF-36 MCS) 
 SF-36 Mental Component Summary (Fixed Effects)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Lived Insecurity Event -0.173 -0.139 -0.138 -0.135 -0.120 
 (0.281) (0.282) (0.282) (0.296) (0.297) 
Predicted Economic Insecurity -3.625 -4.604 -4.562 -0.949 -0.664 
 (5.823) (6.630) (6.628) (7.074) (7.053) 
Age  0.276 0.291 0.334† 0.362† 
  (0.176) (0.181) (0.196) (0.200) 
Age Squared  -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003† 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education (Reference Category: Post-School Qualification) 
University Degree   1.097 1.770 1.785 
   (1.650) (1.698) (1.726) 
High School   0.405 0.166 0.118 
   (1.267) (1.296) (1.310) 
No Qualification   2.728† 2.382 2.435 
   (1.577) (1.612) (1.618) 
Region (Reference Category: Auckland)      
Waikato    2.462 2.491 
    (2.265) (2.262) 
Wellington    1.082 1.117 
    (2.257) (2.255) 
Rest of North Island    -1.111 -1.047 
    (2.330) (2.318) 
Canterbury    6.269* 6.427** 
    (2.482) (2.494) 
Rest of South Island     3.716 3.920 
    (2.531) (2.532) 
Relationship Status (Reference Category: With Partner) 
Relationship Ended Over ESI Year     -1.100 
     (0.821) 
Constant 54.753*** 47.425*** 46.006*** 42.373*** 41.862*** 
 (0.636) (5.019) (5.299) (6.082) (6.146) 
      
Observations~ 10,641 10,641 10,641 9,975 9,975 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.008 
Number of IDs~ 6,828 6,828 6,828 6,561 6,561 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1      
~Observations and Number of IDs are randomly rounded (up or down) to the nearest multiple of three given Statistics 




Table 4.8: Impact of Predicted Insecurity and Lived Insecurity Event on Mental 
Wellbeing (SF-36 MCS) (Including Interaction Term) 
 SF-36 Mental Component Summary (Fixed Effects)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Lived Insecurity Event -0.077 -0.058 -0.058 -0.193 -0.179 
 (0.474) (0.474) (0.473) (0.484) (0.482) 
Predicted Economic Insecurity -3.536 -4.508 -4.467 -1.029 -0.744 
 (5.842) (6.658) (6.656) (7.109) (7.086) 
Lived Insecurity Event * Predicted Economic 
Insecurity -0.762 -0.637 -0.628 0.481 0.479 
 (3.501) (3.507) (3.507) (3.764) (3.763) 
Age  0.275 0.291 0.334† 0.362† 
  (0.176) (0.181) (0.196) (0.200) 
Age Squared  -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003† 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education (Reference Category: Post-School Qualification) 
University Degree   1.098 1.770 1.785 
   (1.650) (1.699) (1.727) 
High School   0.404 0.166 0.118 
   (1.266) (1.298) (1.312) 
No Qualification   2.727† 2.379 2.432 
   (1.576) (1.613) (1.619) 
Region (Reference Category: Auckland)      
Waikato    2.454 2.483 
    (2.271) (2.268) 
Wellington    1.084 1.119 
    (2.257) (2.255) 
Rest of North Island    -1.117 -1.053 
    (2.335) (2.323) 
Canterbury    6.279* 6.437** 
    (2.477) (2.490) 
Rest of South Island     3.715 3.919 
    (2.533) (2.534) 
Relationship Status (Reference Category: With Partner) 
Relationship Ended Over ESI Year     -1.100 
     (0.821) 
Constant 54.746*** 47.444*** 46.026*** 42.357*** 41.846*** 
 (0.636) (5.023) (5.302) (6.084) (6.149) 
      
Observations~ 10,641 10,641 10,641 9,975 9,975 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.008 
Number of IDs~ 6,828 6,828 6,828 6,561 6,561 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1      
~Observations and Number of IDs are randomly rounded (up or down) to the nearest multiple of three given Statistics 





Table 4.9: Impact of Predicted Economic Insecurity on Mental Wellbeing (SF-36 
PCS) 
 SF-36 Physical Component Summary (Fixed Effects)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Economic Insecurity (Predicted Values) -16.645*** -11.733** -12.014** -13.668** -13.666** 
 (3.967) (4.321) (4.327) (4.449) (4.449) 
Age  0.191† 0.153 0.131 0.132 
  (0.106) (0.111) (0.117) (0.117) 
Age Squared  -0.003** -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education (Reference Category: Post-School Qualification) 
University Degree   0.285 0.950 0.950 
   (1.004) (1.024) (1.023) 
High School   -0.304 0.196 0.195 
   (0.786) (0.794) (0.794) 
No Qualification   -1.126 -0.743 -0.741 
   (0.981) (0.987) (0.987) 
Region (Reference Category: Auckland)      
Waikato    0.036 0.035 
    (0.993) (0.993) 
Wellington    -0.340 -0.340 
    (0.898) (0.899) 
Rest of North Island    0.384 0.385 
    (0.785) (0.785) 
Canterbury    -0.853 -0.851 
    (1.206) (1.207) 
Rest of South Island     0.187 0.189 
    (1.026) (1.028) 
Relationship Status (Reference Category: With Partner) 
Relationship Ended Over ESI Year     -0.027 
     (0.485) 
Constant 55.944*** 53.354*** 54.717*** 55.218*** 55.213*** 
 (0.472) (2.724) (2.988) (3.209) (3.213) 
      
Observations~ 17,679 17,679 17,679 16,863 16,863 
R-squared 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.006 
Number of IDs~ 10,686 10,686 10,686 10,380 10,380 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1      
~Observations and Number of IDs are randomly rounded (up or down) to the nearest multiple of three given Statistics 





Table 4.10: Impact of Lived Insecurity Event on Mental Wellbeing (SF-36 PCS) 
 SF-36 Physical Component Summary (Fixed Effects)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Lived Insecurity Event 0.217 0.224 0.220 0.194 0.185 
 (0.232) (0.233) (0.233) (0.243) (0.243) 
Age  0.194 0.167 0.110 0.092 
  (0.155) (0.160) (0.175) (0.176) 
Age Squared  -0.003* -0.003* -0.003† -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education (Reference Category: Post-School Qualification) 
University Degree   2.630* 2.579† 2.570† 
   (1.289) (1.392) (1.403) 
High School   1.921† 1.409 1.438 
   (1.035) (1.118) (1.124) 
No Qualification   -1.540 -0.990 -1.023 
   (1.467) (1.326) (1.329) 
Region (Reference Category: Auckland)      
Waikato    -0.651 -0.669 
    (1.753) (1.755) 
Wellington    -0.289 -0.310 
    (1.506) (1.508) 
Rest of North Island    -0.199 -0.237 
    (1.415) (1.412) 
Canterbury    0.981 0.887 
    (1.925) (1.937) 
Rest of South Island     0.436 0.311 
    (1.697) (1.719) 
Relationship Status (Reference Category: With Partner) 
Relationship Ended Over ESI Year     0.677 
     (0.606) 
Constant 53.458*** 52.832*** 53.150*** 54.821*** 55.154*** 
 (0.047) (4.192) (4.462) (5.037) (5.050) 
      
Observations~ 10,794 10,794 10,794 10,113 10,113 
R-squared 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Number of IDs~ 6,933 6,933 6,933 6,657 6,657 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1      
~Observations and Number of IDs are randomly rounded (up or down) to the nearest multiple of three given 




Table 4.11: Impact of Predicted Insecurity and Lived Insecurity Event on Mental 
Wellbeing (SF-36 PCS) 
 SF-36 Physical Component Summary (Fixed Effects)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Lived Insecurity Event 0.179 0.206 0.202 0.172 0.163 
 (0.233) (0.233) (0.233) (0.243) (0.243) 
Predicted Economic Insecurity -22.574*** -16.417** -16.757** -18.651** -18.827** 
 (5.457) (5.824) (5.820) (6.139) (6.135) 
Age  0.222 0.189 0.111 0.093 
  (0.156) (0.161) (0.176) (0.176) 
Age Squared  -0.003* -0.003† -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education (Reference Category: Post-School Qualification) 
University Degree   2.628* 2.622† 2.613† 
   (1.307) (1.408) (1.419) 
High School   1.711 1.331 1.361 
   (1.054) (1.136) (1.142) 
No Qualification   -1.721 -0.962 -0.995 
   (1.544) (1.354) (1.358) 
Region (Reference Category: Auckland)      
Waikato    0.253 0.235 
    (1.750) (1.752) 
Wellington    -0.099 -0.121 
    (1.518) (1.520) 
Rest of North Island    0.030 -0.009 
    (1.419) (1.415) 
Canterbury    0.494 0.396 
    (1.916) (1.927) 
Rest of South Island     0.426 0.300 
    (1.714) (1.736) 
Relationship Status (Reference Category: With Partner) 
Relationship Ended Over ESI Year     0.679 
     (0.612) 
Constant 55.887*** 52.318*** 52.928*** 54.888*** 55.204*** 
 (0.594) (4.218) (4.489) (5.071) (5.081) 
      
Observations~ 10,641 10,641 10,641 9,975 9,975 
R-squared 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009 
Number of IDs~ 6,828 6,828 6,828 6,561 6,561 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1      
~Observations and Number of IDs are randomly rounded (up or down) to the nearest multiple of three given Statistics 





Table 4.12: Impact of Predicted Insecurity and Lived Insecurity Event on Mental 
Wellbeing (SF-36 PCS) (Including Interaction Term) 
 SF-36 Physical Component Summary (Fixed Effects)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Lived Insecurity Event 0.091 0.133 0.131 0.108 0.099 
 (0.438) (0.437) (0.437) (0.448) (0.448) 
Predicted Economic Insecurity -22.656*** -16.503** -16.841** -18.738** -18.914** 
 (5.470) (5.844) (5.839) (6.159) (6.154) 
Lived Insecurity Event * Predicted Economic 
Insecurity 0.692 0.573 0.561 0.519 0.520 
 (2.892) (2.883) (2.887) (3.057) (3.056) 
Age  0.223 0.189 0.111 0.094 
  (0.156) (0.161) (0.176) (0.177) 
Age Squared  -0.003* -0.003† -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education (Reference Category: Post-School Qualification) 
University Degree   2.628* 2.622† 2.613† 
   (1.306) (1.407) (1.418) 
High School   1.712 1.331 1.361 
   (1.053) (1.135) (1.141) 
No Qualification   -1.720 -0.965 -0.997 
   (1.545) (1.355) (1.359) 
Region (Reference Category: Auckland)      
Waikato    0.244 0.226 
    (1.750) (1.751) 
Wellington    -0.098 -0.119 
    (1.518) (1.520) 
Rest of North Island    0.024 -0.016 
    (1.420) (1.415) 
Canterbury    0.504 0.407 
    (1.922) (1.933) 
Rest of South Island     0.425 0.299 
    (1.716) (1.738) 
Relationship Status (Reference Category: With Partner) 
Relationship Ended Over ESI Year     0.679 
     (0.612) 
Constant 55.893*** 52.301*** 52.910*** 54.871*** 55.186*** 
 (0.595) (4.221) (4.493) (5.079) (5.089) 
      
Observations~ 10,641 10,641 10,641 9,975 9,975 
R-squared 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009 
Number of IDs~ 6,828 6,828 6,828 6,561 6,561 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1      
~Observations and Number of IDs are randomly rounded (up or down) to the nearest multiple of three given Statistics 







The results of the regression models exploring the link between economic 
insecurity and mental wellbeing are not statistically significant. The insignificant findings 
might be caused by the study’s small sample size which limits the variation in the models . 
Using only three waves of panel data over a period of ~6 years may mean that the 
variables under study are slow to change over time. Nonetheless, the lack of statistically 
significant results can still be informative of insecurity’s effect on mental wellbeing. The 
regression models present evidence to suggest a positive relationship between economic 
insecurity and poor mental wellbeing. The findings hold regardless of the insecurity 
measure used and for both psychological distress indicators - the K10 and the mental 
component summary of the SF-36. These results are in line with the majority of the 
findings in the literature.  
An important consideration here is the mechanism through which economic 
insecurity affects mental health. It is likely that this mechanism is the increased stress 
that comes about from financial instability as implied by some studies (Godin et al., 2005; 
Momjian & Munroe, 2011; Parnell et al., 2001; Vives et al., 2013). Chapter 2 shows that 
economic insecurity is highly cyclical in New Zealand and tends to increase in 
recessionary times. A common feature of recessions, which is also a commonly used 
measure of economic insecurity in the literature, is job insecurity. Unemployment in 
recessions can contribute to a decline in household incomes, unmanageable debts and 
decreased living standards, which could all contribute to stress and anxiety. Several 
studies have found evidence to suggest that the effects of economic recessions are indeed 
associated with increased mental health disorders, substance abuse problems, suicidal 
behaviour, increased use of mental health services and increased use of mental health 
related medication (Cooper, 2011; Frasquilho et al., 2015; Linn et al., 1985; Modrek et al., 
2015; Momjian & Munroe, 2011). In New Zealand, unemployment reached a nine-year 
high of 6.5 percent during the Great Recession (September 2009), which was associated 
with increased mental health problems, mainly anxiety and depression (Te Pou o te 
Whakaaro Nui, 2009). Suicide rates amongst New Zealanders, especially for young 
people, are also linked to recessionary times (Howden-Chapman et al., 2005). Increased 
financial and work stressors are not only associated with diminished mental wellbeing, 
but also with increased risk of substance abuse as a coping mechanism (Davis & Mantler, 
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2004; Frone, 2008; Guillaumier et al., 2017; Parkins & Angell, 2011) which can further 
exacerbate mental health problems. 
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has plunged New Zealand into the worst 
recession in decades. Although it is too soon to estimate the full economic impact of the 
pandemic, I expect economic insecurity to rise as it appears to be a feature of economic 
downturns.51 This will likely lead to increased psychological distress in response to the 
impacts of the pandemic. With reference to economic insecurity, this is caused by 
stressors related to job insecurity, the risk of unbuffered income loss and uncertainty 
about the economic future, a sentiment shared by all. In addition, stressors unique to the 
pandemic such as quarantine/self-isolation measures, social distancing, travel 
restrictions, illness caused by the Coronavirus, death of loved-ones, amongst other things, 
are expected to have further negative effects on mental wellbeing. 
Another important and related finding in this study is that predicted economic 
insecurity leads to deterioration in general physical health. Under the assumption that 
stress is also the mechanism at play, it is clear to see why this might be the case. 
Numerous studies in the health literature empirically link stress to the human immune 
system, providing conclusive evidence that stress weakens the immune system and leads 
to disease (Glaser & Kiecolt-Glaser, 2014; Morey et al., 2015; Moynihan et al., 1994; 
Plotnikoff et al., 1991; Segerstrom & Miller, 2004). Alcohol and substance abuse as coping 
mechanisms also have negative effects on physical health. The literature in this chapter 
provides a wealth of studies that support the negative relationship between economic 
insecurity and physical health. 
A surprising finding is that ‘lived insecurity events’ tend to improve physical 
wellbeing. In this regard, it is possible that experiencing negative shocks such as a job 
loss or divorce could potentially motivate individuals to take better care of their health. 
For instance, losing one’s job could free up time to exercise more and getting divorced 
could motivate an individual to adopt a healthier lifestyle. The decrease in stigmatisation 
of divorce and increased ease in forming social networks in modern times make these 
scenarios likely. Increased social support following a divorce helps motivate divorced 
individuals to lead more active and healthier lifestyles (Haber, 2019). Some studies have 
also found relationship dissolution (divorce and separation) to be associated with 
 
51 See Chapter 2 for more on this. 
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decreased BMI and waist circumference, improved diet quality, lower blood pressure and 
increased levels of physical activity (Kutob et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2005). The apparent 
changing nature of how individuals respond to such shocks in modern times could 
explain why a ‘lived insecurity event’ could potentially improve physical health. 
4.5. Conclusion 
This study contributes to the literature by being the first to explore the causal 
relationship between economic insecurity and mental wellbeing in New Zealand using 
the newly constructed ESI. To tackle any endogeneity problems in this analysis, FE 
models are used. The results provide weak evidence of a causal relationship between 
economic insecurity and poor mental wellbeing, and mixed evidence of the relationship 
between insecurity and physical wellbeing.  
The results based on using the K10 scores and the mental component summary of 
the SF-36 suggest that predicted insecurity as well as experiencing a ‘lived insecurity 
event’ increases an individual’s likelihood of suffering a mental disorder. The results of 
the K10 regressions suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the probability of 
being economically insecure leads to an increase in an individual’s K10 score of ~0.13 
points or ~0.27 points (depending on the regression specification); while experiencing a 
‘lived insecurity event’ increases an individual’s K10 score by about ~0.15 or ~0.4 points, 
all else being equal.  The results of the mental component summary of the SF-36 show 
that a 10 percentage point increase in the probability of being economically insecure 
decreases an individual’s standardised MCS score by ~0.06 points or ~0.5 points , while 
experiencing a ‘lived insecurity event’ decreases an individual’s standardised MCS score 
by ~0.1 or ~0.12 points, all else being equal.  The overall results of the mental wellbeing 
analysis are in line with the findings of previous research on the topic (for example, 
Green, 2011; Kopasker et al., 2018; Rohde et al., 2016).  
When it comes to physical health, which is related to mental health, analysing 
predicted economic insecurity and ‘lived insecurity events’ produces mixed results. 
Predicted insecurity is found to decrease an individual’s standardised PCS score by ~1.4 
points or ~1.9 points, all else being equal. The results are statistically significant at the 1 
percent level and suggest that economic insecurity diminishes physical wellbeing. On the 
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other hand, experiencing a ‘lived insecurity event’ increases an individual’s standardised 
PCS score by ~0.15 points or 0.19 points, all else being equal, suggesting improved 
physical wellbeing. These results are not statistically significant. Possible reasons for 
these divergences are discussed in Section 4.4.2. 
Although the results of the study are largely insignificant, possibly due to the 
limitations of the SoFIE panel, it is argued that they provide important insights. The study 
highlights the importance of examining the health effects of New Zealand’s rapidly-
changing economic environment. This could have broad societal ramifications and could 
be an impetus for societal changes and policy interventions, where necessary. Further 
studies are needed in this area. 
4.5.1. Limitations  
SoFIE was used to derive data on psychological distress for this study. However, 
there are several limitations to using this survey. In addition to the survey’s attrition rate, 
a large amount of data was removed in April 2018 due to confidentiality issues, which 
decreased the SoFIE sample to ~48 percent of the wave 1 sample.52 Past studies have 
found attrition to be higher for young people, ethnic minorities, persons with poorer 
health status and persons of lower socioeconomic standing (Carter et al., 2010b). This 
could affect the randomness of the sample and possibly cause sample selection bias. 
Moreover, longitudinal weights do not account for the data removal, so the data used for 
this study are not weighted. Without making this statistical adjustment, the results from 
the sample may not be generalisable to the New Zealand population. Nonetheless, the 
results could still offer some guidance to policymakers, academics and the general public. 
Response errors are likely to exist in this study since the measures of 
psychological distress are self-reported. Some respondents may not be willing to answer 
sensitive questions relating to their mental wellbeing so there may be some 
underreporting for the psychological distress indicators. Response errors may also occur 
if the respondents misinterpret or misunderstand the survey questions. This could be 
 
52 Removed data and attrition in SoFIE are discussed in Chapter 3. 
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due to illiteracy or measurement errors from poor questions or poor questionnaire 
design. The presence of response errors could lead to bias in the results.  
4.5.2. Policy Recommendations 
The extent to which any society experiences or is affected by economic insecurity, 
depends largely on its economic, social and political landscape. For instance, countries 
with strong welfare states have policies in place to buffer their labour force from the 
effects of unemployment or unexpected changes in working arrangements (Caroli & 
Godard, 2016; Esping-Andersen, 1990). Such policies can help insecure households 
maintain a decent standard of living in times of unexpected shocks to the labour market 
and possibly lessen stress or anxiety which is known to deteriorate mental wellbeing. The 
large economic costs of mental healthcare in New Zealand would likely be reduced if 
there were policies that specifically support households that experience large income 
shocks. Attention is often focused on dealing with mental health issues after they occur, 
but there may be tremendous benefits in dealing with the causes, of which economic 
insecurity is one. For instance, in a comparative study of the effects of a severe recession 
that hit both New Zealand and Finland in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was found 
that male youth suicide rates in Finland were less than in New Zealand, which was 
attributed to Finland having a better established welfare system at the time (Howden-
Chapman et al., 2005). Significant economic reforms in New Zealand around that time 
meant that the country had reduced the scope of its welfare state while Finland increased 
its social spending (Howden-Chapman et al., 2005). This suggests that welfare policies 
that are comprehensive and redistributive can, in times of economic downturns, be a 
crucial way of buffering the effects of economic insecurity. 
Wellbeing support programs could be of vital importance for those suffering 
psychological distress brought on by economic insecurity. A report by the Health 
Promotion Agency found that feeling isolated is a strong contributing factor for 
psychological distress and reduced life satisfaction in New Zealand (Kvalsvig, 2018). 
Moreover, an underlying stigma against mental disorders seems to exist in New Zealand. 
In a 2016 study using data from the Health and Lifestyles Survey (HLS), it was found that 
a third of the survey’s 3,854 participants experienced discrimination by society for 
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suffering mental illness, including discrimination in the workplace, from friends and 
family, and from healthcare services (Kvalsvig, 2018). Discrimination further seems to 
have a silencing effect since said people report being less likely to tell someone if they 
suffer from mental illness, with about 3 percent reporting that they would tell no one. 
Programs to tackle discrimination could be helpful in promoting better quality of life and 
easing psychological distress symptoms. Anti-discrimination strategies could include 
education, peer services, mental health literacy campaigns and policy changes (The 
National Academies, 2016).53 Support services should be accessible to all groups. 
Moreover, people with low incomes tend to have financial barriers which make them less 
likely to use services that address mental health or substance abuse (Rosen et al., 2004). 
For this reason, subsidising such services could be helpful. 
Other useful policy recommendations that could also be applicable here which are 
focused primarily on tackling economic insecurity, or its causes, are presented in Section 
2.6.2 in Chapter 2. 
4.5.3. Recommendations for Future Research 
This study explored the link between economic insecurity and psychological 
distress, which may or may not be an accurate predictor of mental disorders. Hence, 
exploring the relationship between economic insecurity and diagnosed psychological 
disorders could be an illuminating comparison to the results found in this study. 
Incorporating subjective measures of insecurity to complement the ESI could add 
to the richness of the results. Looking at individuals’ perceptions of their current and 
future economic circumstances will capture the psychological component of insecurity 
and could be telling of their mental states. For example, being overly pessimistic or overly 
optimistic would likely impact an individual’s mental wellbeing, regardless of their 
economic circumstances. 
Economic insecurity in New Zealand is found to be highly cyclical, with spikes 
observed during economic downturns. Exploring if psychological distress increases for 
 




insecure people at those and other turbulent times could provide useful information for 
policymakers. When data becomes available, research can be done to examine the effects 
of the current recession, which was brought on by COVID-19 pandemic, on insecurity and 
mental wellbeing. This study can be quite illuminating.  
There is also an emerging strand of the literature which models the effects of 
repeated exposure to economic insecurity on mental health, for example, the works of 
Niedzwiedz et al. (2017); Rohde et al. (2017a); Watson and Osberg (2017). This could be 
a practical area to explore in the New Zealand context as it would uncover whether 
psychological distress is a transitory phenomenon or has long-lasting effects on mental 
health. Such revelations will have important implications for public health policy. 
Lastly, the mechanism through which insecurity affects mental health is assumed 
to be stress. Future studies could use longitudinal data to test this hypothesis by 




Appendix I: Characteristics of the Sample 
 
Table I1: Descriptive Statistics  
Variables54 Mean  Std. Deviation 
Economic Insecurity (SoFIE) 0.060 0.238 
Economic Insecurity (HLFS) 0.134 0.094 
Kessler-10 Scale 13.478 4.854 
Sf-36 Mental Component Summary (MCS) 54.426 8.197 
Sf-36 Physical Component Summary (PCS) 53.982 7.546 
Housing Costs (NZD $) 6,365 3,508 
Savings (NZD $) 20,959 17,554 
Income (NZD $100,000s) 0.226 0.307 
Ethnicity: NZ European / Pākehā 0.683 0.465 
Ethnicity: Māori 0.166 0.372 
Ethnicity: Pacific Peoples 0.073 0.259 
Ethnicity: Asian 0.056 0.230 
Gender: Male 0.466 0.499 
Gender: Female 0.515 0.500 
Region: Auckland 0.128 0.334 
Region: Waikato 0.052 0.223 
Region: Wellington 0.078 0.268 
Region: Rest of North Island 0.134 0.341 
Region: Canterbury 0.096 0.294 
Region: Rest of South Island 0.077 0.267 
Age 40.980 23.200 
Age: 15-24 0.151 0.358 
Age: 25-34 0.140 0.347 
Age: 35-44 0.132 0.339 
Age: 45-54 0.132 0.339 
Age: 55-64 0.115 0.319 
Age: 65+ 0.186 0.389 
Education: University Degree 0.077 0.268 
Education: Post School Qualification 0.179 0.384 
Education: High School  0.134 0.341 
Education: No Qualification 0.129 0.335 
Relationship Status: With Partner 0.962 0.191 
Relationship Status: Relationship Ended Over ESI Year 0.038 0.191 
Household Composition 2.732 0.960 
Household Composition: Single Parent Household 0.061 0.239 
Household Composition: Two or More Adults with Kids 0.188 0.391 
Household Composition: Two or More Adults without Kids 0.186 0.389 
Household Composition: Single Person Household 0.152 0.359 
   
Number of Observations~   120,801 
  
 
54 As per Statistics New Zealand’s output rules, all counts are randomly rounded (up or down) to the nearest 




Appendix J: K10 and SF-36 Components  
 
Table J1: Sample Questionnaire of the Kessler 10 Psychological Distress Scale55 
Please tick the answer that is correct for you:  




the time  
(score 4) 
Some of 
the time  
(score 3)  
A little of 
the time 
(score 2)  
None of 
the time  
(score 1) 
1. 
In the past 4 weeks, about how often did 
you feel tired out for no good reason?  
          
2. 
In the past 4 weeks, about how often did 
you feel nervous?  
          
3. 
In the past 4 weeks, about how often did 
you feel so nervous that nothing could calm 
you down?  
          
4. 
In the past 4 weeks, about how often did 
you feel hopeless?  
          
5. 
In the past 4 weeks, about how often did 
you feel restless or fidgety?  
          
6. 
In the past 4 weeks, about how often did 
you feel so restless you could not sit still?  
          
7. 
In the past 4 weeks, about how often did 
you feel depressed?  
          
8. 
In the past 4 weeks, about how often did 
you feel that everything was an effort?  
          
9. 
In the past 4 weeks, about how often did 
you feel so sad that nothing could cheer you 
up?  
          
10. 
In the past 4 weeks, about how often did 
you feel worthless?  




55 Adapted from Cantor (2006). 
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Table J2: SF-36v2 Health Domains Scales and 
Corresponding Abbreviated Item Content56 
Health Domains Abbreviated Item Content 
Physical Functioning (PF)  
Vigorous activities, such as running, lifting heavy objects, or participating 
in strenuous sports 
 
Moderate activities, such as moving a table, pushing a vacuum cleaner, 
bowling, or playing golf 
 Lifting or carrying groceries 
 Climbing several flights of stairs 
 Climbing one flight of stairs 
 Bending, kneeling, or stooping 
 Walking more than a mile 
 Walking several hundred yards 
 Walking one hundred yards 
  Bathing or dressing oneself 
Role-Physical (RP) Cut down the amount of time spent on work or other activities 
 Accomplished less than you would like 
 Limited in kind of work or other activities 
  
Had difficulty performing work or other activities (e.g., it took extra 
effort)  
Bodily Pain (BP) Intensity of bodily pain 
  Extent pain interfered with normal work 
General Health (GH) Is your health: excellent, very good, good, fair, poor 
 Seem to get sick a little easier than other people 
 As healthy as anybody I know 
 Expect my health to get worse 
  Health is excellent 
Vitality (VT) Feel full of life 
 Have a lot of energy 
 Feel worn out 
  Feel tired 
Social Functioning (SF) Extent health problems interfered with normal social activities 
  Frequency health problems interfered with social activities 
Role-Emotional (RE) Cut down the amount of time spent on work or other activities 
 Accomplished less than you would like 
 Did work or other activities less carefully than usual 
Mental Health (MH) Been very nervous 
 Felt so down in the dumps that nothing could cheer you up 
 Felt calm and peaceful 
 Felt downhearted and depressed 
 Been happy 
Self-Evaluated Transition 





56 Adapted from Ware (2007) 
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Chapter 5  
The Deep Determinants of  
Income Inequality 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, the focus shifts away from economic insecurity towards another 
measure of economic wellbeing, income inequality, although the two concepts are 
related.57 Income inequality across the developed and developing world has historically 
been a major area of macroeconomic study. In the 18th century, the works of classical 
economists such as Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus focused on “the distribution of 
income between the main factors of production”, i.e., land, labour and capital (Sandmo, 
2015, p. 6). Since then, the key theme in the literature has changed somewhat and modern 
economists are more concerned with the distribution of income across individuals and 
households.  
Recent research has shown that this disparity in incomes has become more 
uneven over the past four decades (Atkinson, 2005, 2015; Beckfield, 2006; Card & 
DiNardo, 2002; Danziger & Gottschalk, 1992; Fredriksen, 2012; Freeman, 1994; Piketty, 
2017; Piketty & Saez, 2003; Smeeding & Grodner, 2000; Yang, 1999) prompting a 
renewed interest in the topic.58 Much of this attention is focused on the social and 
economic implications of rising income inequality, over which there has been much 
debate. While some argue that income inequality is in fact “good”, in that it is a product 
 
57 See Sections 2.1 and 2.2 in Chapter 2 for more on this relationship. 
58 Figure 5.1 shows cross-country differences in income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient up to 
the year 2015. The income inequality data are sourced from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID), 
version 3.4 (United Nations University, 2017). 
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of free market economies that helps drive innovation, entrepreneurship and public good 
provision (Aghion et al., 2019; Dasgupta, 2009; Itaya et al., 1997; Krueger, 2002; Tselios, 
2011; Zweimüller, 2000), there has also been deepening concern about social justice 
issues surrounding high levels of inequality, whereby the benefits of economic growth 
remain concentrated at the top of the income ladder and do not trickle down to all levels 
of society (Piketty, 2017). Inequality has also been linked to a host of social ills, such as 
crime, mental illness and poor educational outcomes, as well as macroeconomic and 
political instability; and is often viewed as an impediment to economic development 
(Atkinson, 2015; Berg & Ostry, 2017; Jones & Kim, 2018; Oishi et al., 2011; Ostry et al., 
2014; Piketty, 2017; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2011). 
 
Figure 5.1: Income Inequality Across the Globe (2015 or latest) 
 
Source: Created by the author using income inequality data from the World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) (United Nations University, 2017). 
 
Throughout the income inequality literature, there are a number of commonly 
cited reasons for widening income gaps, including the economic development process, 
skill-biased technological progress at the turn of the century, globalization, financial 
deregulation, the Great Recession/banking crises, limited social mobility of the non-
wealthy, and changes in redistribution and policy fashion (Alderson & Nielsen, 2002; 
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Bergh & Nilsson, 2010; Caminada et al., 2019; De Haan & Sturm, 2017; Frost & van 
Stralen, 2018; Jaumotte et al., 2013; Kearney & Levine, 2014; Kuznets, 1955). This study 
contributes to this literature by examining the deep determinants of income inequality, a 
largely unexplored topic. 
To explore the deep determinants of income inequality, this study draws on the 
comparative development literature, which almost exclusively focuses on explaining 
cross-country variation in income per capita. The determinants of comparative 
development are typically classed into two groups, proximate determinants and deep 
determinants. Proximate determinants refer to variables that are included in the 
aggregate production function (physical capital, human capital and technology), while 
deep determinants are factors that explain proximate determinants  (Acemoglu et al., 
2005; Hussey et al., 2020; Knowles & Owen, 2010). Deep determinants tend to be intrinsic 
and enduring within a society as time goes by. This study examines whether the deep 
determinants of comparative development also affect the distribution of income. If the 
deep determinants affect average incomes in an economy, they might also affect the 
variance of incomes. 
There are three main hypotheses that are commonly used as explanations for 
cross country differences in income per capita in the deep determinants literature – the 
geography hypothesis, the institutions hypothesis and the genetics/fractionalization 
hypothesis. The geography hypothesis rests on the premise that the natural environment 
of countries has a strong influence on levels of economic development. Hence, 
characteristics such as climate, distance from the equator, coastal proximity, soil quality 
and the disease environment play major roles in determining the quality and productive 
capacity of human and physical capital (Mellinger et al., 2000; Olsson & Hibbs, 2005; 
Sachs, 2001, 2003). For instance, a key finding is that geographical factors such as land 
endowments, topography, disease environment and climate (deep determinants) 
influenced where European colonizers decided to settle and may explain why these 
countries possess location-specific human capital (a proximate determinant) that leads 
to higher incomes today (Hibbs & Olsson, 2004; Michalopoulos, 2012; Sachs, 2001).  
The institutions hypothesis proposes that the economic, legal and political climate 
of countries, in areas such as property rights, rule of law, corruption and democratic 
freedoms, are what determines differences in economic development (Acemoglu et al., 
2001, 2002; Easterly & Levine, 2003; Hall & Jones, 1999; Rodrik et al., 2004). Some 
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studies have also assessed the role of informal institutions, such as culture, trust, 
cooperation and social norms, in determining the possible deep determinants of 
development (for example, Dobler, 2009; Knowles & Owen, 2010). 
More recently, there is an emerging strand in the literature that proposes that 
biology, genetics, history and culture are important factors in determining economic 
development (Ashraf & Galor, 2013a, 2013c, 2018; Putterman & Weil, 2010; Spolaore & 
Wacziarg, 2009, 2013). These studies propose that the genetic makeup of countries, 
which is strongly rooted in development history, has a significant effect on comparative 
development. 
This study seeks to determine whether the established deep determinants of 
comparative development are important in explaining within-country income inequality 
in a cross-section of 169 countries. To my knowledge, there are only a couple of empirical 
studies in the deep determinants literature that focus on the distribution of income across 
individuals and households in their analyses – specifically, Putterman and Weil (2010) 
and Easterly (2007). This study, therefore, addresses an important gap in the literature. 
The empirical analysis employed in this chapter estimates ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions to ascertain whether the geography, institutions and/or 
genetics/fractionalization hypotheses are related to within-country income inequality. 
Since the variables used are considered to be deeply rooted in history, it is assumed that 
they do not suffer from reverse causation. The study deals with possible omitted-variable 
bias by including a comprehensive set of explanatory variables and common controls 
used in the deep determinants literature. Variables specific to each hypothesis are 
examined separately, then a full (preferred) regression model which combines variables 
covering all three deep determinants hypotheses and a full battery of controls is analysed.  
The results of the full model show that there are some elements from each of the 
three hypotheses that contribute to explaining within-country income inequality. 
Specifically, whether a country is landlocked or not, distance from the technological 
frontier (proxied by genetic distance from the United States), birthplace diversity and the 
timing of the Neolithic Revolution are all found to be deep determinants of income 
inequality. The results also show that the deep determinants of income inequality vary 
depending on a country’s level of economic development. Explanations are discussed for 
the different findings. 
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The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 gives a review of the 
pertinent deep determinants literature. Section 5.3 discusses the data used in this study. 
Section 5.4 presents the econometric analysis and discusses the results of the regression 
analysis. Section 5.5 concludes and presents some policy recommendations based on the 
findings. 
5.2. Literature Review 
5.2.1. The Deep Determinants of Comparative Economic 
Development 
During the European colonial period, several European powers acquired full or 
partial political control over territories in the Americas, Africa, Asia and Oceania, 
primarily for economic gain. The countries of the Caribbean and Latin America, for 
instance, were particularly attractive around 1500 CE as they were well endowed with 
land and other resources that were deemed economically beneficial to European 
Colonists.59 In such regions, European Colonists set up colonial rule primarily for the 
extraction of natural resources, usually through the use of slave labour – known as 
extractive institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001). In contrast, the countries of the North 
American continent were less economically desirable, but had vast amounts of land and 
were less densely populated which made them ideal for settler colonies. Settler mortality 
in settler colonies was also relatively low compared to tropical regions, where the disease 
environment was unfavourable to the survival of Europeans. Hence, ‘Neo-Europes’ were 
established in settler colonies and institutions similar to those that existed in Europe at 
the time were introduced (Acemoglu et al., 2001).  
By observing these regions today, Acemoglu et al. (2001) found that the regions 
where Europeans settled are far more economically successful (as measured by income 
 
59 CE or Common Era (also Current Era or Christian Era) refers to the time that has elapsed since year 1 in 
the calendar used in many parts of the world, based on the Christian calendar which started counting from 
the birth of Jesus Christ. BCE is an abbreviation for Before Common/Christian/Current Era (a year before 
Jesus Christ was born) (Cambridge University Press, 2020a, 2020b). 
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per capita in 1995) than the regions where extractive colonies existed. The authors argue 
that the institutions that were set up in the Neo-Europes, which promote property rights, 
protection from expropriation and democratic freedoms, persist to the present day and 
could explain their higher levels of development. In contrast, extractive institutions in 
extractive colonies allowed for the concentration of political power and increased rents 
to the elite minority, creating a risk of expropriation for the poorer majority. These 
observations were the foundation for an influential paper by Acemoglu et al. (2002) 
which found that former European colonies that were richer in 1500 CE, in that they were 
densely populated, more urbanized and more technologically advanced, had become 
poorer by 1995. Conversely, those countries that were considered relatively poorer in 
1500 CE had become rich by 1995. The authors refer to this phenomenon as a “reversal 
of fortune” (Acemoglu et al., 2002). They used their findings to support the institutions 
hypothesis and argue that it is good institutions rather than geography that determines 
a country’s level of economic development. Other researchers that have supported the 
institutions hypothesis include Hall and Jones (1999), Easterly and Levine (2003) and 
Rodrik et al. (2004). They have all found evidence to suggest that institutions, rather than 
geography, is the main fundamental determinant of economic development. 
There is a smaller section of the literature that explores the role of informal 
institutions in determining economic development (Ahlerup et al., 2009; Dobler, 2009; 
Knowles & Owen, 2010; North, 1991). Informal institutions include features such as 
interpersonal trust, social norms, culture, conventions and codes of behaviour within a 
society (Knowles & Owen, 2010; North, 1991). These analyses support the inclusion of 
informal institutions into the deep determinants of development framework and argue 
for their possible complementarity or substitutability with formal institutions. Dobler 
(2009) explored the role of both formal and informal institutions in the deep 
determinants framework. The analysis included cultural traits and examined whether 
religious roots affected the development of institutions. The author found that both 
formal and informal institutions are important determinants of development. Similarly, 
Ahlerup et al. (2009) found a positive effect of both formal institutions and social capital 
(trust) on economic growth between 1995 and 2005. They included an interaction term 
between formal institutions and social capital, and found that they are substitutes in the 
development process. Knowles and Owen (2010) also included both formal and informal 
institutions, as well as an interaction term and geographical variables, in their analysis of 
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life expectancy (a proxy for health). Their findings are in line with those of Ahlerup et al. 
(2009) and Dobler (2009) in that both formal and informal institutions have a positive 
effect on life expectancy, and they are substitutes in development. 
There are also researchers who strongly support the role of geography in 
determining long-run economic development. In an influential book, Guns, Germs and 
Steel, Diamond (1997) presented a biogeographic framework to show why the timing of 
the Neolithic Revolution is key in explaining comparative development. The Neolithic 
Revolution marked the transition process from a hunter-gatherer lifestyle to sedentary 
agriculture (Hansen et al., 2015). This began in the Fertile Crescent, a region in the Middle 
East where sedentary farming techniques were first employed, circa 10,000 BC. The 
Neolithic Revolution spread on an East-West axis rather than a North-South axis and 
could explain why it quickly spread from the Fertile Crescent to Eurasia (and parts of 
North Africa), where the climate was ideal for agricultural activities (Diamond, 1997). 
Eurasia was also well endowed with a variety of plant and animals that were suitable for 
domestication, and possessed a natural environment that made transportation and 
communication easy (Diamond, 1997; Olsson & Hibbs, 2005). Societies practising 
sedentary agriculture were able to produce an agricultural surplus allowing some 
members to specialise in other production tasks, which led to economic development. In 
contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) lacked easily-domesticable plants and animals, as well 
as climate suitable for agriculture. Diamond (1997) argues that SSA’s biogeographic 
disadvantages, rather than lack of ingenuity, explain why SSA did not achieve similar 
levels of economic development as the Eurasian Continent. This is mainly because 
Eurasia’s geographical endowments afforded the region a head start on the Neolithic 
Revolution and, thus, economic development.  
Diamond’s hypothesis influenced the works of Galor and Moav (2002), Olsson and 
Hibbs (2005), Ashraf and Galor (2011) and Galor and Michalopoulos (2012) which all 
support the proposition that biogeographic endowments have a strong influence on 
modern-day income. Similarly, in a series of papers, Gallup et al. (1999), Gallup and Sachs 
(2001), Sachs and Malaney (2002) and Sachs (2003) have found that measures of 
economic development are strongly correlated with geographical variables such as 
coastal proximity, disease ecology and climate. Gallup et al. (1999) observe that countries 
that are located close to the equator are poorer than those at mid- to high-latitudes, while 
landlocked countries have lower incomes than coastal countries. Easterly (2007) used 
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cross-country data to explore the mechanism through which geography affects economic 
development. The author found that one of the main channels is through income 
inequality. Easterly suggests that a country’s agricultural endowments are important in 
determining structural inequality (defined as inequality formed by colonial rule), and 
that structural inequality predicts a country’s level of development. 
Including human genetics in comparative studies is a relatively new strand of 
study in the deep determinants literature. It is rooted in work on fractionalization 
presented from the 1990s onward. Fractionalization indices were created as a way to 
measure diversity amongst populations. Some of the most commonly used measures of 
fractionalization in the literature are ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization. A 
seminal paper by Easterly and Levine (1997) solidified the use of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization as a standard measure in studies on this topic. This measure has, 
therefore, become a common control variable in regression models explaining any cross-
country differences in economic performance that may arise from ethnic fragmentation. 
Similarly, La Porta et al. (1999) and Collier (2001) found that a composite index of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, which was constructed by averaging four indices of 
linguistic diversity for 157 countries, is important in explaining economic development. 
However, Alesina et al. (2003) pointed out that the measure made popular by Easterly 
and Levine (1997) does not distinguish between ethnic and linguistic diversity, especially 
since people may differentiate themselves using both characteristics in highly diverse 
populations. They, therefore, constructed a new, disaggregated measure of ethnic, 
linguistic and religious diversity for between 190 and 215 countries for their study. They 
found that ethnic and linguistic fractionalization played key roles in determining 
economic success in terms of GDP growth, quality of institutions and welfare, and policy 
quality, more so than religious fractionalization does. 
The emerging body of inquiry that explores the importance of human genetic 
diversity as a deep determinant of comparative development developed out of the 
aforementioned work on fractionalization. The inclusion of human genetic data is 
becoming more commonplace in economic analyses following pioneering work by 
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), which used genetic heterogeneity as an explanation for 
economic development (proxied by income per capita). In their study, Spolaore and 
Wacziarg (2009) found evidence to suggest that genetic distance, the time since two 
populations shared a common ancestor, has a statistically significant impact on the 
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differences in incomes across countries. More specifically, genetic distance is associated 
with the pairwise income differences between countries. They suggest that populations 
that have smaller genetic distance, i.e., they are very similar culturally, will have less 
barriers to economic development. The rationale is that more closely related populations 
have a higher likelihood of sharing knowledge amongst themselves and improving 
technology and institutions. Their results stand up to various controls for differences in 
present day incomes as well as incomes back in 1500.  
Michalopoulos (2012) explored the origins of ethnic diversity to examine the deep 
determinants of economic performance. The author found that geographic heterogeneity 
(diverse land and elevation attributes) shapes ethnolinguistic diversity across countries. 
The study further examined the mechanisms by which geographic heterogeneity may 
determine the formation of different ethnolinguistic groups. The study found that 
localized ethnicities came about due to variability in land endowments, which 
determined location-specific human capital. 
Some researchers recognized the importance of controlling for a population’s 
ancestry and found that a persistence of fortune is prevalent at the population level 
rather than at a location-specific level (Chanda et al., 2014; Putterman & Weil, 2010). In 
other words, it is the populations’ ancestral backgrounds - for example, years of 
agricultural experience - rather than the history of the place they live in that predicts 
current GDP per capita. They are among several other works in this literature, including 
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) and Comin et al. (2010), that have established the 
importance of looking at the history of people rather than locations in determining the 
deep-rooted determinants of economic development.  
Ashraf and Galor (2013c) considered genetic heterogeneity within societies in 
their Out of Africa hypothesis. They used an ancestry-adjusted measure of genetic 
diversity, which controls for population migration and the mixing of genes throughout 
history, based on data on 53 ethnic groups from the HGDP-CEPH Human Genome 
Diversity Cell Line Panel. The predicted heterozygosity (genetic diversity) of a country is 
based on the migratory distance from East Africa, specifically, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
Their rationale for using this measure is that the migratory distance of people from East 
Africa - the ‘cradle of humankind’ - determines the level of genetic diversity in human 
settlements and the latter has an enduring effect on comparative economic development. 
The study found that economic development has an inverted-U relationship with genetic 
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diversity in precolonial times and a nonmonotonic effect on comparative development in 
modern times. Their subsequent studies show similar results (Ashraf & Galor, 2013a, 
2018). 
In a more recent study, Alesina et al. (2016) investigated the relationship between 
population diversity in birthplaces and economic prosperity. The researchers used a new 
birthplace diversity measure which they constructed based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
concentration index. Their index measures the probability that two individuals randomly 
drawn from the population have two different countries of birth. It is based on skill, 
essentially distinguishing between high-skill diversity (university graduates) and low-
skill diversity and is decomposed into a size component (share of immigrants) and a 
variety component (diversity of immigrants). Unlike the majority of the empirical 
literature, which shows that heterogeneity measures have negative effects on economic 
growth in cross-country comparisons (for example, Alesina et al., 2003; Collier, 2001; 
Easterly & Levine, 1997), Alesina et al. (2016) found that heterogeneity has positive 
economic effects. Their empirical analysis shows that diversity of, and arising from, 
immigration is positively related to economic prosperity. This relationship holds 
especially for skilled immigrants in rich countries. 
5.2.2. Income Inequality in the Deep Determinants 
Literature 
The extent to which income inequality has been included in the deep determinants 
literature is mainly as a mechanism that explains differences in economic development 
(for example, Easterly, 2007); hence, there is a gap for empirical inquiry into the possible 
inherent causes of inequality. The only researchers to, thus far, focus on explaining 
income inequality in a deep determinants study are Putterman and Weil (2010). Their 
study examined the determinants of within-country inequality, as an accompaniment to 
their main study analysing the deep determinants of income per capita. Their rationale 
for doing so is related to the findings of their main study which suggest that early 
development of a country’s people, in terms of agriculture and politics, influences 
present-day income. Development today being linked to development 500 years ago 
exists because of a persistence of fortune through high-quality institutions at the 
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population level, rather than the location-specific level. They argue that the theories that 
explain the role of historical development in determining modern-day income (i.e., the 
deep determinants), would also explain how differences in early development of a 
country’s ancestors - which came about from populations migrating throughout history - 
affects income inequality today. This is because factors such as human capital, which 
relates to the timing of the Neolithic Revolution, or genetics would have persisted in these 
cultures. 
On this basis, they used OLS regressions to empirically investigate the relationship 
between income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) and some heterogeneity 
measures (ethnic, historical and linguistic fractionalization). Their study found evidence 
to suggest that heterogeneity that existed in a country’s early development is important 
in explaining current income inequality. Their main argument is that heterogeneity leads 
to struggles over the distribution of income which hinders the development of growth-
promoting institutions, hence exacerbating income inequality. Their empirical results 
show that ethnic, historical and linguistic fractionalization have significant impacts on 
income inequality. However, this effect weakens or completely disappears when controls 
are added to their model. 
5.2.3. Why are the Deep Determinants of Comparative 
Development Expected to Affect Income Inequality? Insights 
from an Extended Literature. 
In addition to Putterman and Weil’s (2010) reason for exploring the relationship 
between income inequality and the deep determinants of economic development, other 
researchers provide evidence that implies that a relationship possibly exists. This section 
will give a brief overview of such work. Even though these studies do not directly 
investigate this relationship, they provide some insights that help form the rationale for 
the current study. 
The inherent geographical characteristics of a country as well as genetics and 
institutions could potentially have an effect on income inequality. Adverse geographical 
characteristics are more than likely to have a stronger negative effect on the poor 
compared to the rich. For instance, diseases tend to have a larger disproportionate 
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negative effect on the low-income individuals within a population since they may not be 
financially able to access high-quality healthcare as the rich can. Similarly, formal 
institutions may be set up in a way that favour high-income individuals or dominant 
ethnic groups, thus exacerbating inequality. There is a small, but growing, body of 
literature by economic historians that has proposed evidence to support these claims 
(Engerman et al., 2002; Engerman & Sokoloff, 1997, 2005; Sokoloff & Engerman, 2000). 
These studies find factor endowments to be a key determinant of structural inequality, 
which in turn leads to poor quality institutions and low investment in human capital. 
Historical studies show that large disparities in human capital, wealth and 
political power throughout the New World (for instance, North America versus Latin 
America) are due mainly to differences in their land endowments (Engerman & Sokoloff, 
1997; Sokoloff & Engerman, 2000). The land endowments and temperate climate of the 
North American countries were highly suitable to set up small family farms for growing 
commodities, such as wheat, which enticed colonizers to settle in these places. In Latin 
America, on the other hand, the land endowments and tropical climate were more suited 
to the production of lucrative cash crops at the time, such as sugarcane, which produced 
large economies of scale for colonists through the use of slave labour. 
The authors also suggest that these differences across the New World may have 
persisted throughout time through the use of economic institutions. In North America, 
where European colonists decided to settle, institutions were put in place to encourage 
investment and promote the growth of the middle class. In Latin America, where 
colonizers decided to exploit the natural resources through the use of slave labour 
(extractive institutions), the large disparities in wealth acted as a deterrent to colonizers 
from implementing institutions that support investment in human capital and 
democratic freedoms. The authors claim that the elite were afraid of the poor gaining 
majority power, and redistributing economic benefits (rents, income, etc.) away from the 
ruling class. In this way, they were able to maintain their status over time by forging legal 
frameworks that benefited themselves. Other researchers also proposed the institutions 
explanation as the mechanism by which the rich aimed to maintain their elite status by 
withholding democratic freedoms and equal rights from the masses (Acemoglu, 2003; 
Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000; Bourguignon & Verdier, 2000). 
Engerman et al. (2002) found that higher levels of inequality are related to lower 
investment in education. They attribute these lower levels of schooling to lower 
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enrolment rates by the poor who are unable to afford school fees; low levels of subsidized 
schooling in societies where the wealthy elite hold the political power, and therefore 
resisted taxes being redistributed to fund schooling for the poor; and low levels of 
economic support to schools in poorer communities where education was funded 
through local resources. Rajan and Zingales (2006) argued that underdevelopment in 
human capital amongst the poor exists because of the upper and educated middle classes’ 
strategic refusal to provide educational opportunities for the poor in an effort to avoid a 
reduction of rents to the members of the upper and middle classes. Moreover, Engerman 
and Sokoloff (2005) found that egalitarian countries, as well as those that were more 
ethnically homogenous, tended to extend voting rights to the population much earlier 
than unequal societies which contributed to a more equal distribution of political 
influence. 
With population heterogeneity increasing globally, immigration-driven diversity 
could possibly place pressure on wages. There is a strand in the literature which explored 
this relationship in the context of the United States (Borjas, 2003; Borjas & Katz, 2007; 
Card, 2009; Ottaviano & Peri, 2008). Borjas (2003) and Borjas and Katz (2007) found a 
significant negative effect of immigration on the wages of less educated natives.60 Card 
(2009) explored the relationship between immigration and income inequality in major 
cities in the United States and found that immigration has a weak effect on native wage 
inequality. However, since immigrants were observed to cluster around the high or low 
ends of the education distribution, they tend to have higher residual inequality, thus 
increasing economy-wide wage inequality. 
  
 
60 The authors use the word “natives” to refer to persons born in the United States as distinct from 
immigrants. It is not a reference to Indigenous Americans.  
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5.3. Data  
A group of common variables used in the deep determinants of comparative 
development literature is employed in this study. These variables are drawn from the 
literature that supports the geography, institutions and genetics hypotheses. The source 
of each variable is presented in parentheses after the variable name in this section. Table 
K1 in Appendix K presents descriptive statistics for each variable. 
5.3.1.1. Dependent Variable 
Gini Coefficient (from United Nations University, 2017) - The Gini coefficient is used as a 
measure of income inequality for this study. The data are derived from the UNU-WIDER, 
World Income Inequality Database (WIID3.4) (United Nations University, 2017). WIID3.4 
is the most recent version of the database at the time of writing, with 8,817 observations 
covering 182 countries up to the year 2015. 
A caveat in using the Gini coefficient for this study is that income inequality 
measurement techniques vary across countries. Unlike GDP which has a standard 
measurement across all countries, there is no agreed-upon method for measuring income 
inequality consistently and the data could come from different sources depending on the 
country (United Nations University, 2017). Estimates could vary based on the surveying 
technique, weighting procedures and the treatment of income or expenditure measures 
(United Nations University, 2017). This is important as the estimates could potentially 
suffer from measurement bias. 
5.3.1.2. Independent Variables 
(A) Geographical Variables 
 
Neolithic Transition Timing (from Ashraf & Galor, 2013c) – This variable represents the 
number of years that have elapsed (until the year 2000 CE) since a region shifted from a 
hunter-gatherer subsistence to sedentary agriculture – also known as the Neolithic 
Revolution or the Agricultural Revolution. Though this is not a purely geographic 
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variable, like temperature for example, it is often treated as a geography variable in the 
literature. The treatment of this variable is likely attributable to the work of Diamond 
(1997) who proposed that each country’s geographic endowments determined the 
timing of its Neolithic Revolution and could explain economic development today. This 
variable is log transformed to reduce skewness, considering that the Neolithic Age 
occurred roughly over the period 10,000 BCE to about 4000 BCE (Ramesh, 2018). 
 The timing of the Neolithic Revolution is expected to influence within-country 
income inequality today since how countries operate, in terms of specialisation, 
institutional quality and advances in technology, can be linked to when they transitioned 
to sedentary agriculture. Regions that transitioned earlier were also able to advance 
agricultural techniques earlier, leading to agricultural surplus. This freed up time and 
resources for these regions to specialise in other areas and develop institutions that 
supported property rights and promoted the growth of the middle class. When colonisers 
from early-transition regions came in contact with less-developed regions, they were able 
to overpower the indigenous people with their relatively more advanced weapons. Most 
notably, the development of extractive institutions likely concentrated power in the 
hands of a few colonizers while the majority were exploited for economic gain, with little 
concern for promoting the development of institutions that favoured growth in incomes 
for slaves. Remnants of such structures may still exist today and could affect the 
distribution of incomes.  
 
Absolute Latitude (from Ashraf & Galor, 2013c) – Absolute latitudinal distance from the 
equator. These data are reported by the CIA’s World Factbook (Central Intelligence 
Agency, n.d.). 
 
Temperature (from Ashraf & Galor, 2013c) – This variable represents the average 
temperature of a given country in degrees Celsius between 1961 and 1990. 
 
Percentage of Arable Land (from Ashraf & Galor, 2013c)– This variable represents the 





Landlocked (from Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2009)– This is an indicator variable indicating 
whether a country is entirely enclosed by land or not. 
 
The four preceding geographical variables, latitude, temperature, arable land and 
the landlocked indicator, may play important roles in explaining income inequality since 
the natural environment influenced where settler colonies and extractive colonies were 
set up. Since Europeans settled in regions where the climate and disease environment 
were favourable for their survival, high quality institutions that promoted economic 
development were established in these places (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly & Levine, 
2003; Gallup et al., 1999). In contrast, in regions with unfavourable disease 
environments, but which were also suitable for growing cash crops, small groups of 
Europeans settled in these places where they set up extractive institutions. The 
hierarchical rule in these societies likely led to disparities in power and  wealth, to the 
advantage of the colonists. Moreover, colonisers likely did not invest in human capital 
development for the native population as a way of maintaining social and economic 
control. This is discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.3.  
 
(B) Variables representing Institutions 
 
Fst Genetic Distance to the United States (from Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2009) - This 
variable measures the time since two populations shared a common ancestor (measured 
by allele frequencies), essentially capturing the length of time since two populations were 
separated from each other.  
For the purpose of this study, and in line with Spolaore and Wacziarg’s studies, 
this measure is interpreted as a proxy for technological innovation and productivity 
relative to the world technological frontier, the United States (Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2009, 
2013, 2018). The rationale is that divergences in intergenerationally transmitted cultural 
traits can act as a hindrance to social, political and economic cohesion, which in turn 
hinders the development of good quality institutions to support the sharing of ideas and 
innovation. This is because people are more likely to integrate with others who share 
similar characteristics making the spread of institutions and technology likely higher in 
more closely-related societies with a more recent common history (Spolaore & Wacziarg, 
2009, 2013, 2018). Hence, the assumption in this study is that distance from the world 
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technological frontier, in terms of a society’s ancestral lineage, creates a barrier to the 
diffusion of institutions. 
If distance from the technological frontier acts as a barrier to the development of 
institutions which support spread of innovation, this could likely affect income inequality. 
Considering that technology plays a major role in modern-day economic development, it 
follows that in countries that are further away from the technological frontier, where 
poor institutional quality may hinder access to technology for a large proportion of the 
population, there could be severe barriers in the ability to earn income, especially for 
disadvantaged subgroups of the population.  
 
State History (from Chanda & Putterman, 2005) – This variable summarizes the extent 
to which present-day countries had an identifiable political state up to the year 1500 CE.  
Some studies have found that state history is related to modern-day economic 
development (for example, Chanda et al., 2014; Chanda & Putterman, 2007; Putterman & 
Weil, 2010). It is assumed that state history may also have an effect on modern-day 
income inequality since a transition from a tribal setting toward a system of governance 
or concentrated authority would have an effect on institutions and the ability of citizens 
to earn and grow income.  
 
English Legal Origin (from La Porta et al., 1999) – This is an indicator variable that 
identifies whether a country’s legal system originated from the English Common Law 
system. English legal origin is an important inclusion as it is considered to be the most 
widespread and influential legal system in the world (Wood, 2008). England’s common 
law and statute law have been established throughout the British Empire, with many 
aspects of the system surviving after independence from British rule throughout the 
commonwealth realm. Moreover, it is still influential in the Unites States legal system. 
 Having a well-established legal system is key in maintaining social and economic 
order, which upholds the rights of a country’s residents. English legal origin was 
influential in establishing laws that protect property rights and protect citizens from 





Former European Colony (from Acemoglu et al., 2002; Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2009) – This 
indicator variable represents whether a country was a former European colony or not. 
This is included because, during the colonial era, Europeans developed settler colonies in 
the regions where they were most likely to survive. They set up similar institutions in 
these settler colonies as those that existed in Europe at the time (Acemoglu et al., 2001). 
In contrast, they set up extractive institutions in colonies that were used primarily for 
economic benefit. Since some of these institutions persisted over time, they may have an 
effect on modern-day inequality. See Section 5.2.3 for more on this. 
 
(C) Genetics and Fractionalization Variables 
 
Predicted Genetic Diversity (from Ashraf & Galor, 2013c) – A predicted genetic diversity 
variable was constructed by Ashraf and Galor (2013c) based on a genetic diversity 
measure developed by geneticists to measure the probability that two individuals chosen 
randomly from a population are genetically different from each other.  Geneticists use 
allelic frequencies, i.e., the rate at which an allele (gene variant) occurs in a sample 
population, to construct the expected heterozygosity measure, termed observed genetic 
diversity. 
Given the potential endogeneity of observed genetic diversity with economic 
development, Ashraf and Galor (2013c) used this raw measure to construct a new 
diversity measure. The new measure is predicted by “migratory distances from East 
Africa to the year 1500 CE locations of the ancestral populations of the country’s 
component ethnic groups in 2000 CE, as well as by pairwise migratory distances between 
these ancestral populations” (Ashraf & Galor, 2013b, p. 45). The rationale is that the 
greater the migratory distance from East Africa, the less the observed genetic diversity. 
This is referred to as the serial founder effect and implies that as subgroups migrated 
from Africa during the course of human history to set up settlements elsewhere, only a 
subset of the overall genetic diversity left the parent colonies in those instances. Hence, 
greater migratory distance from East Africa is associated with lower genetic diversity. 
Through the loss of genetic variability, the new population may be both genotypically and 
phenotypically different from the parent population. The serial founder effect is depicted 
in Figure 5.2. 
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Proposing that human genetics possibly affect income inequality could be deemed 
controversial. This suggests that an individual’s genetic makeup predisposes them to 
interact with society in a way that affects economic outcomes. According to Dobzhansky 
(1973), human genetic diversity does not predict social and economic inequalities 
claiming that “monozygotic twins, though genetically similar, may engage in different 
occupations and achieve unequal socioeconomic status” (p.219). Hence, I propose that 
this possible relationship is not driven by human genetics, since the mechanism at play is 
likely higher levels of interpersonal trust and social cohesion amongst people who regard 
themselves as being similar in areas like physical characteristics, culture, language, 
socioeconomic background, education and religion, and lower social cohesion amongst 
those who do not. Low levels of trust tend to segregate populations and since people tend 
to integrate mainly with people with shared characteristics (some determined by 
genetics), it can be seen how genetic diversity and trust could be related. Where high 
levels of fractionalization exist, societies may be less altruistic to groups that are different 
and less supportive of policies that support the advancement of these groups. There may 
also be unequal access to resources and discrimination in the labour market which can 
promote greater disparities in wealth. 
 
Figure 5.2: Illustration of the Serial Founder Effect 
 




Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (from Easterly & Levine, 1997)- This variable 
measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the national 
population belong to different ethnolinguistic groups. Ethnolinguistic groups share a 
common ethnicity and language. This measure is based on data from the Atlas Narodov 
Mira (Bridgman, 2008; Bruk & Apenchenko, 1964). 
 Language and ethnic barriers can lead to coordination problems in the workplace 
as well as society as a whole. Communication problems can lead to prejudices against 
individuals or ethnic groups that speak a different language. As discussed for the previous 
variable, genetic diversity, less altruism towards a group that is ethnolinguistically 
different may lead to a culture of exclusion in economic activities. Less economic 
opportunities being available to certain subgroups of a population could cause disparities 
in income.  
 
Religious Fractionalization (from Alesina et al., 2003) – This measure estimates the 
probability that two individuals randomly drawn from a population belong to different 
religious groups (Arbatlı et al., 2020; Patsiurko et al., 2012). This variable was 
constructed using religious affiliation data from Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the 
Year 2001 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2002). 
 Similar to the explanation for genetic diversity and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, prejudice or fear toward certain religious groups that do not share the 
same views can lead to social and economic inequities. 
 
Birthplace Diversity, Migrants (from Alesina et al., 2016) – This is a measure developed 
by Alesina et al. (2016) using data on a cross-section of countries in the year 2000. The 
index, based on the Herfindahl-Hirschmann concentration index (Rhoades, 1993), uses 
information on relative group sizes to measures the probability that “two individuals 
drawn randomly from an entire population have two different countries of birth” (Alesina 
et al., 2016, p. 106). A discussion about why birthplace diversity may affect inequality is 





(D) Additional Control Variables 
 
Continent Indicators (from Ashraf & Galor, 2013c) – These variables identify the 
continent on which a given country is located. Four indicator variables are used to 
distinguish continents in this study, namely Africa, Asia, Europe and Americas. Oceania is 
omitted from the regression analysis to avoid perfect multicollinearity, since every 
country in the sample falls into one of these categories. 
 
Population Density in 1500 CE (from Ashraf & Galor, 2013c) – Population density in 
1500CE calculated as total population in 1500CE ÷ total land area. Data on total 
population are from McEvedy and Jones (1978) and data on total land area are from the 
World Development Indicators (The World Bank, n.d.). 
In Malthusian times, population density was a predictor of economic success. This 
is because densely populated areas at that time were the ones that were naturally 
productive making them most suitable for agriculture. Hence, population density is used 
as a proxy for comparative economic development in 1500 CE. This variable is included 
in the deep determinants analysis since past economic development likely influences 
current economic development, and could also affect income inequality through the 
quality of institutions developed during the development process. 
5.4. Econometric Analysis 
This study tests the hypothesis that the deep determinants of comparative 
development also affect within-country income inequality. Specifically, I examine the 
extent to which the geography, institutions and genetics/fractionalization hypotheses 
explain income inequality. To empirically investigate the relationship between income 
inequality and various deep determinants of comparative development, the OLS model in 
Equation (5.1) is specified.61 For each country, i,  
 
 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖 + 𝑖 (5.1) 
 




where GINIi, is the Gini coefficient (2015 or latest); Geogi is a vector of geographical 
variables (Neolithic transition timing (log), absolute latitude, temperature, percentage of 
arable land and landlocked indicator); Insti is a vector of variables representing 
institutions (Fst genetic distance to the United States (proxy for technological 
advancement), state history, state history squared, English legal origin and former 
European colony); Geni is a vector of genetics and fractionalization variables (predicted 
genetic diversity, predicted genetic diversity squared, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 
religious fractionalization and birthplace diversity); 𝑋𝑖  is a vector of control variables 
(population density in 1500 CE and continent indicators) and εi is the error term. 
 For all the regression specifications containing predicted genetic diversity, I use 
bootstrapping with 1000 replications to derive consistent standard errors. This is 
because the predicted genetic diversity variable was constructed by Ashraf and Galor 
(2013c) using a two-step method which leads to generated regressor bias.62  
5.4.1. Endogeneity Concerns 
The studies in the deep determinants literature typically use OLS for their 
analyses (for example, Ashraf & Galor, 2013c; Michalopoulos, 2012; Putterman & Weil, 
2010; Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2013) or a 2SLS approach to control for possible endogeneity 
issues (for example, Acemoglu et al., 2001; Ashraf & Galor, 2013c).  
In this study, the variables of interest representing the deep determinants are all 
treated as exogenous. The rationale is that these variables are inherently rooted in 
history and have, thus far, been persistent over time. This makes them less subject to 
reverse causality. For instance, in order to emphasize this point for the predicted genetic 
diversity variable, Ashraf and Galor (2013c) used observed diversity as the variable of 
interest for part of their regression analysis for which they ran both OLS and 2SLS 
regressions. In the 2SLS regressions, migratory distance from East Africa was used as an 
IV for observed genetic diversity and both methods estimated largely similar coefficients, 
 
62 See Section 4.4 in Chapter 4 of this thesis for further information on generating regressors using a two-
stage approach. Section 5.3.1.2 documents how the predicted genetic diversity variable was constructed by 
Ashraf and Galor (2013c) using the two-stage approach. 
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suggesting that there are likely no endogeneity issues between genetic diversity and 
economic development. The predicted genetic diversity variable used in this analysis is 
predicted by migratory distance from East Africa, so it is assumed to be exogenous.  
To account for possible omitted-variables bias, the regression analysis employs a 
comprehensive set of explanatory variables and common controls used in the literature. 
This point was emphasized by Putterman and Weil (2010) in establishing a causal link 
from migration of people from countries with high levels of early economic development 
to economic growth today. The main concern for the authors was that in early 
development history, a deciding factor for where people settled may be related to some 
features that made certain places more attractive than others, such as geography or 
institutional quality. If this is the case, then these location-specific features may be what 
made these places wealthier rather than migrants. The authors found that the 
relationship held after controlling for aspects such as climate and temperature. They 
conclude that endogeneity is unlikely a problem in their analysis. 
5.4.2. Regression Results 
Results of OLS regressions showing the effect of several deep determinants on 
income inequality levels are presented in Tables 5.1 to 5.6. Each table presents the results 
of the model specified in Equation (5.1). In Tables 5.1 to 5.3, variables specific to the 
geography, institutions and genetics hypotheses are examined separately to ascertain the 
relationship with income inequality. Table 5.4 presents the full model which combines 
variables representing all three hypotheses and a full battery of controls. Table 5.6 
disaggregates the sample into “rich” countries and “poor” countries to see if the deep 
determinants of income inequality vary depending on which stage in the development 
process a country falls. The poor country sample represents countries for which GDP per 
capita in the year 2000 falls below the median for the sample of countries in the same 
year, whereas the rich country sample represents countries for which GDP per capita is 
more than or equal to the median for the same year. The results collectively support the 
proposed hypothesis that some of the deep determinants of comparative development 
are important in explaining income inequality. 
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5.4.3. The Deep Determinants of Income Inequality 
Table 5.1 presents results showing the relationship between income inequality 
and several common geographical variables used in the literature. The results suggest 
that the most important geographical deep determinants of income inequality are 
Neolithic transition timing and absolute latitude. Specifically, the more time that has 
elapsed since the Neolithic revolution is associated with lower levels of income inequality 
(p<0.05), while the further away a country is from the equator is associated with lower 
levels of income inequality (p<0.05). These results are robust to the controlling for 
population density in 1500 CE and continent fixed effects. 
Table 5.2 presents the results using variables for institutions. The results suggest 
that distance from the technological frontier is the most important institutional deep 
determinant of income inequality. The results show that the further away a country is 
from the technological frontier, the greater the levels of income inequality. This result is 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 5.3 presents the results using genetic and other fractionalization measures. 
The results suggest that greater religious fractionalization and birthplace diversity are 
related to higher levels of income inequality. Both are significant at the 5 percent level. 
Section 5.4.3.1 presents the full model to see which deep determinants retain 
statistical significance when confounding factors are controlled for. This is the preferred 




Table 5.1: The Deep Determinants of Income Inequality: Geographical Variables 
 Income Inequality (Gini) 
Geographical Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log Neolithic Transition 
Timing -6.924*** -4.485*** -4.482*** -4.354*** -4.266*** -4.573*** -3.656** 
 (1.303) (1.220) (1.204) (1.143) (1.165) (1.247) (1.779) 
Absolute Latitude  -0.244*** -0.321*** -0.266*** -0.290*** -0.287*** -0.181** 
  (0.031) (0.073) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) (0.084) 
Temperature   -0.174 -0.111 -0.159 -0.160 -0.121 
   (0.144) (0.145) (0.145) (0.147) (0.150) 
Percentage of Arable 
Land    -0.090** -0.089** -0.048 -0.037 
    (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.041) 
Landlocked Indicator     -2.045 -2.248* -2.036 
     (1.300) (1.306) (1.312) 
Population Density in 
1500 CE      -0.080 -0.022 
      (0.070) (0.071) 
Africa Indicator       6.015 
       (3.729) 
Asia Indicator       3.508 
       (4.595) 
Europe Indicator       0.774 
       (4.555) 
Americas Indicator       8.786** 
       (4.028) 
Constant 96.173*** 82.481*** 87.648*** 85.540*** 86.857*** 89.310*** 73.019*** 
 (11.039) (9.898) (9.795) (9.428) (9.656) (10.298) (12.392) 
        
Observations 151 150 150 148 145 143 143 
R-squared 0.261 0.461 0.467 0.475 0.487 0.508 0.553 
RESET Test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0057 0.0146 0.4937 0.0934 0.1884 0.2394 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 5.2: The Deep Determinants of Income Inequality: Institutions 
  Income Inequality (Gini) 
Institutions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fst Genetic Distance to the United States 
(Proxy for Technological Advancement) 
94.337*** 72.802*** 52.254*** 49.894*** 80.797*** 
(11.211) (13.976) (15.190) (15.381) (16.515) 
State History  -17.455* -10.161 -9.578 0.642 
  (9.977) (9.949) (10.155) (11.647) 
State History Squared  10.826 6.014 6.836 0.748 
  (9.856) (10.208) (10.674) (11.260) 
English Legal Origin    -1.127 -1.021 0.037 
   (1.315) (1.359) (1.372) 
Former European Colony   6.861*** 7.177*** 1.344 
   (1.508) (1.508) (2.118) 
Population Density in 1500 CE    -0.056 0.004 
    (0.103) (0.090) 
Africa Indicator     -2.893 
     (3.639) 
Asia Indicator     -3.955 
     (4.260) 
Europe Indicator     -6.356 
     (4.799) 
Americas Indicator     5.591 
     (3.741) 
Constant 29.915*** 36.637*** 32.589*** 32.468*** 31.754*** 
 (1.261) (3.176) (2.908) (2.995) (4.003) 
      
Observations 159 139 125 123 123 
R-squared 0.315 0.338 0.474 0.486 0.588 
RESET Test (p-value) 0.5197 0.1492 0.6673 0.9262 0.7766 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 5.3: The Deep Determinants of Income Inequality: 
Genetics/Fractionalization 
 Income Inequality (Gini) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Predicted Genetic Diversity -1,401.608*** -1,541.987*** -1,463.196*** -1,394.626*** 29.827 
 (380.990) (401.716) (391.802) (389.044) (487.304) 
Predicted Genetic Diversity 
Squared 992.128*** 1,093.820*** 1,034.493*** 986.119*** -61.104 
 (280.751) (297.328) (290.570) (288.109) (348.833) 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization  8.166*** 6.939*** 7.378*** -2.297 
  (2.424) (2.684) (2.758) (2.628) 
Religious Fractionalization   5.467* 4.923 5.813** 
   (3.111) (3.142) (2.937) 
Birthplace Diversity, Immigrants    5.915* 5.692** 
    (3.191) (2.788) 
Population Density in 1500 CE     -0.044 
     (0.076) 
Africa Indicator     11.348* 
     (5.814) 
Asia Indicator     2.551 
     (5.240) 
Europe Indicator     -3.046 
     (5.413) 
Americas Indicator     5.953 
     (5.790) 
Constant 531.159*** 575.423*** 547.780*** 519.303*** 38.389 
 (128.402) (134.746) (131.251) (130.704) (170.048) 
      
Observations 168 135 133 133 133 
R-squared 0.186 0.237 0.254 0.268 0.534 
RESET Test (p-value) 0.0021 0.0006 0.0012 0.0007 0.0303 
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses    




5.4.3.1. Full Model Results and Discussion 
The results of the full regression model are presented in Table 5.4. This model 
combines the covariates of all the deep determinants hypotheses to ascertain the deep 
determinants of income inequality. In this way, the model controls for all the variables 
under study to ascertain if there are specific variables that are driving the variation in 
income inequality. 
To test the normality of the residuals in the full model (column labelled “All”), I 
employ the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality.63 The null hypothesis is that the residuals are 
normally distributed. This test returned a p-value of 0.01 and a Shapiro-Wilk W-statistic 
of 0.97 suggesting that the distribution of the residuals is normal. The kernel density plot 
presented in Figure 5.3 also suggests that the residuals approximately follow a normal 
pattern. I further test for functional form misspecification in the model using the Ramsey 
RESET test (Wooldridge, 2016, p. 277).64 The null hypothesis is that the model is correctly 
specified. Since the p-value in the final model is greater than 0.05, I fail to reject the null 
hypothesis (at the 5 percent level). I conclude that it is unlikely that the functional form 
of this model is mis-specified. 
The full model establishes the deep determinants that are most important in 
explaining income inequality in a cross-sectional sample of 115 countries. Many of the 
variables that were found to be statistically significant when the different deep 
determinants hypotheses were analysed separately become insignificant after the full 
battery of controls is added. The model finds that three of the deep determinants 
variables are important in individually explaining within-country income inequality, 
namely genetic distance to the United States (proxy for technology), whether a country is 
landlocked or not and birthplace diversity. The model accounts for ~66 percent of the 




63 The Stata command, swilk e, is run in postestimation to test the hypothesis that the distribution is normal. 
In addition, the histogram e, kdensity normal command is used to produce a histogram for the residuals 
overlayed by a normal distribution for comparison.  
64 The Stata command, ovtest, is run in postestimation to test for functional form misspecification.  
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Table 5.4: The Deep Determinants of Income Inequality: Full Model 
 Income Inequality (Gini) 





Log Neolithic Transition Timing -4.266*** -2.693* -2.485 -3.492 
 (1.218) (1.575) (2.141) (3.156) 
Absolute Latitude -0.290*** -0.185* -0.065 -0.016 
 (0.075) (0.106) (0.114) (0.117) 
Temperature -0.159 -0.194 0.012 0.070 
 (0.152) (0.166) (0.178) (0.191) 
Percentage of Arable Land -0.089** -0.056 -0.002 0.008 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.044) (0.050) 
Landlocked Indicator -2.045 -3.234** -2.567** -3.031** 
 (1.328) (1.572) (1.236) (1.240) 
Fst Genetic Distance to the United States (Proxy for 
Technological Advancement) 
 47.957** 89.156*** 83.520*** 
 (21.327) (23.202) (25.605) 
State History  2.749 7.534 1.513 
  (11.802) (11.058) (13.114) 
State History Squared  -2.984 -3.912 1.488 
  (11.177) (10.537) (12.903) 
English Legal Origin   -1.175 0.218 0.026 
  (1.354) (1.518) (1.702) 
Former European Colony  2.775 -0.048 -0.145 
  (2.092) (2.273) (2.660) 
Predicted Genetic Diversity   -814.987** -820.789 
   (334.907) (510.389) 
Predicted Genetic Diversity Squared   559.167** 588.811 
   (246.556) (372.369) 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization   -1.371 -1.462 
   (2.528) (2.494) 
Religious Fractionalization   1.038 1.780 
   (2.767) (2.973) 
Birthplace Diversity, Immigrants   4.165 5.522* 
   (2.764) (2.893) 
Population Density in 1500 CE    -0.017 
    (0.086) 
Africa Indicator    1.939 
    (6.666) 
Asia Indicator    5.202 
    (6.945) 
Europe Indicator    1.309 
    (6.733) 
Americas Indicator    6.910 
    (7.229) 
Constant 86.857*** 64.616*** 342.497*** 335.020* 
 (10.299) (15.529) (114.790) (180.839) 
     
Observations 145 122 115 115 
R-squared 0.487 0.536 0.639 0.659 
RESET Test (p-value) 0.0934 0.6743 0.9247 0.9411 
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses     




Figure 5.3: Kernel Density Plot for Full Regression Model 
 
5.4.3.1.1. Institutions 
The results suggest that genetic distance to the United States, the technological 
frontier, is a deep determinant of income inequality. This relationship is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level for all estimations in Table 5.4. This variable is 
considered an institutional variable in this study under the assumption that a 
population’s intergenerationally transmitted genealogical links are important for the 
diffusion of institutions, through the transmission of technological, and other, knowledge 
(Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2009, 2013, 2018).  
This finding suggests that the countries in the sample that are further away from 
the technological frontier are more likely to experience relatively higher levels of income 
inequality. To provide the size effect of genetic distance on a scale that is easy to interpret, 
the estimated beta coefficient for the genetic distance variable is multiplied by its 
standard deviation (Wooldridge, 2016, p. 169) - specifically, 83.520 ×  0.052 = 4.343. 
This essentially provides a way to interpret the coefficient value independent of the scale. 
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From this result, a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance is associated with 
an increase in the Gini coefficient of ~4 points (measured on a 100-point scale), i.e., just 
under half of a standard deviation of inequality, all else held constant.65  
This is likely due to the lack of institutions which promote access to technology in 
countries that are further away from the technological frontier. The data for this current 
study show that countries that are further away from the technological frontier are 
poorer on average, and also experience relatively higher levels of income inequality than 
countries that are closer to the frontier (see Figure 5.4). Due largely to globalization, 
technology has become ubiquitous in all parts of the world, including poorer regions. 
However, technology may be relatively more difficult to access in poor countries that are 
further away from the technology frontier due to lack of technical skills, lack of economic 
resources or lack of physical access to technology. Moreover, supporting modern 
technology requires stable infrastructure which may simply not be available in poorer 
countries and/or requires highly-educated and skilled human capital. Such workers are 
more likely to be drawn from the wealthier portions of these societies who have access 
to, and can afford, education and training leading to skill-biased technological progress. 
Gaps in technological diffusion may mean that technology does not reach all citizens, 
especially those who live in remote areas where infrastructure may be still 
underdeveloped.  
For these reasons, technology may be unevenly distributed in poorer countries, 
possibly only servicing a small proportion of some populations. Those who are fortunate 
to be able to access information and communications technology (ICT) in this ever-
changing technological landscape will progress at a higher rate than those who cannot 
causing a digital divide. This is important because most modern-day jobs require an 
understanding and working knowledge of different forms of technology to be successful. 
Even some of the lowest paying jobs require the use of basic technology. In places where 
a large proportion of the population lacks access to, and/or knowledge of, ICT, they may 
be disadvantaged compared to their tech savvy counterparts in the job market, who are 
 
65 The same procedure is used for other independent variables that are interpreted in terms of a change in 
standard deviation. Descriptive statistics showing the standard deviation for all variables included in this 
study are presented in Appendix K. 
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likely to secure higher paying jobs. This could result in widening income disparities in 
countries further away from the technological frontier. 
The opposite is true for countries that are closer to the technological frontier. On 
the assumption that these countries are mostly wealthier, there is a higher likelihood that 
there will be more equal access to public goods and the labour market, due to high quality 
formal institutions created over the course of their development history. These 
institutions support the spread of ICT throughout such populations. Because of this, the 
digital divide in more technologically advanced countries will be smaller in comparison 
to those further away from the frontier. Whereas inequality in access and skill-biased 
technological progress may have affected advanced economies at the dawn of the Digital 
Revolution, institutions would have evolved as technology evolved to support these 
changes. Hence, countries closer to the technological frontier are quicker to react to 
technological changes. 
Table 5.5 provides some evidence to support these suppositions. It shows how 
internet usage varies by income inequality levels. In a sample of some of the most unequal 
countries in the study sample (Gini coefficient > 50), it is observed that less than 15 
percent of these populations have access to the internet. On the other end of the 
spectrum, in a sample of some of the most equal countries in the study sample (Gini 
coefficient < 30), more than 90 percent of these populations have access to the internet. 
Growth-promoting institutions in nations that are closer to the technological 
frontier also support growth in incomes for the majority of their populations. For 
example, the tax and welfare system in countries like Austria and Switzerland influences 
the redistribution of wealth and supports greater equality among citizens. According to 
the Swiss Federal Statistics Office (2020), the country’s social security policy aims to deal 
with the unequal distribution of incomes gained in both labour and capital markets 
through taxes and social transfer benefits. As a result, the country tends to report less 
disparities in income in their national statistics after government transfers and other 
redistributive effects are accounted for. Similar redistributive policies are in place in 
other countries close to the frontier (Causa & Hermansen, 2017). Such institutions may 
be weak or lacking in countries further from the frontier. For instance, in Zambia, fiscal 
policy is set up in a way that the benefits of redistribution do not reach the poorest 
households (for example, energy subsidies targeted at the rich) and lead to a greater 
number of poor and vulnerable households experiencing net reductions from their 
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incomes than those experiencing net additions (De La Fuente et al., 2017). These 
circumstances tend to exacerbate poverty and income inequality. 
 
Figure 5.4: The Relationship between Technological Advancement, GDP per capita 





Note: The figures quoted in Panel 2 indicate the Gini coefficient matched to the countries 
in Panel 1.  
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Table 5.5: Income Inequality and Internet Usage 










Haiti 60.8 12.2% Iceland 23.6 98.2% 
Namibia 59.7 12.0% Norway 23.9 97.3% 
Central African 
Republic 56.2 4.0% Sweden 25.2 91.5% 
Comoros 55.9 7.9% The Netherlands 26.4 90.4% 
Guinea-Bissau 50.7 3.8% Luxembourg 28.5 97.5% 
 
Source: The Gini coefficient data are from the WIID database, version 3.4 (United Nations 
University, 2017). Internet usage data (2016 estimates) are from the World Development 
Indicators (The World Bank, 2018). 
5.4.3.1.2. Genetics/Fractionalization 
Birthplace diversity is found to be another deep determinant of income inequality. 
The results in Table 5.4 show that birthplace diversity is positively related to income 
inequality. This result is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The results 
suggest that a one standard deviation increase in birthplace diversity increases the Gini 
coefficient by ~1 point, all else held constant. 
Increased cross-border movement of people of diverse backgrounds is a major 
characteristic of modern-day globalization that will lead to an inevitable increase in 
diversity across the globe and transform the makeup of future populations. Birthplace 
diversity can be complex, capturing not only genetic diversity, but also diversity in areas 
such as languages, religions, culture, socioeconomic backgrounds, life experience and 
value. Considering this, I propose that the mechanism driving this relationship could 
possibly be a lack of social cohesion between natives and immigrants, especially amongst 
those who regard themselves as being different from other groups in society. This is likely 
because with greater levels of birthplace diversity, prejudices are formed, labour markets 
become more competitive and trust between diverse groups may be weak.  
It has been documented across different fields, including economics, sociology and 
anthropology, that individuals with shared characteristics tend to band together and 
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share information, experiences etc., and thus have closer social and economic ties 
(Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Knack & Keefer, 1997; McPherson et al., 2001; Putnam, 1993, 
2000). The scientific term for such attitudes is homophily, which is used to explain the 
phenomenon whereby human beings tend to share more genes with their friends than 
with strangers (Christakis & Fowler, 2014; Domingue et al., 2018).66 Homophily limits 
the way people interact socially and economically, and has powerful implications for 
social attitudes and knowledge sharing. This is because social networks tend to be 
strongly divided by race and ethnicity, exhibiting fractionalization in terms of religion, 
age, gender, occupation, income and education (McPherson et al., 2001). This hinders the 
transfer of cultural, behavioural, technological or economic information across 
populations.  
As more heterogeneous groups become part of the workforce and society as a 
whole, cultural and language barriers could lead to coordination problems (Easterly & 
Levine, 1997). These high transaction costs causes inefficiencies in the market and could 
also further illuminate homophily and decrease altruism to other groups. In highly 
fractionalized societies, studies have pointed to issues of low trust, low social cohesion, 
less cooperation and hence lower levels of socioeconomic order (Ashraf & Galor, 2011, 
2013c). Diversity increases the incidence of mistrust and civil conflicts leading to 
“inefficiencies in the operation of the economy relative to its Production Possibility 
Frontier” (Ashraf & Galor, 2013c, p. 11). A culture of exclusion makes it difficult to 
implement redistributive policies that support the entire population since diverse groups 
have less altruistic attitudes towards groups that are culturally or ethnically different 
(Desmet et al., 2009). For instance, labour market policies may be biased against 
immigrants leading to disparities in the income earned by natives and immigrants.  
 
66 The term, homophily, originated in the field of sociology from the work of Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) 
who studied the dynamics of racial attitudes and friendship in a mixed-race community in Pennsylvania in 
the United States, but today is commonly used in the study of social networks (e.g. Halberstam & Knight, 




Table 5.4 shows that geography also plays a role in determining income inequality. 
Specifically, whether a country is landlocked or not is an important deep determinant of 
income inequality. This finding is robust to the full battery of controls, including all 
variables for institutions and genetic fractionalization. The results suggest that the Gini 
coefficient for landlocked countries are, on average, ~3 points lower than non-landlocked 
countries, all else held constant. This relationship is statistically significant at the 5 
percent level.  
A possible reason for this finding is that the greater proportion of the world’s 
landlocked countries are considered poor on international standards, with a few 
exceptions such as Austria, Luxembourg and Switzerland. For instance, 2019 GDP per 
capita (constant 2010 US dollars) for Burundi was US $208.07, while for Afghanistan was 
US $571.47 (The World Bank, 2020). Both of these countries are landlocked, both are 
classified as low-income nations by The World Bank and both have relatively low levels 
of income inequality, with Gini coefficients of 33.36 and 27.8 respectively. The 
assumption is that there may be little variation in incomes within these countries’ 
populations as the majority are equally poor. 
This may be due to these countries’ high dependence on surrounding territories 
for the transit of goods. This dependence makes it imperative that landlocked nations 
have good political, social and economic ties with neighbouring countries. In addition, 
accessibility to ports is also dependent on the neighbouring country’s infrastructure, 
administrative practices, and economic and social stability (Faye et al., 2004). This may 
lead to severe restrictions in the extent to which landlocked countries can develop 
economically, especially if there are conflicts with surrounding nations, thus hindering 
opportunities for within-country income growth. This is especially true if the landlocked 
economies are highly reliant on primary industries, where trade is mainly comprised of 
physical goods. In these cases, high transportation costs becomes a disadvantage for 
landlocked countries when competing in global markers (Faye et al., 2004). These 
geographic disadvantages are assumed to be ubiquitous in landlocked countries, in that 
they not only restrict the opportunities available to grow wealth for low-income 
residents, they also restrict growth for middle- and higher-income residents. This 
possibly explains less disparities in income in these countries.  
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When it comes to the high-income landlocked nations, their areas of specialisation 
as well as economic integration with neighbouring countries may provide them economic 
advantages. Consider the Swiss economy. Switzerland is highly specialised in banking 
and financial services which are mainly carried out electronically, thus decreasing the 
need for physical ports to transit goods and services. Moreover, Switzerland’s integration 
within the European Economic Area (EEA) makes it easy to move their manufactured 
goods - for example, Swiss watches - across countries. This makes it easier to support 
inclusive income growth for their residents. Other landlocked countries that benefit from 
the EEA agreement are Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg and the Slovak 
Republic, all with relatively low levels of income inequality. 
5.4.3.2. Split Sample Results: Rich vs Poor Countries 
The data were also split into two separate samples of poor and rich countries. The 
split sample results are presented in Table 5.6 and show that the deep determinants of 
income inequality vary by a country’s stage of economic development when confounders 
are controlled for. In the poor country sample, Neolithic transition timing appears to the 
main deep determinant of income inequality; while in the rich country sample, genetic 
distance to the technological frontier and whether a country is landlocked or not play a 
significant role in explaining income inequality. 
In the poor country sample, the results suggest that the greater time that has 
elapsed since the Neolithic Revolution is associated with lower levels of income 
inequality. Specifically, a 1 percent increase in the number of years that have elapsed 
since the Neolithic Revolution (until the year 2000 CE) is associated with a 0.1 point 
decrease in the Gini coefficient, all else held constant. This relationship is significant at 
the 5 percent level. Countries that experienced an earlier transition to agriculture had a 
longer time to establish stable social, political and economic cohesion through the 
development of high quality formal institutions, shared values and a stable culture based 
on interpersonal trust and cooperation. This fits with Diamond’s hypothesis which 
suggests that regions that experienced an early transition to agriculture had a longer time 
to devote to economic development. Favourable geographical endowments gave early-
transition countries a head start to improve agricultural production techniques over 
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time. As agricultural production became more efficient, resources could be devoted to 
developing areas such as knowledge, technology, institutions and weapons (Olsson & 
Hibbs, 2005). Such development gave these countries an advantage when they made 
contact with less-developed nations which transitioned later to agriculture. Because of 
superior technology and weapons, the early-transition countries were able to overpower 
less-developed countries, and in some cases, develop extractive institutions. Extractive 
institutions promoted the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of the ruling 
classes leading to disparities in areas such as wealth, healthcare, education and 
democratic freedoms (Acemoglu, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2000; Bourguignon & Verdier, 2000; Sokoloff & Engerman, 2000), that likely persist to 
this day in some of the poorer regions. This is a possible channel through which 
geography influenced modern-day income inequality. For low-income countries that 
experienced a later transition to agricultural production, it is also assumed that they are 
further behind in their development of strong growth-promoting institutions.  
When it comes to the rich countries, the greater distance to the technology frontier 
is associated with higher levels of income inequality, while landlocked countries 
experience less inequality. I propose similar arguments as those presented in Section 
5.4.3.1 for the full sample results. Since technology is part of almost every aspect of life in 
advanced economies and deemed as necessary to be competitive on an individual level, 
it is logical to assume that those who do not keep up with ever-changing technological 
progress will likely fall behind in labour markets and in their personal lives. The rich 
landlocked countries are mostly located in Europe which are able to reap economic 
benefits for citizens through the EEA. Moreover, redistributive policies in wealthy 
landlocked countries which support a more equal distribution of income, could explain 




Table 5.6: The Deep Determinants of Income Inequality: Rich/Poor Country Split 
Samples  
 Income Inequality (Gini) 
  Poor Countries Rich Countries 
Log Neolithic Transition Timing -10.020** 0.465 
 (4.378) (6.862) 
Absolute Latitude 0.075 -0.343 
 (0.193) (0.318) 
Temperature 0.109 -0.346 
 (0.274) (0.468) 
Percentage of Arable Land 0.023 -0.027 
 (0.095) (0.101) 
Landlocked Indicator -2.816 -5.598* 
 (2.177) (3.253) 




State History -14.696 34.824 
 (19.214) (43.712) 
State History Squared 13.140 -20.297 
 (20.172) (37.152) 
English Legal Origin  -2.157 5.502 
 (2.712) (5.210) 
Former European Colony 1.183 -15.550 
 (5.108) (13.869) 
Predicted Genetic Diversity -1,662.195 -1,068.406 
 (1,452.131) (1,484.862) 
Predicted Genetic Diversity Squared 1,211.078 767.665 
 (1,009.119) (1,146.214) 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 0.531 3.098 
 (4.359) (6.865) 
Religious Fractionalization 0.398 3.771 
 (5.521) (6.242) 
Birthplace Diversity, Immigrants 8.312 -3.997 
 (6.659) (7.118) 
Population Density in 1500 CE 0.049 0.027 
 (0.279) (0.155) 
Africa Indicator -5.668 -5.963 
 (8.853) (19.346) 
Asia Indicator 4.241 -25.517 
 (7.489) (17.416) 
Europe Indicator -2.049 -23.043 
 (9.559) (15.818) 
Americas Indicator -0.886 -0.990 
 (11.399) (12.811) 
Constant 678.991 422.946 
 (534.398) (504.872) 
   
Observations 62 53 
R-squared 0.691 0.798 
RESET Test (p-value) 0.1518 0.2326 
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses   





This chapter finds evidence to suggest that some of the deep determinants of 
comparative development are also important in explaining within-country income 
inequality. The deep determinants data were drawn from literature that covers the three 
most common deep determinants hypotheses – the geography, institutions and 
genetics/fractionalization hypotheses. OLS regressions were run to determine these 
relationships under the assumption that all covariates used in this study are exogenous. 
When the deep determinants hypotheses are analysed separately, there is strong 
and statistically significant evidence to suggest a relationship with multiple variables 
from all three categories of deep determinants and income inequality. However, when all 
three hypotheses are combined into a single sample which controls for many different 
confounding factors, the results show that the most robust deep determinants of income 
inequality are genetic distance to the United States (interpreted as a proxy for 
technological advancement), birthplace diversity and whether a country is landlocked or 
not. Specifically, (1) greater distance from the world technological frontier (United 
States) is associated with higher levels of income inequality; (2) greater birthplace 
diversity is associated with higher levels of income inequality; and (3) landlocked 
countries exhibit lower levels of income equality. In the rich country/poor country split 
sample, the results show that the deep determinant of income inequality in poor 
countries is Neolithic transition timing, while the deep determinants of income inequality 
in rich countries are distance from the technology frontier and whether a country is 
landlocked or not. The results show that greater time elapsed since the Neolithic 
Revolution is associated with lower levels of income inequality in poor countries. In rich 
countries, genetic distance is positively related to income inequality, while being 
landlocked is negatively related to income inequality. 
The results in this study show that there are features from all three of the deep 
determinants hypotheses that are important in explaining within-country income 
inequality. Possible explanations for the findings were presented. The discussion covered 
only the results that were found to be statistically significant in the full models; however, 
this does not imply that some of the other variables are irrelevant. More study is needed 
in these areas. 
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5.5.1. Policy Recommendations 
Redistributive policies can be powerful is reducing disparities in income. In cases 
where the benefits of economic growth are not shared by all in a given society, especially 
the poor, income transfers from taxation can be a way to reduce income inequality. 
Taxation should be, ideally, progressive, with a tax-free threshold for the very poor. 
Promoting good governance principles could help in the collection of revenue to support 
society. Moreover, government expenditure aimed at providing opportunities for growth 
in personal incomes can also help. These could include funding education and skills 
training for the most vulnerable, as well as providing access credit facilities, healthcare 
and energy. 
A key finding in this study is that greater genetic distance from the world 
technological frontier, where institutional quality is assumed to be weaker, is related to 
higher levels of income inequality. A recommended policy that can help lessen inequality 
in this regard is for governments to implement national strategies that support science, 
technology and innovation. Because ICTs are unevenly distributed in countries further 
from the frontier, education is important to assist low-income individuals in gaining 
technological knowledge and access to technology. This can help develop technical skills 
that can improve individuals’ marketability in the labour market. Moreover, investment 
in infrastructure that support the diffusion of technology could also be helpful. 
Another recommendation surrounds inclusive polices that support diversity 
within populations. This recommendation is aimed at the positive relationship between 
income inequality and birthplace diversity. If the assumption holds that immigration-
driven diversity will continually rise for future generations, the best social and economic 
policies would support integration and social cohesion. Strong institutional quality is 
imperative for creating long-run economic benefits through its ability to foster trust and 
civic cooperation. Inclusivity ensures no group is marginalized and will give people a 
sense of identity, hence making them more likely to support and contribute to economic 
progress. For example, affirmative action in the United States protects individuals from 
underrepresented minority groups from discrimination. The policy tends to focus highly 
on providing minorities with access to education and the labour market (Cornell Law 
School, 2018). Similar policies that help promote equal opportunities for all, especially 
disenfranchised groups, exist in places like South Africa (the Employment Equity Act, 
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post-Apartheid), China (preferential treatment for minority nationalities in education) 
and New Zealand (improved access to university courses and scholarships for individuals 
of Māori and Pacific descent) (Burger et al., 2016; Clothey, 2005; Education Counts, 
2018). These types of policies foster more inclusive social and economic systems. 
The finding that the greater the time that has elapsed since the Neolithic 
Revolution is related to lower levels of income inequality in poor countries warrants 
improvement in formal and informal institutions in these countries. The assumption is 
that countries which transitioned earlier to agriculture had a longer time to forge social, 
economic and political cohesion through high quality formal and informal institutions. 
Hence, in poor countries that are lagging behind, working towards providing high 
institutional quality is imperative for creating long-run economic benefits through its 
ability to foster civic cooperation. An institutional framework that helps minimize 
corruption by upholding the principles of the rule of law, protecting all citizens in legal 
transactions and implementing measures that protect citizens from expropriation would 
be ideal.  
Governments of poor landlocked countries should aim to maintain good political, 
social and economic relations with neighbouring countries to ensure there are no 
conflicts that could disrupt trade. Developing governmental institutions for the purpose 
of mediating conflicts can be helpful. For landlocked countries on the African continent, 
the newly-formed African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement may provide 
opportunities for more integration through cross-border relationships.  
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Appendix K: Characteristics of the Sample 
 
Table K1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Income Inequality (Gini Coefficient) 169 39.042 8.801 23.600 60.800 
Log Neolithic Transition Timing 164 8.313 0.642 5.892 9.259 
Absolute Latitude 205 25.632 17.223 1 72 
Temperature 184 18.698 8.686 -19.455 28.639 
Percentage of Arable Land 196 14.342 13.320 0.040 62.100 
Landlocked Indicator 191 0.204 0.404 0 1 
Fst Genetic Distance to the United 
States (Proxy for Technological 
Advancement) 176 0.097 0.052 0 0.209 
State History 143 0.443 0.246 0.021 0.964 
State History Squared 143 0.256 0.237 0.000 0.929 
English Legal Origin  202 0.337 0.474 0 1 
Former European Colony 204 0.500 0.501 0 1 
Predicted Genetic Diversity 207 0.701 0.056 0.572 0.774 
Predicted Genetic Diversity 
Squared 207 0.494 0.076 0.327 0.600 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 143 0.411 0.282 0.001 0.925 
Religious Fractionalization 190 0.440 0.229 0.002 0.860 
Birthplace Diversity, Immigrants 190 0.739 0.191 0.040 0.959 
Population Density in 1500 CE 184 6.028 9.248 0.022 62.500 
Africa Indicator 208 0.260 0.439 0 1 
Asia Indicator 208 0.236 0.425 0 1 
Europe Indicator 208 0.221 0.416 0 1 




Chapter 6  
Conclusion 
6.1. Concluding Remarks 
6.1.1. Thesis Summary 
This thesis explores various aspects of two measures of economic wellbeing, 
economic insecurity and income inequality. In Chapters 2 and 3, I construct two versions 
of an ESI for New Zealand using micro-level data from multiple population surveys. I use 
a modified version of the technique used to construct the ESI for the United States in 
Hacker et al. (2014). Currently, there is no agreed-upon technique for measuring 
economic insecurity, but Hacker’s measurement captures many different important 
components of insecurity, making it a comprehensive measure. 
The results of the ESI show that economic insecurity in New Zealand is cyclical, 
tracking closely to the unemployment rate and the GDP growth rate. The proportion of 
the population experiencing insecurity increases during economic downturns and 
decreases in expansionary times. This implies that experiencing economic insecurity may 
be largely involuntary. Another key finding is that there are ethnic differences in 
economic insecurity. Ethnic minority groups are disproportionately affected by economic 
insecurity, with higher rates of unbuffered losses experienced by Pacific peoples, Māori 
and Asians. When compared to Pākehā, New Zealand’s largest ethnic group, Māori and 
Asians are almost twice as likely to experience insecurity, while Pacific peoples are more 
than twice as likely to experience insecurity. Other population subgroups that are more 
susceptible to large unbuffered economic loss include young adults, people with no 
educational qualifications, single-adult households, persons whose relationships ended 




   
In Chapter 4, I use both versions of the ESI along with longitudinal health data 
from SoFIE to examine the impact of economic insecurity on mental wellbeing. To control 
for endogeneity, I use fixed effects regressions. Mental wellbeing is captured by the K10 
psychological distress scale and the SF-36 health survey. The results of several different 
regression specifications show that experiencing economic insecurity worsens mental 
wellbeing. These findings are not statistically significant. The study also finds that 
predicted insecurity worsens general physical health, as proxied by the physical 
summary component of the SF-36. These results are significant at the 1 percent level. It 
is likely that the mechanism at play is increased stress that comes about from financial 
instability and uncertainty about the future. On the other hand, experiencing a ‘lived 
insecurity event’ improves an individual’s physical wellbeing, although the results are not 
statistically significant. 
The studies in Chapters 2 to 4 highlight how important it is that researchers and 
policymakers are aware of how insecurity affects New Zealanders. Knowing the 
subgroups of the population that are most susceptible to experiencing insecurity, what 
drives insecurity and how it affects the overall wellbeing of households, is key to 
implementing targeted policies to address the problem. However, establishing how the 
insecurity impacts New Zealand households requires a comprehensive and effective 
measurement tool. The objectivity, representativeness and temporal coverage of the 
main ESI constructed in this thesis makes it ideal for this purpose. It is strongly 
recommended that the raw ESI data be published on an annual basis by Statistics New 
Zealand so that an official insecurity index is available to researchers. Different versions 
of the index could be made available to meet the needs of researchers - for example, 
providing both ‘buffered’ and ‘unbuffered’ versions of the index. 
It is also recommended that the government provides universal basic income for 
all New Zealand residents. This will act as a guaranteed financial safety net to help buffer 
economic losses and lessen the stress on households in bad economic times. This is 
important since the results of the study in Chapter 4 suggest that economic insecurity 
worsens mental wellbeing. Not having to worry about financial security in uncertain 
times will not only relieve the stress on individuals, but will also lessen the burden on 
government agencies as well as the healthcare system during recessions. Funding UBI 
can be done through the current tax base (and government borrowing if necessary), but 
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it is also recommended that inherited wealth and capital gains be taxed. In addition to 
UBI, financial literacy programmes is another way to help household’s prepare for 
financial shocks. These can provide households with tips to help manage their financial 
resources and prepare for economic shocks. 
For those who have experienced mental distress resulting from economic 
insecurity, publicly available wellbeing support programmes are recommended. 
Wellbeing support programmes can be invaluable in helping households cope with 
diminished mental wellbeing that results from insecurity, especially in cases where 
individuals are unable to find support through their network of family and friends. Public 
campaigns that aim to normalise the face of mental health imbalances could also prove 
helpful in breaking the stigma and discrimination that surrounds mental health problems 
in New Zealand.  
In Chapter 5, the focus shifts to income inequality. OLS regressions are used in this 
chapter to explore the deep determinants of income inequality. It is assumed that reverse 
causality is not a problem in this analysis since the variables under study are deeply 
rooted in history. Further, this study employs a comprehensive set of explanatory 
variables and controls to account for possible omitted-variables bias. I find that some of 
the deep determinants of comparative development are important in explaining income 
inequality. Based on the findings of this study, the deep determinants of income 
inequality are distance from the technological frontier, birthplace diversity, whether a 
country is landlocked or not and the timing of the Neolithic revolution. It is also observed 
that the deep determinants of inequality differ based on a country’s level of development.  
This study in Chapter 5 illuminated the importance of having access to technology, 
especially in developing countries. ICT is such an important part of how people 
communicate and work in modern times, and is necessary to reap the benefits of 
globalisation. Improved communication, falling costs of production and efficiency in 
transportation are just some of the ways that developing countries can use technology to 
foster inclusive economic growth and reduce inequality. Governments in these nations 
have the important task of not only providing technology to their residents, but also  
ensuring that access reaches the most vulnerable residents. That way, the benefits of 
technology can be shared by all. 
The results also suggest that the diversity of immigrants is associated with greater 
income inequality. Inclusive policies to ensure that no citizen is marginalised based on a 
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set of observable characteristics is recommended. This supports social and economic 
integration that drives the sharing of knowledge and skills. The more often diverse 
groups come into meaningful contact with each other, the more altruistic behaviours are 
formed, which could drive social and economic cohesion. This inclusivity should also 
extend to heads of governments, especially in landlocked nations. Developing and 
maintaining good economic, political and social ties with neighbouring countries can lead 
to greater cooperation in trade activities and cross-border movement, which can help 
provide opportunities for the residents of landlocked countries. 
Another key observation is that good institutions are needed to support strategies 
that support inclusive growth. Ensuring that citizens are protected in legal transactions, 
the principles of the rule of law are upheld and that there is transparency in government 
operations (to avoid corruption) are some of the ways to help achieve stable, high quality 
institutions. 
6.1.2. Link to Current Global Issues 
The studies in this thesis are important contributions to the wellbeing debate in 
New Zealand and across the globe. They provide a foundation for policy discussion and 
future research. Considering the current social, political, economic and cultural realities 
that the world is facing, ways of improving human wellbeing are needed now more than 
ever. The actions recommended in each chapter could prove useful in this regard.  
The effects of the current COVID-19 pandemic in New Zealand could particularly 
benefit from the research presented in Chapters 2 to 4. Including the ESI in policy 
decisions can help the government target the most vulnerable groups in society that are 
likely to be most adversely affected by the pandemic. Having social policies in place that 
ensure each New Zealand resident is comfortable even in the event of negative shocks 
can prevent excess worry and lessen mental problems in crisis times. 
Similarly, the current tension in several countries around the world surrounding 
the marginalisation of certain groups based on concepts like ethnicity, religion, 
nationalism, sexual orientation and gender identity could benefit from some of the 
insights provided in Chapter 5. The most notable at this time are the protests and 
demonstrations in the United States surrounding systemic racial inequities. Arguably, 
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these mounting tensions could also partly be linked to rampant fear related to the COVID-
19 pandemic being manifested as discrimination. My policy recommendations for more 
inclusiveness of diverse groups could be helpful in this regard. Moreover, promoting 
institutions that support sustainable development for all population subgroups could 
diminish such tensions in future generations. Institutional change is not something that 
is quick and easy to bring about, but incremental steps in a positive direction need to be 
at the forefront of policy agenda. The more people are exposed to, and more importantly, 
integrate with groups that are different from themselves, the more understanding can 
blossom. I stress integration here because superficial encounters are unlikely to change 
prejudices. Only when different groups are encouraged to not only work together, but 
also share in other aspects of each other’s lives, in a system that supports inclusion, can 
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